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[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UPA-90-038 of 2 July 1990, sourceline for the article: "CPSU De-Ideologization Viewed As Answer to Perestroika Crisis" on page 1 should read: Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA]

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Attempted Hijacking on Minsk Flight Detailed
90UN2340A Moscow TRUD In Russian 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by A. Trushin: "There Was a Strong Urge to Exchange the Kolkhoz for Brussels"]

[Text] On 7 July at 1720 aboard an An-24 aircraft on a Minsk-Vitebsk route an unknown person demanded through the stewardess that the crew fly to Brussels.

The threat was the usual one: I will, he says, blow up the plane with all of its 46 passengers, but the explosive is in the baggage. The crew contacted the ground and learned that the airport inspection was conducted carefully and that no suspicious objects were found. The aircraft commander decided not to pay attention to the threat of the "hijacker," and he landed the aircraft on schedule at the airport in Vitebsk. The transport militia were already waiting for him there.

The amateur of air travel to Belgium turned out to be L. Shavrovskiy, 30 years of age, who works on contract at one of the kolkhozes [collective farm] in Brest Oblast. No explosive substances were found in either his hand luggage or in his baggage. An investigation is being conducted.

As we were informed in the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MVD, together with the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the KGB worked up a draft of a USSR civil aviation state program. It will be applied in relation to civilian aircraft carrying out passenger and air cargo trips both on the territory of our country and outside its borders. A special security service will be organized whose employees, who will be correctly trained, will begin to escort air trips.

Leningrad Theses for Russian CP Issued

90UN2203A Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 9 Jun 90 p 3

[Leningrad Initiative Committee theses for preconference discussion: "The Fate of Russia and the Tasks of the Russian Communist Party"]

[Text] The second stage of the Initiative Congress of a Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU begins today in the Political Education Center. For two days its participants will study and adopt proposals for the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and party rules, sum up the republic communists' discussion of the theses "The Fate of Russia and the Tasks of the Russian Communist Party" and "Program of a Revival of the Russian Communist Party," and will decide organizational matters.

In accordance with a decision of the joint conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization, our newspaper has already familiarized readers with a number of resolutions and documents of the Initiating Congress, the first stage of which was held, as is known, in Leningrad on 21-22 April. Today we publish in a slightly abridged version the theses of the Leningrad Initiative Committee for Preparation of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU "The Fate of Russia and the Tasks of the Russian Communist Party."

It is believed that familiarization with these documents will enable both the supporters and opponents of the creation of a Russian Communist Party to judge more objectively the position of the sponsors of a revival of the Russian Communist Party.

I. Unity and Struggle of Forces and Trends in the Modern World

A process of socialization predetermining the objective need for realization of the communist idea and consequently propitious prospects for the preservation of the sacred and priceless gift of life on earth, worthy and equal conditions of development for all members of society, true freedom of the individual... is continuously underway in the world.

The forces of socialism representing the progressive trend have sustained colossal losses in upholding the idea of independence, freedom, and justice in the struggle against the forces of reaction, external and internal. Each Soviet family has suffered loss. The brunt of the burden of lifting the state from the ruins and ensuring peace was borne by the peoples of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. The weakening of the progressive forces caused by objective factors has been intensified by incorrect policy in the solution of the contradictions of socialism.

II. Essence of the Economic and Political Crisis

A Russian Communist Party within the CPSU would begin to operate under conditions of the acute economic

and political crisis which goes under the sign of perestroika. The peoples of Russia are living in poverty.

The crisis is intensifying primarily because the immediate producers of material benefits are not interested in an increase in productivity inasmuch as their situation would not improve here; that is, public ownership would not be realized.

The results of an increase in productivity—additional material benefits and free time—are, instead of serving as the conditions of the harmonious and free development of all members of society, increasingly being usurped by a part of it. The poor are becoming poorer, the rich, richer. Petty bourgeois and bourgeois aspirations to enrichment and to live at others' expense are increasing.

The logical extension and expression of these aspirations was the orientation of the economy toward the chaos of the market, which matured in the period of "developed socialism," is being extolled by its creators, who have now changed their coats and become the superintendents of perestroika, and is opposed to the world trend toward socialization. In our reality it is leading to the instantaneous strangling of the "free" tradesman and the headlong destruction of society's productive forces, primarily the leading productive force—the worker and working person. The worn-out equipment, backward technology, wretched organization of production, incompetent management, people's deaths, industrial injuries, deteriorating work conditions, and the impossibility of creative self-expression are being manifested in drunkenness, a fall in discipline, the breakup of the family, and degradation of the personality. "Troglodytic" capitalism leading to the plunder of the country by transnational monopolies enriching themselves at the expense of the impoverishment and weakening of Russia is emerging.

To fashionable slogans of pluralism and democratization the working people are increasingly being pushed away from power. Their place in the soviets and other power structures is being taken by the direct or indirect representatives of our "own" Soviet and the world bourgeoisie, changing in its favor the class nature of the state proclaimed in the constitution of the "times of stagnation" as all-people. The abandonment in the 1936 constitution of the Leninist principle of elections via the work force and further modifications of the system of territorial elections, characteristic of bourgeois parliamentarianism, up to and including the introduction of elections from public organizations, have turned the soviets into a plaything in the hands of political intriguers. Manipulating the USSR Basic Law under the sign of a state based on the rule of law, they have brought the soviets to the point of their negation by the introduction of the institution of the presidency making the fate of the peoples of a vast country dependent on the personal attributes of one man.

The party, which declared itself nearly 30 years ago to be all-people, has also begun to change its class nature,

gradually changing from being the vanguard of the working class and all working people into a conglomerate of the most diverse, including opposite, political forces which is incapable of active conscious and aggressive struggle for the people's interests. Those who with great pretension call themselves the Center have become so divorced from the people that they have even appropriated the deputies' mandates without the former's consent and have begun and are playing an impetuous game of give-away, primarily at the expense of Russia, with the high-handed foreign bourgeois and nationalist extremists. A mood of desertion (apostasy) and defeatism [words illegible].

At a time when integration processes are being speeded up throughout the world, the central authorities are conniving at petty bourgeois and bourgeois nationalists splitting the Soviet Union. The crisis in the CPSU has not only weakened the positions of the first socialist country but has led to a slump in the world communist movement and brought about the disintegration of the world socialist system. The economic and political conditions of revanchism are taking shape under the cover of social democratism, which permitted the unleashing of World Wars I and II. The threat to peace and the country's security is growing....

III. Awakening and Mustering of the Creative Forces

Experiencing the loss of the real gains of socialism—the deterioration in work conditions, price increases, the disappearance of the most essential consumer items, the growing instability, and the threat of unemployment and social lack of protection—having for the first time since the invasion of German fascism encountered the problem of half a million refugees and overtaxing their forces to the whooping and shrieking of the masses which are departing for permanent residence abroad and which have availed themselves of their labor, the peoples of Russia, spat upon from Prince Svyatoslav up to V.I. Lenin, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and deprived in day-to-day life not only of clean rivers, lakes, forests, and springs but also songs, dances, and religious beliefs and frequently language also, are unwilling to put up with it any longer, nor will they.

Cast aside by the Center, this passive witness to the disintegration of the USSR attempting at Russia's expense to stop up the holes which are forming in the economy and policy and no longer entertaining the hope that their labor and struggle will be properly organized by the leadership of the party and the state, the working people of Russia have stopped waiting for sets of instructions and directives and the fruits of perestroika promised five years ago and are rising to the defense of their interests. A wave of strikes rolled over the country in the summer of 1989. An example of the establishment of just worker power capable of deciding competently and in the interests of all strata of the population the questions which no one before it was able or wanted to solve was set in the miners' areas.

Ordinary parents and their children—the heirs to the Glory and Pride of Russia—and the maturing of self-awareness, self-development, the work of the public spirit for upturn and revival, and the awakening and mustering of the people's forces were assisted and are being assisted by real zealots and patriots of Russia from the ranks of the intelligentsia: teachers, writers and poets, composers and artists, scholars and commentators, and party officials and enterprise managers and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy. They are performing this devoted mission of theirs by overcoming the ill will of the proprietors of television, which is becoming commercial, and newspapers and journals oriented under the sign of pluralism toward a monopolistically preset viewpoint and current restructuring dogmatism.

...The joint efforts of the workers, peasants, and truly popular intelligentsia:

brought to an end the war in Afghanistan;

foiled the attempt to lower at a stroke the living standard of millions thanks to an increase in the price of food;

halted implementation of the criminal policy of the destruction of "unpromising" villages;

organized the movement against anti-worker laws in respect of a freezing of wages at state enterprises and in support of the closing of profiteering trading and purchasing cooperatives;

as a counterweight to the deception of the masses with unrestrained propaganda of the utopian pseudo-ideal of pre-monopoly capitalism, elaborated a realistic version, in keeping with the working people's interests, of truly radical economic reform;

created public, social and political, and patriotic organizations in defense of the interests of the working man, Russia, the Soviet Union, and socialism and assisted the awakening of the class self-awareness of the workers and an understanding of the revolutionizing role of the intelligentsia;

founded the All-Russia Academy of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture and are organizing the Russian Academy of Sciences;

are forming Russian trade unions and a Communist Youth League and initiated the public movement for the revival of the Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU....

IV. Main Political Task—Overcoming the Crisis in the Economy and Ensuring its Socialist Development

A prerequisite of the extrication of the economy from crisis and a guarantee of its stable development is the surmounting of the alienation of the worker and working person from S&T progress and the restoration and reinforcement of the involvement of the immediate producer of material, intellectual, and spiritual values in

a constant growth of productivity and the quality of labor. It is necessary that with its growth there unfailingly be an improvement in his life as a personality, as a member of the family and the collective, as the inhabitant of the locality where his enterprise is situated, and as a skilled and caring son of the fatherland in a great state.

In order to set a limit to the plunder of the peoples of Russia and restore the working man's true freedom and interest in an increase in productivity, it is essential to immediately:

freeze the contracts with foreign states which are enslaving, ruinous, and high-handed and seek the equivalence of the relations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] with the other union republics. Implementing Lenin's idea of a monopoly of foreign trade, to put a stop to the selling off of strategic raw material, the latest arms, and basic necessities;

exchange banknotes in an unlimited amount upon the presentation as of R10,000 upward of a statement of income, cancel interest on deposits in excess of R10,000, eliminate high interest on domestic loans and transfer to the Children's Fund anonymous deposits payable to the bearer, and establish a progressive inheritance tax on amounts of R20,000 and more, canceling inheritance tax on lesser amounts. These measures would disrupt the turnover of the shadow economy and the process of enrichment of social parasites;

give the cooperatives and state enterprises equal conditions of management in terms of prices of raw material, proportion of deductions from earned income, and prices of identical products in order to preclude unearned income on the part of some people killing off the desire to work in the rest;

to curtail the lowering of job rates and an increase in output quotas without anticipatory changes in the provision of labor with equipment and to exclude a lowering of wage categories;

to institute state proceedings against violators of sanitary and ecological standards;

to introduce incentives for an increase in productivity not only with an increase in earnings and the granting of a large number of cultural and aesthetic benefits but also with a reduction in work time, which, at the workers' discretion, may be used for extended leave and a reduction in the work day and participation in management or for the manufacture of products, given double pay for work in the time saved;

to switch to forms of management which enable the work force to engage a management with payment for its services depending on the pay of the collective.

The enumerated measures are realistic and require of party figures and statesmen for their implementation merely conscientious service of their people.

In order to ensure the consistent and stable upturn of the national economy and make the economy receptive to the achievements of S&T progress, and the working person, the owner of its fruits, it is essential to implement the following cardinal permanent measures:

to change the orientation of the financial autonomy of the enterprises in the opposite direction. To materially encourage the people at enterprises manufacturing consumer goods depending on the overall amount of reduction in the prices of the manufactured product, and the enterprises manufacturing consumer goods, depending on economies in labor obtained thanks to the use of the manufactured equipment....

to concentrate some resources in state funds for the assimilation of high-quality products satisfying the new requirements, by way of which to finance initiative pertaining to the organization of the flow production of these products;

to create conditions for the preservation and development of the country's intellectual potential countering the "brain drain";

by the efforts of research, planning, design, and production collectives coordinated by a common state modernization plan and on the basis of general ecological certification to refit enterprises with equipment saving more labor than has been expended on its production with a seven- to nine-year replacement cycle instead of shifting onto the enterprises alone the accomplishment of all-state economic tasks;

to distinguish in the structure of the economy, science, technology, and education a strategic echelon of centralized S&T progress and the accomplishment of large-scale social tasks built and managed per the model of a major capitalist monopoly....

to undertake the public elaboration and plan-oriented realization of a program of the socioeconomic development of the republic and the country as a whole coordinating diverse enterprise and varied-level and varied-functional interests, putting under the working people's supervision determination of the future of present and future generations. The main thing in this program should be children's upbringing, the people's education and self-education, and use of the time released as a result of S&T progress for extending the working people's participation in management;

to undertake the consistent level-by-level sovietization of the economy, proceeding from the priority nature of the social tasks being tackled. The uniform rate of deductions from earned income for the state budget to be determined by the working people through their responsible representatives. The sovereignty of the soviets is incompatible with their loss of economic power and the distribution or sell-off of public property together with the collectives realizing it through "public" actions into the dirty hands of home-grown Soviet bourgeois who are cleaning out the people, who have been legalized, and

who are thirsting for absolute power. The work force should be the principal source and not only the co-holder but also holder of Soviet power. Through the deputies, communist managers, and the primary party organizations the Russian Communist Party will implement economic policy in the interests of the working people.

In order for the working people, as the premier productive force of mankind, to become enriched professionally, creatively, and spiritually and not become worn out and degraded in the process of collective labor, the following are essential:

introduction of techniques of safe, noninjurious labor, the exclusion primarily of the labor of women under conditions dangerous to their health, including on the night shift, a normal work rate, a reduction in heavy and monotonous work, enrichment of the content of labor, transition to increasingly skilled work, and the surmounting of the retention of the working man in non-creative types of activity, which enslaves him;

prevention of the cancellation of days off, a reduction in the amount of overtime permissible by law, a reduction in work time (a shortening of the work day or work week, an increase in the amount of leave), a plan-oriented increase in free time as time for free development in line with a growth of productivity in the country and the exclusion on this basis of the plague of unemployment, poverty, and destitution....

V. Toward Russia's Revival

To repay the debt to the countryside. To solve the housing problem. To provide the life of the large peasant family with amenities. To build roads. To bring the achievements of civilization to the village community. To provide the rural intelligentsia with all it needs to accomplish its selfless mission. To arm the peasants with equipment and technology on the basis of the highest achievements of science no worse than in the foremost capitalist countries. To increase the fertility of the soil, taking the land register as the basis. To protect the peasantry by the power of the state against direct or indirect attempts to cause a deterioration in its life. Until the complete supply of gas to the Russian countryside to suspend the current supplies of gas by pipelines passing beyond the USSR over RSFSR territory.

To call science to the service of Russia's revival. The Russian Academy of Sciences will be composed of people of science—academy, sectoral, or higher educational institution—united in live, specific work on assembling ideas in the "Revival of Russia" program which should channel the forces and resources of a vast country, of unique risk in terms of its natural-geographical and historical conditions, into a creation worthy of its peoples so that all that is done in Russia by the state is profoundly considered from the standpoints not of a favorite but a good and thrifty proprietor.

The attainment of the heights in creative building is impossible without the assembling, inheritance, and

comprehension of the riches of culture. While preserving the traditional openness to and thirst for all that is great and which elevates man and for world classics, to preserve the distinctiveness and singing creative soul of the national culture of the peoples of Russia. To revive in the system of education the study of Greek and Latin and the Slavic languages and help culture rid itself of elitism, and the masses, of ignorance implanted by stupefying mass culture compounded of commercial interest. To make libraries rich and accessible to everyone. To foster a feeling for what is beautiful and not only a constant need for intercourse therewith but also a capacity for creating it oneself.

To guarantee the youth work, education, creativity, prospects of a meaningful life, and opportunities for displaying the potential of the personality for the good of the fatherland.

...The way to the solution of problems of interethnic relations lies through joint development which contributes to the surmounting of socioeconomic equality, which is the goal of the Communist Party distinguishing it from other parties. The Russian Communist Party demands of its members in the event of an interethnic conflict arising that they display forbearance, tractability, and magnanimity in respect of the party considering itself aggrieved. It displays concern for observance of the legitimate rights of the representatives of all nationalities, including compatriots living outside of Russia....

Political power of the working people ensuring their protection and a steady rise in the people's living standard may be guaranteed only given the leading role of the working class and its party all the way to the complete surmounting of class differences. The party should not stand above its class but, as its conscious vanguard, help it in alliance with the peasantry and intelligentsia exercise power in the interests of the whole people. The Russian Communist Party sets as its task organization of the working people through the trade unions and other public organizations, through its deputies in the soviets, and through the formation of committees of working people's deputies at enterprises for the creation of new soviets, the source and holder of whose power is the work force with the right of recall....

...It is impossible being the master of one's fate by jettisoning a great achievement of the social thought of mankind—Marxism-Leninism—instead of developing and propagandizing it with regard for the changes occurring in the world. Introducing to the consciousness and struggle of the working people a clear understanding of whether we are at a standstill and whether we are moving forward or making a move backward along the highway of the development of world civilization, an understanding of what needs to be done to move forward rapidly and steadily, is a most important ideological task of the Russian Communist Party.

A key task of the Russian Communist Party is assembling around a solution of the problem of Russia's revival, the enrichment of each Russian family together with a growth of the wealth of society, a reduction in social inequality and use for the common good of the highest achievements of human civilization of intellectuals and people of cerebral labor embodying humanitarian, natural and technical, engineering, organizational and managerial, and political culture and military art, and strengthening the alliance of people of mental and physical labor.

VI. Intra-Party Tasks

Not only states but political parties also are not all-people. The Russian Communist Party absorbs into its ranks representatives of all strata and classes, learning, expressing, and defending by the means available to them the foremost interests of the working class standing, together with the peasants, last in the social line.

The task of the party intelligentsia, as the generator of ideas and exponent of the creative spirit, is on the basis of the development of the dialectical-materialist ideology of the working class—Marxism-Leninism—to elaborate the party's strategy and tactics and participate in their realization. At the same time, however, only in a period of conversational priorities might it appear to some people that what is true in intra-party relations is an authentic word, dialogue, and debate, not action. Lest the party suffer the disease of the detachment of word from deed, workers and collective farm members in the directive party bodies, in the shop bureaus and committees of industrial enterprises primarily, should constitute a decisive majority, and the social composition of the party as a whole, reflect the social composition of society in its dynamics.

The party cannot be independent of the opposite trends which exist in society. In theoretical form this is manifested in the struggle for the development of Marxism and against revisionism, which is a current opposite to Marxism within itself, and in practical form, in the struggle for the fundamental interests of the party and the people and against opportunism sacrificing the movement's fundamental interests to that which is secondary and transient. Unless the Russian Communist Party fights against revisionism and opportunism in its ranks, inevitable disintegration and perdition await it. Both the theoretical oblivion of the ultimate communist goal and the imitation in practice of movement toward it instead of an improvement in the life of the people are equally dangerous for the party today.

...The registering of all party leaders and officials of the party apparatus with shop party organizations of industrial enterprises and direct and constant participation in their life will help the party organizations guard themselves against exaltation, petty bourgeois hysterics, and visiting and local orators, and leaders, to avoid detachment from their party comrades.

The introduction of a party maximum is essential lest good-looking profit-seekers and dishonest mafiosi worm their way into the place of party leaders. The establishment thereof as a multiple of the per capita average income would bring the communists as fighters for social equality not only closer to one another but to the people also....

The entire activity of the Russian Communist Party is built not in expectation of manna from heaven in the form of directives from above but on independence and initiative supported, developed, and directed on a scientific basis by leaders elected by the communists themselves. The party leaders should express and exercise the collectively formulated will of the whole party, subordinating themselves to the decisions of the majority. Decisions affecting the interests of the whole party should take effect following confirmation by party-wide ballot in the primary party organizations constituting the basis of the party.

Inasmuch as the process of formulation of the collective will is a contradictory process which is not insured against mistakes, consideration of the opinion and protection of the rights of the minority disagreeing with the decision of the majority with the obligatory return after a certain length of time to an examination and evaluation of the adopted decision on the basis of an analysis of its practical realization are essential. Not suppression of the minority by the majority but constructive consideration of any constructive opinion.

The Russian Communist Party advocates collegiality. Collegiality of leadership by no means signifies that party leaders may take cover behind it from responsibility, as if behind a screen. A leader influencing the fate of large masses of people is great if he has understood and expresses that which is progressive in historical development and if he is prepared to bear the responsibility for the result. And he is worthless and harmful if his words are at variance with his deeds and if he does not shun deception of the people and summons them to an unknown or undeclared goal. The Russian Communist Party will support the first and struggle against the second in every possible way.

Remembering that the party is a combination of scientific socialism and the workers movement and the creation and struggle of the working people, the communists, thanks to the creative atmosphere of the assimilation and development of Marxism-Leninism created in the party, should grow constantly as the exponents and proponents of what the people recognize.

A member of the Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU performs the duties of a member of the CPSU and is specially responsible for the fate of Russia and all its peoples. This responsibility will grow in the event of a weakening of the Center and the unity of the USSR or the Center's disregard for its obligations in respect of Russia.

VII. The Russian Communist Party and its Allies

Policy is a movement of large masses of people and a struggle for power in the state, which is conducted by classes headed by their political parties. The policy of the Russian Communist Party is to ensure the closest unity of the working people, including believers, in common struggle for freedom from exploitation, for justice, progress, and concord and for Russia's revival. The Russian Communist Party constructs its attitude toward other parties, organizations, and movements depending on their contribution to this process, basing its conviction of success on knowledge of the objective laws of social development and firm belief in the deep-lying powers of the peoples of Russia.

The Russian Communist Party calls for friends—zealots of the land of their fathers—to stand up and be counted and embark all together on its revival with the protective shield of our dependable warriors.

For Russia's revival!

[Signed] The Leningrad Initiative Committee for Preparation of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU

Civil Defense Lends Dosimeters to Public

90UN2224A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by BELTA correspondent A. Taranda: "A Dosimeter For Rent"]

[Text] Mozyr—the employees of the city civil defense headquarters came to the aid of the radiological service of the Hydrometeorology Administration and of the experts of the Mozyr sanitation and epidemiology station. They organized a mobile consultation station, and thus their initiative helped to cope with the shortage of radiation counters and lack of information. The station has data on the radiation situation in the city and the oblast; its personnel teach people how to use the dosimeters and how to measure the local gamma background.

The mobile service will, however, require a lot of time to satisfy all the numerous requests of organizations and individuals to conduct radiation control. For that reason they have adopted a simpler version of control also. Any person can conduct his own check of his house, apartment, recreation area, or groceries. For that the person may borrow a radiation counter at the civil defense headquarters. To borrow the counter one just has to show his passport.

Party Response to Chernobyl Cleanup Noted

90UN2224B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 1

[Letter to the editor and comment by Party Life and People's Control Department: "Are We Looking In the Right Place?"]

[Text] Lately the republic press has started to inform us in considerably more detail about the situation in the contaminated areas and about the work done at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station on the disaster cleanup there. We have information on the involvement of public organizations in our problems; these are "The Children of Chernobyl" coordination center, the republic branch of the Soviet Children's Foundation imeni V.I. Lenin, and the Soviet Peace Foundation.

In other words, many people want to help and they do help by giving money at least. But at the end of February I saw an article in SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA under the title: "On the Party Budget for 1989." I am a Communist Party member and I could not fail to be interested in this material.

I discovered some figures there which amazed me greatly. The party committees spent 7.9 million rubles [R] alone for the upkeep of official automobiles! Can we afford such luxuries at a time when we are addressing the United Nations to ask the world community to help us?

[Signed] D. Pavlov, CPSU member, Great Patriotic War participant, retired.

Comment by the Party Life and People's Control Department

We have received a considerable number of such letters lately. Often they are overly emotional; the people that write them do not try to figure anything out, they just want heads chopped off left and right, they denounce the "damn bureaucrats," those short-sighted, spoiled, top bosses; their particular indignation is aroused by the "apparatchiks."

But when you start scrutinizing all of this you discover that very often there is nothing behind the emotions. And sometimes things are just turned upside down and confused so that the person who wrote the letter cannot understand them either. This Dmitriy Vasilyevich is not quite accurate either. The 7.9 million from the party budget, which is a considerable sum of course, were not spent only on the automobiles' upkeep; they also covered "administrative expenses including maintenance of the premises and computers and supplies purchases." The information mentioned by D. Pavlov also contains a passage that is directly connected with the Chernobyl disaster:

"With the view to expedite the development of the social sphere and to facilitate residential construction for Chernobyl disaster victims it was decided not to build the planned annexes to the premises of the Rechitsa and Slonim City Party Committees or annexes to the buildings of the Smolevichskiy, Krupskiy, Kopylskiy, Mstislavskiy, Stolbtsovskiy, and Lioznenskiy Rayon Party Committees."

It might be appropriate to remember now that last year the CPSU Central Committee gave R50 million on behalf of the entire party to help clear the aftermath of

the earthquake in Armenia. We can mention another problem here: Orphaned children who are leaving orphanages today have no money to start their adult life with and they need help too. We have a lot of holes to patch: the disabled who have a hard and bitter life, especially if they live outside the cities; the retired who receive beggarly pensions; people who have large families; etc.

Whichever way we try to divide the party budget in our republic, it will not be sufficient for all the orphans and the unfortunate. But then it is by its nature not a charity fund. It was formed for other purposes which is true not only for the CPSU. All parties of all times have used membership fees or donations for the needs of the party itself—you can read about this in more detail in the 18 March issue of PRAVDA. That is what the money is collected for.

But still....

One cannot read those letters and not feel a heartache. We understand the people who wrote them, we are together with them in our hearts. We are with those who have to leave their homes and start looking for better life in a strange place, who have to get used to new ways when an apple tree, a meadow, or a lake may seem an involuntary enemy. For that reason we would like to talk to communists today. Are we looking in the wrong place? There are many important actions ahead of us and the party will definitely need the money: to pay their employees—definitely fewer of them—to print their publications, to train their personnel, etc.

But then all of us—every communist and party group or primary organization—can do something concrete to give some real help to those who suffered in the Chernobyl disaster. That is what we have the greatest shortage of now—concrete actions!

What can we do, for example?

If you live in a clean area you can invite a mother with small children from "over there" to come and spend the summer with you. Or we can form a communist construction brigade of people who are on leave and let them all work without pay building houses for resettlement in Dribinskiy Rayon, which is now being developed. Or we can organize in our institution and make all the necessary provisions to set up a labor and recreation camp for high school students from the "zone." There is no end to what else a collective mind can propose.

Unusual? Yes, but it is possible.

It is of course much easier to donate rubles, tens and hundreds of them, than to help in this way. But who can judge which kind of help is needed more. Why try to guess; both of them must be "needed more."

People's Front Founder on Belorussian Political Climate

90UN1921A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 4 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Vasil Bykov, Belorussian People's Front Founder; 4 May, in Riga, by correspondent Sergey Shapran: "Today's Crisis of Total Ideologization"]

[Text] [Shapran] Vasil Vladimirovich, once you said that the present Belorussian leadership is one of the most unpopular in that republic in all the years of its State system.

[Bykov] So it is. Representatives of various strata of the population are talking about it. But our leadership thinks that its reputation among the people is very high. And it found confirmation of this partly in the election results.

[Shapran] But the party apparatus made a "step to the side:" some of its representatives, not wanting to risk being put to the vote in the capital, went to the countryside.

[Bykov] This devised method, as far as our law about elections, accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the past convocation, is far from the democratic law and rule of law: in it was left several existing loopholes in order to conduct elections in such a way that it is advantageous to their organizers. In particular, this conducting of elections in the "backwoods," where democratic sentiments are almost at the embryo stage, and where controlling of election results on the part of the democratic community and means of mass information is difficult, and at times impossible. There the elected commissions are completely free in their actions. And those candidates who do not have a chance of being elected in the capital and major cities are using this.

[Shapran] The Chairman of the Belorussian People's Front (BNF) Soyma [Soviet], Zenon Posnyak, observed that in the case that the Belorussian leadership does not listen to the public's opinion, actions of citizens' disobedience will follow.

[Bykov] Everything will depend on the public's—the Belorussian people's—positions and actions. But, as experience shows, democratic activity of the broad masses is not enough today.

[Shapran] You, being a member of "Committee-58," became one of the organizers of the Belorussian People's Front. What do you make of the BNF's activities today?

[Bykov] Like any activity where there are many complications, difficulties and shortcomings. But I think the goals of the People's Front serve the people's interests.

[Shapran] You yourself are one of the organizers of "Belorus Martyralog." What is being done with this organization at present?

[Bykov] It promotes rehabilitation of those who have been illegally subject to repression. Last year, for

example, by the initiative of "Martyralog" nearly 50 Belorussian figures of literature and art were rehabilitated. "Belorus Martyralog," besides this, also gives help to repressed citizens, and conducts propaganda work. But the fact is that its activity is limited, since the organization still is not acknowledged by powers, and therefore is not a person in the eyes of the law, does not have a bank account, etc.

[Shapran] The BNF, existing since October 1988, still is not acknowledged as "de jure." Perhaps glasnost is almost the sole achievement of our perestroika.

[Bykov] Yes, perhaps it is.

[Shapran] However, if the Baltic press partly succeeded in tearing itself out from under party dictates, then matters with the Belorussian press would become much worse.

[Bykov] In our republic perestroika processes were taking place in completely different conditions than in the Baltic states. This is explained, first of all, by the level of political consciousness not only in the democratic community, but also in the party itself. We have—I agree with Zenon Posnyak's estimation—the Belorussian communist party, which is the most conservative and most reactionary in the Soviet Union. It not only does not promote, but in every way prevents the development of perestroika in Belorussia.

[Shapran] Today, apparently, talking about which structure we need is not only a vain waste of time, but also a rash (or possibly, well thought-out) concentration of attention on a second-rate question. The main thing is forward movement.

[Bykov] Of course! The whole point is that the total ideologization of our life has brought us to today's crisis. In order to live properly, one must build a life first of all on an economic basis and it is not at all obligatory to call Marxism the basis of our life, especially as it is blindly following the principles of a century of antiquity.

[Shapran] One famous poet said that it is possible that all our misfortunes arise from the fact that in Russia people trust very much the word (I should add—the printed word), but the Bolsheviks were not accustomed to answering for their words.

[Bykov] Yes, of course. We had very many words. And besides, beautiful words! But since the first days of Soviet power, words have been completely divorced from actions.

[Shapran] And one of the Christian canons was violated: the happiness of the majority was sacrificed to the happiness and life of a few.

[Bykov] Christian morals are good in general. But in life something must often be sacrificed. Usually the minority is in the role of the sacrifice. Of course, democratic societies strive to take into consideration the interests of all. True, we can only dream about such a society.

Especially as our history keeps examples when the majority is sacrificed. Most offensive of all, is that this is done in the name of illusory and even frankly extravagant ideas, as this had a place in the Stalin era.

[Shapran] "The whole world is not worth a child's little tears?"

[Bykov] These nevertheless are completely different things. I think that Dostoyevsky exaggerated: first of all, one cannot build a man's happiness only on account of "little tears," but also on account of the lives of thousands of infants. Another thing—the moral side of the question. Morals—sooner understanding from the sphere of the necessary, but not always faraway from the sphere of the possible.

[Shapran] And not by accident, therefore, our society today turns its face toward religion...

[Bykov] Religion—it is a colossal appearance in our civilization. For 2000 years various things have been in it—blood, and crime, but the moral foundations were worked out, which still remain immovable. Under the conditions of bankruptcy of other ideas, Christian ideas remain vital. A return then to the principles of Christianity should be supported in every way possible.

[Shapran] Vasil Vladimirovich, excuse me, are you a believer?

[Bykov] In the church sense, I suppose not. But I tolerate the existence of God in the souls of believers. Maybe he has settled in my soul as well.

[Shapran] What do you make of the events in Lithuania?

[Bykov] I think that what is happening in Lithuania is the realization of the political aspirations of many peoples, making up the USSR. But not all peoples matured before politics which the Lithuanians are pursuing. Evidently, similar things should be done in this most favorable historic moment. Not everything right now favors the Lithuanian people. We see how circumstances revolve around this, it would seem, indisputable idea.

[Shapran] Lately the opinion is all the more often heard that Mikhail Gorbachev "sits on two chairs."

[Bykov] One must do him justice: as a political leader he possesses a very versatile intellect. Partly this is bad: some part of our society would like a great adherence to democratic principles and more radicalism. But at the same time one should not forget about the politics of the possible: maybe he himself would like much more, but he has to take into account hundreds of various factors, and probably, he chooses—of all the variants—not the most deserving, but the most possible.

[Shapran] At times he is accused of an absence of courage...

[Bykov] So it goes. But, you understand, with such a composition of the deputies' body, that what he does,

maybe appears the most radical. Especially as Gorbachev has to consider the deputies' opinion and the party's opinion. And when are heard lately all the more often undisguised attacks on the Politburo and on Gorbachev personally, he cannot help taking this into account and reacting in a corresponding fashion.

[Shapran] Vasil Vladimirovich, you were saying that you do not especially like to occupy yourself with public activities.

[Bykov] Of course I do not like to... But one has to occupy oneself, although I am a man of a contemplative intellect, with which usually I should be a writer. But the whole thing is that our Writers' Union for many years was brought up in such a way that now, when the maximum participation of intellectuals is needed in perestroika processes, the Writers' Union as a whole withdraws from perestroika. Therefore that load, which is essential for the whole writers' community to carry, in Belorussia falls on the shoulders of a few writers.

[Shapran] But you don't feel like withdrawing too, and occupying yourself only with creative work?

[Bykov] I'd like that very much!

[Shapran] What's keeping you from it?

[Bykov] Life...

[Shapran] Vasil Vladimirov, in conclusion: what hopes do you place on the Baltic states?

[Bykov] I would like to wish the Baltics the quickest self-determination. And my wish is very passionate that this self-determination will take place as smoothly as it can, with the least emotional costs.

[Shapran] Thank you for the discussion.

Rayon Party Organization Disbands Over Chernobyl Issues

90UN1921B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 13 May 90 p 3

[Article by A. Gotovchits, staff correspondent for SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Gomelskiy oblast: "Three Were Left in the Party"]

[Text] Nineteen Party cards were sent to the CPSU Central Committee from the Vetkovskiy Mobile Mechanized Column-93 (PMK). Included in the senders are the secretary of the party organization V. Kukota and member of the Belorussian CP rayon committee (raykom) G. Gerasimov, who are now already former members.

The decision about the self-dissolution of the party organization was accepted in the PMK at a meeting after repeated appeals to the party raykom, obkom, and the Belorussian CP Central Committee in connection with the complex ecological situation in the rayon center after the Chernobyl catastrophe. Communists demanded free

resettlement of members from Vetkovskiy rayon, improvement of nutrition, conditions of labor and wages, and annual restoration of children's and adults' health. These demands were only partially fulfilled, intensifying distrust, and 19 communists out of 22 decided once and for all to sever relations with the party. They transferred dues for March - April (559 rubles) into the "Children of Chernobyl" fund.

"The obkom bureau expelled all 19 from the CPSU ranks," says the second secretary of the Belorussian CP Vetkovskiy raykom R. Klimova. The party meeting's resolution regarding self-dissolution was repealed on the grounds that it was in violation of the Party Charter. Just three—chief engineer V. Simonenkov, retirees E. Kavulkina and P. Malashenko—were left in the party...

Estonia's Toome on Relations With Sweden

90UN1976A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 9 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Indrek Toome, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, by ETA correspondent L. Sher: "Sweden: Support and Caution"]

[Text] At the end of April, the Swedish Free Enterprise Institute organized a conference on the subject "East Europe: From Socialism to a Market Economy." Invited to it as the main speakers were prominent scientists and social figures from England, Hungary, Germany and other countries, including the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, Indrek Toome, who gave a report on the political situation in Estonia and the transition to a market economy. Upon returning from Sweden, I. Toome was interviewed by an ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] correspondent.

[Correspondent] Against the background of the stormy processes occurring in the Eastern European nations, the events in the Baltic probably were in the background for the Swedish business men and politicians?

[Toome] I would not say so. After my report I answered questions for a rather long time. However, the point is that the program of my stay in Sweden was far from being restricted to the limits of the conference. The workday began at 0800 hours in the morning and ended late at night. One can very clearly isolate two lines in the meetings and talks—political and economic.

I described the political situation in the USSR, the Baltic and Estonia to the members of the Swedish Parliament, to leaders from political parties and representatives of the business circles. I had a very interesting meeting with leaders of the Estonian emigration, among whom were also prominent persons such as Andres Kung and Mart Nurk. The interest in our affairs can be seen from the very list of names of the persons I spoke with in Sweden: the Chairman of the Moderate Party, the Deputy of Parliament Carl Bildt, the Chairman of the Liberal Party Bengt Westerberg, the Deputy Minister of Foreign

Affairs Pierre Schori and the Ambassador Staffan Sohlman. There was a substantial discussion in the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. With the secretary of this committee, Thomas Bertelman, there was a discussion of the meeting planned for the end of May and the beginning of June for parliamentarians from Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and this would become a manifestation of support for the struggle of the Baltic peoples for state independence. We clarified the program and the membership of the delegation. Arnold Ruutel was invited to head our delegation.

[Correspondent] Moral and political support, of course, are very important but in the existing economic situation, it seems to me that economic collaboration and economic aid are much more significant. And for now Swedish capital does not seem to be much in a hurry.

[Toome] The second, basic line of my contacts was related precisely to these questions. As is known, the Swedish Parliament has allocated 1 million krone to provide aid to East Europe and the Baltic. The government has been assigned to determine the use of these funds. During a talk at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I proposed that the amount being allocated to Estonia be channeled into financing the training and retraining abroad of our specialists and scientists from the most diverse areas. Of course, with this money it would be possible to buy a certain amount of production equipment, but I am confident that knowledge is the most effective investment for capital, if one bears in mind the transition to a market economy and about which we have only a very hazy notion.

The question of economic collaboration was brought up at meetings with leaders of the Swedish Free Enterprise Association Stig Rindborg and Sture Eskilsson, at the Swedish Free Market Institute, at the Swedish Free Entrepreneurship Fund, the Swedish Savings Bank Association, the Swedish National Organization of Small Entrepreneurs and the Swedish Taxpayers Association. Incidentally, illustration of just how closely our affairs are being monitored in Sweden: it was enough for one of our leading workers to state at a session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet that he considered it advisable to adopt the Swedish taxation system and this was immediately picked up and the Swedish Taxpayers Association expressed certainty of forthcoming close collaboration with an analogous organization in Estonia which, they are confident, will soon be set up—and certainly taxes are very high in Sweden.

[Correspondent] All the same, why is Swedish capital not in a rush to enter Estonia?

[Toome] The situation in the Baltic has caused a dual feeling among business people: on the one hand, there is support for the just cause of gaining state independence and, on the other, caution. Our development for the Swedes, and not only for them, is closely tied to the situation in the entire Soviet Union. They are fearful that our already very radical steps would jeopardize M.S.

Gorbachev and his policy. In government circles they do not conceal their fear for the fate of perestroika.

I spent a good deal of time and energy in explaining that eliminating the historical injustice against Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia not only was not directed against perestroika but rather is an inseparable component part of it and without this it would be difficult to speak about a common European home.

The position of the Swedish business circles is also influenced by our domestic situation, by the absence of unity in Estonia itself and by the uncertainty as to the clarity of our policy of self-determination. The people and the public support us very ardently. Every day in Stockholm and other cities meetings are held, but the government is guided by considerations of global strategy. Not long before my trip to Sweden, as is known, K. Prunskene visited there and there was enormous interest in the visit, but she did not achieve virtually any aid. In order for this to happen, two basic factors are essential: a settlement of relations with Moscow and the creation in our legislation of dependable guarantees for foreign capital.

[Correspondent] One last question: The visit to Sweden was the first in your post as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission. What do you see as the function of this commission in the existing situation?

[Toome] The primary task is the elaboration of a general foreign policy line. This is enormous work which we should be concerned with together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists, the social organizations, including the corresponding commission of the Estonia Committee. The work is all the more difficult as over the last half-century no one has been seriously concerned with foreign policy in Estonia. Clearly, we must create an overall line for the transitional period and for the long run. For this we need close contacts with overseas and a knowledge of the positions and attitude toward us from there.

In turn, in the course of these contacts, we would explain the goals and aspirations of our people and the steps that we are undertaking.

Foreign trips have now ceased to be a rarity. People are already beginning to rumble that people are traveling everywhere but in fact little changes because of these trips. I feel that our commission should assume responsibility for analyzing the effectiveness of those trips which are made with state, that is, the people's money so that both the commission and the governmental bodies have a full view. I would put it this way: At present, each person is endeavoring to break through his own personal window to Europe. We should assume the function of integrating foreign relations.

Statehood Treaty Outlined for Estonia

90UN1904A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
23 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Liia Hänni, Uku Hänni, Jaan Pelt and Mart Rahi: "Starting Points for Estonia's Statehood Treaty"]

[Text] The Estonian Statehood Treaty is an international agreement for restoring the sovereignty to the Republic of Estonia. The statehood treaty is proposed as a historically established method (the statehood treaty of Austria) for finding a comprehensive solution to problems of policy-making on domestic, foreign and economic issues that are linked to Estonia's movement toward independence. The positions of all parties involved would be clarified in the course of political and diplomatic preparations for the statehood treaty and appropriate guarantees made to protect the legal interests of these parties.

Treaty Participants:

Direct: Republic of Estonia, Soviet Union;

Anticipated: United States of America; France; Great Britain

Possible: Norway, Poland, Sweden, GDR, Finland, Denmark;

Goals of the Treaty:

- Terminating the Soviet annexation of Estonia.
- Restoring the sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia and securing international guarantees to uphold it.
- Maintaining political and military balance, and international security, in the face of changes precipitated by Estonia's (and other Baltic countries') movement toward independence.
- Establishing ground rules for mutual relations between Estonia and other parties to the treaty so as not to violate the sovereignty of any of the parties.
- Giving international guarantees for establishing a state order in Estonia that honors democracy, human rights and basic freedoms.

The Political Premises for Entering the Treaty:

The legal basis for the sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia is to be the Peace Treaty of Tartu.

- The *de jure* existence of the Republic of Estonia is recognized by several states.
- Terminating the annexation of the Baltic countries as one of the consequences of World War II is an essential condition for normalizing international relations in Europe.
- The emergence of an independent Estonia (and other Baltic countries) will create favorable conditions for

reducing the armament load, and also for economic collaboration in Northern Europe.

Political and Diplomatic Preparation of the Treaty.

Starting negotiations between authorized representatives of the Estonian SSR and the USSR organs of power and the government on the primary issues:

- Introduction of the statehood treaty and its premises.
- Preliminary agreements for lining up possible parties to the treaty.
- Agreements for regulating nationality relations in Estonia during the transitional period. Firm guarantees to be given by both the Estonian SSR and the USSR for protecting the rights and security of Estonians and national minorities.
- Agreements for regulating the issues of military service for the young men of Estonia, and for reducing the armament load within the territory of Estonia.
- Continuation of negotiations to regulate economic relations during the period of transition.
- Agreements for continuing cultural and scientific collaboration.

Forming a fully mandated Estonian delegation for multi-lateral negotiations.

- A coordinated delineation of mandates between the Estonian SSR state power and the Estonian Congress.
- Negotiations to include Estonian Congress as the fully mandated organ for representing the citizenry of the Republic of Estonia.

Unofficial, preliminary negotiations between Estonia's fully mandated delegation and the government of Soviet Union regarding the future status of Estonia as a state that is either 1) demilitarized, 2) neutral, or 3) militarily connected to the USSR.

Establishing international contacts, and preliminary negotiations with possible parties to the treaty:

- Clarification of conditions for gaining international recognition for the evolving state power of Estonia.
- Collaboration with, and the joining of international organizations in the areas of politics, environmental protection, culture and sports.
- Having an Estonian delegation participate in the meetings of Helsinki II and related international events.
- Calling for a Baltic conference.

Ground Level Negotiations on All Issues Relating to the Statehood Treaty.

Restoration of the sovereign and democratic Republic of Estonia as a legal successor to the Republic of Estonia that was annexed in 1940.

- International guarantees to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unviolability of borders for the Republic of Estonia.
- International guarantees to ensure self-determination for the Estonian people to establish their own political and economic order.
- International guarantees and obligations on the part of Estonia to secure human rights and basic freedoms to all citizens subject to the jurisdiction of Estonia.
- Establishing the basics of Estonian citizenship and setting the conditions for available options.
- Agreements between Estonia and the Soviet Union about conditions for reuniting families.
- Establishing the political, economic and social rights of all citizens of the Soviet Union (or other states) living permanently in the Republic of Estonia.
- Guaranteeing the rights of national minorities in the Republic of Estonia.
- Delineation of property rights and the establishment of economic relations between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union.
- Establishing the amounts and due dates for financial obligations between Estonia and the Soviet Union.
- Agreements to grant Soviet Union and its citizens visiting rights to cemeteries, memorials and cultural objects located within the territory of Estonia for a free exercise of their human rights, and to outline the obligations assumed by Estonia for the protection and care of these objects.
- Establishing ground rules for the use of Baltic seaports and for related transit agreements.
- Establishing a regimen for border and customs procedures.
- Agreements between Estonia and the Soviet Union about possible military collaboration, procedures for the removal of Soviet military forces, its extent and target dates; determining the scope of the armament quota to be turned over to Estonia by the Soviet Union.
- Establishing ground rules for mutual political, economic and military relations between parties to the treaty in matters relating to Estonia.
- Establishing procedures for the formation of an international arbitration committee for resolving possible issues of dispute.

Commentary

We hope that the above principles and samples of negotiating points will give you an idea of the scope of work ahead of us before we can seriously tackle the matter of creating lawful organs of power.

Right now, there is nothing more important than starting negotiations with Moscow and other parties to the treaty. It doesn't matter who starts these negotiations, what really matters is who completes them and who signs the Estonian Statehood Treaty.

February 17, 1990

Liia Hänni, Uku Hänni, Jaan Pelt, Mart Rahi

Estonian Law on State Symbols

90UN1957A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 11 May 90 p 1

[Estonian SSR Law: "On Estonian Symbols"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, having in mind the purpose of restoring the independent Estonian state and guided by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR of 30 March 1990, "On the State Status of Estonia,"

Decrees:

1. To void the designation "Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic" and introduce the name "Estonian Republic" as the official designation.
2. To discontinue the use of the coat of arms, flag and anthem of the Estonian SSR as state symbols.
3. To put into effect the following articles of the 1938 Fundamental Law of the Estonian Republic:

"Article 1. Estonia is an independent and sovereign republic in which supreme state power rests with the people.

"Article 2. The territory of the Estonian state is an indivisible entity.

"Article 4. The only laws enforceable in Estonia are those enacted by its agencies.

"The generally accepted rules of international law shall operate in Estonia as an inalienable part of the legal order.

"No one can justify one's actions by ignorance of the law.

"Article 5. The state language of Estonia is the Estonian language.

"Article 6. The state colors of Estonia are blue, black and white.

"The external appearance of the State Flag and State Coat of Arms is determined by law."

4. During the transitional period, seals and letterheads bearing the Estonian SSR coat of arms may be used.

5. This Law shall come into force from the time it is passed.

A. Ruutel, chairman,
Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet
Tallinn, 8 May 1990

Estonian Resolution on Display of National Flag

90UN1957B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 13 May 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic: "On the Use of the Estonian National Flag as a State Symbol of the Reconstituted Independent Republic"]

[Text] In accordance with the Estonian SSR Law "On Estonian Symbols," the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic decrees:

1. It is hereby stipulated that during the transitional period until the restoration of the legitimate state power of the Estonian Republic the state symbol of the newly reconstituted independent and sovereign republic shall be the national flag displaying the state colors of the Estonian Republic.

2. The national flag to be used as a state symbol represents a cloth displaying the colors blue (cornflower blue), black and white.

The stripes of the flag shall be of equal width. The ratio of the width of the flag to its length is 7:11. The generally accepted size of the flag is 105 by 165 centimeters.

3. The national flag shall be raised as a state symbol:

1) On buildings where sessions (meetings) of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic or representative bodies of local self-government are being held—throughout the entire period of the session (meeting);

2) On buildings of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, the Government of the Estonian Republic, and of bodies of local self-government (ispolkoms)—permanently;

3) On buildings of ministries and agencies of the Estonian Republic, state and public bodies, enterprises, offices and organizations, as well as on residential houses—during Estonian state occasions and holidays;

4) As decreed by the Estonian Government.

The Estonian national flag may also be raised as a state symbol during ceremonies and other public events conducted by Estonian state and public bodies, enterprises, offices and organizations.

4. The Estonian national flag shall be raised as a state symbol during state occasions and holidays at 7.00 and lowered at 22.00, if there is no special ordinance of the Government of the Estonian Republic or local self-government body regarding the time for raising or lowering the flag.

5. On occasions of mourning the Estonian National Flag can, on the instructions or with the concurrence of the Government of the Estonian Republic, be raised in a mourning mode.

In such cases a black ribbon 10 centimeters wide shall be attached to the upper end of the flagstaff or flagpole, with both ends of the ribbon hanging along the entire length of the flag.

6. During the transitional period, the state flag of the USSR may be raised during USSR state holidays.

7. When the Estonian national flag is raised as a state symbol together with the state flags of other nations they shall be placed to the left of the Estonian national flag as seen from the side of the flags.

A. Ruutel, chairman,
Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic
Tallinn, 10 May 1990

Estonian Leadership on 15 May Demonstrations

Supreme Soviet Presidium Appeal

90UN1964A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 May 90 p 1

[Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium Appeal to All Residents of the Estonian Republic]

[Text] On May 15, in Tallinn, a crowd incited by inflammatory statements tried to force the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and Government to sway from the path of peaceful restoration of Estonian Republic independence.

Attempting to force an ultimatum upon them, a group of extremists invaded the building of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and Government in Toompea, using violence against law enforcement agents guarding the building.

Thanks to action by those agents, and especially to prompt and unanimous intervention of Estonian patriots, full mutual understanding and support of the Supreme Soviet, the Government and the people, the assault on law and order in Estonia was repulsed.

The attack on Toompea showed how far supporters of the interests of the empire are prepared to go to play their role in the imperial play.

The Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet sees these events as a turning point in the political development of Estonia. The willingness of the Estonian people to defend to the end its freedom and independence was

clearly seen, as was the fact that only a few non-Estonians are prepared to oppose our independence by violent means. Most non-Estonian residents of Tallinn, as well as the majority of Russian-speaking Supreme Soviet deputies, did not support those illegal actions.

The Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium announced that law enforcement authorities started an investigation.

The Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and Government, certain of decisive and full support from all sons and daughters of Estonia, continue their peaceful activity to restore Estonian Republic independence.

Maintain calm and dignity, and we will seek solutions in a dialogue.

Our goal is a restored Estonian Republic.

Communist Party Central Committee Appeal

90UN1964B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 May 90 p 1

[Estonian CP Central Committee Statement]

[Text] At 4:00 p.m. on May 15, at Toompea, some 5,000-6,000 people gathered for a rally in support of the Estonian SSR Constitution. Municipal authorities had not given permission to stage that rally. The rally was highly emotional. By 6:00 p.m. the overwhelming majority of participants left the square, but a group of activists of the strike committee and the Inter-movement, led by M.Lysenko and consisting to some 100 extremists, attempted to storm the seat of the republic government. In our view, it was an act of hooliganism seen by the government as an attempted coup d'etat. The fact that the people put an end to this violation of public order clearly showed that the people is capable of decisive action in defense of its deputies. We commend the Tallinn residents who came there for their restraint which helped prevent a confrontation.

Disorders occurred in Latvia and Estonia concurrently.

We demand an objective and thorough investigation of these events and punishment for persons who encouraged hooliganism and violated public order. But we must not equate all those who took part in the rally with the handful of thugs. The latter represented neither the Russian people nor the working class.

It is unclear why law enforcement authorities were unable to stop the actions of a handful of extremists, even though the Ministry of Internal Affairs had sufficient forces at its disposal for such contingencies. Hooliganism at the municipal building which had taken place on May 9 should have put them on alert. We are expecting the government to provide explanations on this account.

Party committees must immediately give a personal assessment of the actions of the communists who have

allowed the crowd's emotions to rise to the extent that the situation got out of control.

We call upon all workers to show restraint and calm and not be swayed by provocations and emotions. Problems can be solved by a dialogue and not by extremist means such as political strikes or violent resistance. Everyone should ask himself a question: who benefits from the events at Toompea? Without overdramatizing it, we must not give a pretext for suppressing our young, burgeoning democracy by means of restoring a 1930s' style "age of silence" or the "managed democracy" of more recent years.

The already fragile fabric of legality is being destroyed by the creation of law enforcement entities based on national or party lines. This may lead to a serious clash between different forces. This is why we call upon all movements and parties to respect the law and to protect democracy. Let us not forget that in history, economic chaos spiked with extreme nationalism has often led to powerful reactionary blows. This way we can never win.

Government Discusses Crisis

90UN1964C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 May 90 p 1

[Article by ETA correspondent Yu.Khidov: "Government Discussed Crisis Situation"]

[Text] On May 16 the Estonian Republic Government met in Toompea. The meeting was conducted by Prime Minister E.Savisaar.

It discussed the troubling events of May 15 in front of the government building in Toompea. Justice Minister Yu.Raydla and Minister of State R.Vare noted that during the unsanctioned rally at Toompea disorders with criminal characteristics took place. A number of leaders of the Joint Council of Estonia Labor Collectives [OSTK] took an active part in organizing those actions. OSTK activists also distributed appeals to participate in the rally.

The report presented by A.Korkom, chairman of the Tallinn city council, stated that the municipal authorities have a number of documents showing how the OSTK ignores local government entities and stages unsanctioned rallies.

Explanations about the events were given by OSTK officials S.Petinov and V.Lebedev. They asserted that the main organizers of the events at Toompea were M.Lysenko, chairman of the strike committee, and A.Say.

L.Ugre, the republic procurator who took part in the meeting, announced that a criminal case was opened to investigate events of May 15. The investigation is handled by the extremely important case investigator at the republic procuracy.

The Government decided to suspend temporarily the April 17, 1989, Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Presidium resolution approving the registration of the OSTK statute. Based on this, the account of the organization was also frozen (except to pay salaries to officials). By May 23, the government will make a final determination on the legality of the OSTK actions and whether or not they corresponded to the approved statute.

A resolution was passed to form people's defence units "Eesti Kondukaytse". Olev Laanjarv was appointed its head and Andrus Yeevel chief of staff. Registration of volunteers for this organization began May 16. Those who are willing to obey the laws of the Estonian Republic, resolutions of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and orders of the republic Government may join it. Registration will take place at the Economic Ministry building in Tallinn, at Komsomoli, 1. The organization "Eesti Kondukaytse", in cooperation with the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, will provide security for the most important government buildings. The government thanked volunteers who came forward on that critical night to guard the government building at Toompea, the Supreme Soviet building in Kadrioru, the television and radio center and the television tower.

A. Kuddo, minister of social issues, reported on the progress of setting financial subsidies related to price rises on food and other rationed goods and services. The government specifically requested that when price reform are implemented the offsetting system of subsidies come into effect at the same time.

Other issues were also discussed.

MVD Minister Interviewed

90UN1964D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Olev Laanjarv, Estonia's minister of internal affairs, and L. Ugre, Estonia procurator, by ETA correspondent R. Amos: "Dress Rehearsal"]

[Text] Following the dress rehearsal of the storming of Toompea, calm was restored.

[Correspondent] How the security of Toompea was organized?

[Laanjarv] Let me start by saying that the organizers of the "event" did not do as they had promised. They planned to picket the building and to submit demands to the Supreme Soviet. The behavior of the crowd that gathered there, its excitement kept up by slogans, was a logical continuation of political processes taking place in Estonia. But, in my opinion, this was a case of a crowd being excessively aroused by the organizers who then lost control over it.

Faced with the danger of the building being invaded, we decided not to split our forces but to concentrate them in the building. We had only one goal: to protect the building from the attackers. I think that we could have

handled that task. But fortunately things did not reach that point. At the crucial moment, the head of government appealed to the people and the people came to our assistance.

[Correspondent] How many men were there in the building and how were they armed?

[Laanjarv] We had enough people, or about 80 men. We did not intend to use firearms. We hoped to use only truncheons and tear gas.

[Correspondent] Did you plan to use units of internal affairs troops, as it was done in Riga?

[Laanjarv] The procedure for deploying internal affairs troops is very lengthy and complicated. The request to do so had to go through Vilnius on to Moscow, so we did not intend to use them.

[Correspondent] What do you intend to do in the future to prevent similar attacks not only on the Toompea castle but on other vital and strategic sites?

[Laanjarv] The people, by gathering there, provided security to all the most important sites for the entire night. Now, based on the government resolution, the organization "Eesti Kondukaytse" has been formed. In cooperation with these forces we intend to provide security to all the most important buildings.

[Correspondent] What are the legal rights of this organization?

[Laanjarv] Tomorrow, the Supreme Soviet Presidium will consider the draft law defining the status of the organization and changes in the criminal code of the republic. It will also define the rights and responsibilities of organization members.

[Correspondent] Many want to know what nationality were the militia agents who were on duty yesterday at Toompea?

[Laanjarv] Eighty two percent of the Tallinn militia corps are members of the non-indigenous nationality. The buildings were guarded also by two groups of students of the Tallinn special militia high school staffed with young Estonians. Members of the security battalion of the government building acted well, too.

Several questions related to the opening of the criminal case were posed to Lev Ugre, republic procurator.

[Correspondent] What legal sanctions will be used against organizers of the disorders? What has already been done?

[Ugre] The republic procuracy opened a criminal case under Article 194(3). It covers responsibility for organizing group actions or for active participation in such actions violating public order. The criminal case was passed to the especially important case investigator at the republic procuracy. Under his command, a group

will be formed which will include also Ministry of Internal Affairs employees. The investigation has already begun.

[Correspondent] Does the republic procuracy have sufficient proof against actual individuals or do you need help from witnesses who could provide more precise testimonies?

[Ugre] Yes, whenever we investigate crimes we always rely on the assistance of citizens. The disorders were witnessed by many and we have taken down many testimonies. We have video records, but on the other hand we would not turn down any assistance either.

[Correspondent] Do you plan to arrest organizers of the disorders any time soon?

[Ugre] It is too early to talk about it, since the criminal case has just been opened. The guilt of any person placed under guard has to be watertight.

[Correspondent] When do you intend to pass the case to the court?

[Ugre] According to regulations, preliminary investigations may take up to 2 months. I think that if we have enough testimonies, we will be able to complete the investigation in the time period allocated by law.

Estonian Leaders Comment on Party Split, Talks With Moscow

90UN1992A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 21, May 90 pp 5, 11

[Interviews with E. A. Sillari, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, A. Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, and A. Gusev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party Maintaining Organizational and Ideological Unity with the CPSU, conducted by SOYUZ correspondent Galina Kacheva and IZVESTIYA correspondent Leonid Levitskiy, in Tallinn, 22 May 1990: "Three Meetings in Tallinn"; followed by commentary by Kacheva and Levitskiy]

[Text] At the end of March two major events drastically altered Estonia's sociopolitical life. At its 20th Congress the Communist Party split into an independent ECP and an ECP Maintaining Ideological and Organizational Unity With the CPSU. A transitional period was provided in order for communists to decide which they would belong to. On 30 March the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on Estonia's state status. In accordance with it, USSR statehood no longer extends to Estonia's territory. A transitional period for the restoration of its own statehood was declared. The republic's name as the Estonian SSR, its anthem, emblem and flag were revoked. Now it is again called the Estonian Republic. SOYUZ correspondent G. Kacheva and IZVESTIYA correspondent met with the secretaries of the parties that were formed and with A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The questions

that the journalists asked Estonia's political leaders were formulated before the promulgation of the 19 May Ukase of the USSR President "On Declaring the Estonian Republic Law 'On the Principles of Temporary Procedures for the Government of Estonia' Invalid.

However, even after it the interviewees confirmed the views they had expressed earlier.

We are publishing "Three Meetings in Tallinn" with a brief commentary reflecting events of the past few days.

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] 1. In September 1988 the Estonian Communist Party proclaimed a policy of renewing the party, renewing the federation, and attaining genuine sovereignty within the USSR. Why were its principles changed so drastically on the eve of the 20th Congress?

2. Was every possibility of avoiding a split in the party taken advantage of at the congress? How does one explain the mass exodus from the ranks of the Estonian Communist Party?

3. Two parties and two Central Committees—is a confrontation inevitable?

4. How do you assess the establishment of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights, and the position of the cities in northeastern Estonia?

E. A. Sillari, First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee: 'Do Not Upset the Fragile Equilibrium'

1. I cannot agree with that way of putting the question. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee's approach to the problem changed sharply not on the eve of the 20th Congress, but much earlier—at its 11th Plenum in September 1988. At that time a thorough analysis of existing problems was made, and the nationality question was raised—a subject that had been taboo for decades. For the first time, the Central Committee Bureau directly and candidly stated its attitude toward the demographic situation in Estonia and the questions of Estonian SSR citizenship, the status of the Estonian language, full economic accountability, and so forth.

Never before had the communists in the republic's party organizations had the right to take part in "major" politics. They were assigned the role of carrying out the will of the center, from which they received instructions, up to and including instructions on how to think. They were supposed to be carried out unquestioningly, and that was that. The Communist Party's leaders were also unable to carry out policy locally in the interests of the republic's inhabitants.

Many mistakes that were committed previously were the fault precisely of the center. Let us add our own miscalculations to them, and it will become clear why our chosen course led us further and further away from prosperity. After the 11th Plenum, events developed as follows: we began to talk about a new union treaty, but at

that time our proposals not only met with no support, but put the center on guard: the Estonians are overstepping all permissible limits, and that is dangerous. What followed such a reaction in the republic? The process of radicalization sped up: since things are not working out with the treaty, let's go further ourselves.

Today dialogue is extremely necessary, but not dialogue on the level of general political phrases: "confederation," "a renewed federation," "the republic's special status." One would like to know just what, specifically, is being proposed to us? And we ourselves will think up a suitable name later.

What is needed is precisely dialogue, not monologue: ultimatums and declarations will not move matters forward. Both sides should express their views. But one must take into account the fact that today the situation is much more complex than it was, say, six months or a year ago. I think that if negotiations had been started earlier, the situation in Estonia would be different now.

And a couple of words about statehood. Freedom is a sacred concept for any people. Today it is not just in the Baltics that people are talking about it. But we have our own idea of how to reach it. For us it is not a one-time act, and not a high-flown declaration: "Henceforth we are an independent state." And tomorrow we'll look and see how to carry out independence in practice. The attainment of independence is a process in the course of which not just its legal prerequisites (although a legal basis already exists—the 1938 constitution), but also its political, economic and social prerequisites must be provided.

2. It is hard to say whether every possibility was taken advantage of. Probably some additional options could have been found, but I think that, by and large, every possibility of averting a split that existed at the given stage was explored. Instead of the planned two days, the congress met for three. The delegates proposed and discussed various options for preserving the Communist Party's unity. Nonetheless, the split occurred. But I think that our way is still more optimal than events in the Communist Parties in Lithuania and Latvia. In them the splits occurred precisely along lines of nationality. We elected a coalition Central Committee that included representatives of both Estonian and Russian-speaking communists. We did not alienate either Estonians or party members of other nationalities. And that is a positive result of the congress.

A fragile equilibrium was established in the party. It would be easy to upset it; all that is needed is to divide everything into black and white, into our people and the outsiders. But such a division has destructive force. Yes, we have different ways of seeing a number of problems—they differ, for example, between the Estonians and the Russian-speaking Northeast. But given a tolerant attitude toward each others' views, it is still possible to work together. In a single, independent Estonian Communist Party.

More than a month has passed since the congress. And I can say that the decisions made at it are proving their merits. Yes, I can still say that today. Although, of course, there are other views. Some of the Estonian communists have accused us of being compliant: we shouldn't have accepted any compromises, but should have held to a clear-cut, rigid line. But politics, all the same, is the art of compromise. Within certain limits, of course. And I believe we have not overstepped those limits.

And on the other hand, communists of other nationalities are accusing the congress's Russian-speaking delegates who joined the coalition Central Committee of all but treason. Both the first and the second position are extremes. Those who hold them are forgetting three truths. The first is that Estonians have lived, are living and will live on this land by the Baltic Sea. The second is that our neighbors to the south, north, east and west have been there, are there, and will always be there. The third is that Estonia never was and never will be a multinational republic. We intended to proceed in our policies from those three defining circumstances.

The attitude toward the independent Estonian Communist Party is also mixed. It must be explained to communists that our communist party today is part of the CPSU, that we are members of the CPSU, and that we maintain ties with the CPSU Central Committee. And given the present complex situation in the republic, it may happen that the Estonian Communist Party remains the sole communications channel with the center. God forbid, of course, that that should happen, but it is impossible not to take the possibility into account.

Yes, the Communist Party's ranks are thinning. In the first quarter of the year, 3,700 communists turned in their membership cards. Of them, 60 percent were Estonians. But I cannot say that is a direct consequence of the 20th Congress. During the comparable period of last year, 4,500 people quit the party. The resignations will continue, and to some extent this is a natural process. The attrition has been especially high in rural regions: apathy has manifested itself; the rural people are tired of politics and are asking to be left in peace to attend to their own affairs. They are quitting the Communist Party, but they are not joining other movements, not even the rural centrist party that was recently established as though with them it mind. In addition, a certain number of communists do not like the party's loss of its leading role in society.

I do not know exactly how many communists support us. And it is premature to take a count. People must be allowed to sort out what is happening and make their own choices. I admit that we have not yet done very much to restore the party's lost prestige. We have been more concerned with our internal affairs—and a great deal is still unclear. But we understand that the time has come to also work actively in the external world, so to speak.

There are presently 53 communists in the new parliament. But identical party membership cards no longer guarantee unanimity.

3. I would not say so. Although even today I am certain that the establishment of a second Central Committee was premature. Its leaders are trying to prove that they are the true Marxists and we are "the other" party, but take our program and compare it to the CPSU Central Committee's platform for the 28th CPSU Congress. If you find a fundamental difference, that means we really are "the wrong" party. We have the same ideological foundation—Marxism, and the same goal—a democratic, humane socialism. Of course, there are also differences; for example, we have different ideas about the way out of the economic crisis. Nonetheless, we are the leftist force that is called on to defend the interests of all who live in Estonia, and to strive for social justice for everyone, regardless of nationality.

As for cooperation with the second Central Committee, I cannot see great prospects for that. Nonetheless, we are prepared to do so. For a start, I would like to get a look at the second Central Committee's program of activities. So far, I have not seen their documents.

I admit that, at the press conference following the congress, I may have too harshly expressed my negative attitude toward those who undertook to split the party. But the other side also took steps that simply offended me. One of the first questions that the second Central Committee discussed on the night after the congress was the question of dividing up party property. The talk about dividing it up continues to this day.

4. The Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power was born in the emotional atmosphere of 2 February after the meeting of deputies of all levels. As far as I know, however, the committee has not yet taken any actual steps. Its establishment was more of a gesture. I do not like it that the committee chose the simplest position, the position of rejection, for itself. The cities of northeastern Estonia—Narva, Kokhtla-Yarve and Sillamäe—have not recognized the Supreme Soviet's 30 March decree on Estonia's state status. The deputies of city soviets probably have that right, if their constituents support them in it.

A. Gusev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party Maintaining Organizational and Ideological Unity With the CPSU: "One Republic, Equal Rights For All"

1. You, like many, are mistaken. The policy proclaimed by the 11th Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee logically ended with the 20th Congress and schism. The times demanded calming down the party organizations and society that had not yet "ripened" for radical changes, and smoothing out the increasingly abrasive slogans of the People's Front. Granted, the plenum took very correct decisions concerning the national-democratic renewal of the republic and the party, and the strengthening of their sovereignty

within the federation and the CPSU. But nothing was done to implement them. And a substantial number of communists, and communists in leadership positions at that, actively helped the People's Front plan policies and a program of action aimed at breaking with the CPSU and the USSR and removing the Estonian Communist Party from the republic's political life. One must say, they brilliantly planned and carried out their plans, using both party and state mechanisms.

That is the main reason for the party's split. I will not rehash the course of the congress. We did everything but get down on our knees to preserve the threads that still held the party together. Why didn't we succeed? A month after the congress Yu. Tamme, first secretary of the Tartu Party Gorkom, candidly said in an interview with SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA: "The differences within the Estonian Communist Party among its various parts were more significant than the differences between the radical wings of the Estonian Communist Party and political forces outside the party. Therefore, the split in the party was natural and necessary. If the 20th Congress had ended without a divorce, that would have been an utter failure. It's too bad that we were late. The Tartu delegation was oriented toward the inevitability of a split."

If we made a mistake, it was only that we confused the congress delegates by trying to make compromises for the sake of unity. The divorce took place at the very last moment, without preparation, which provided food for false rumors.

2. The split unquestionably undermined both the positions and prestige of the Estonian Communist Party. The time that the congress allowed for choosing whether to remain in the CPSU or move to the independent Estonian Communist Party was a time in which the party's ranks melted away. But they had started to thin even before the congress. And that process had been artificially stimulated for nearly two years.

Estonia's population and communists waited for the Central Committee to provide answers to the acute questions of today: citizenship, migration, citizens' committees, prices policy. Answers about how to preserve and strengthen civil peace in the republic and ensure the equality of inhabitants. I repeat, they were artificially held captive to the past, returning again and again to 1939-1940.

Nothing so corrupts any organism as inaction. Even before, the primary units were left on their own, and now that is even more true. The proclamation of an independent Estonian Communist Party and the establishment in it of a coalition Central Committee were explained as the only possibility for helping the local party organizations, especially in Russian-speaking collectives. But just what has the coalition Central Committee done for them? For the rural rayons in whose organizations the

greatest attrition has occurred? Absolutely nothing. There are some rayons now that are practically without communists.

Such a situation cannot be attributed to the transitional period and to reorganization. Abandoned to whims, without information, people are quitting the sort of party that shows no interest in them and makes no effort to keep them. The real figures and real losses in the party's ranks are so far being concealed. The goal of keeping them quiet is clear. 17 delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress have been elected from party organizations supporting the independent Estonian Communist Party. Suddenly it would become known that the organizations have been deserted and that some delegates represent practically no one.

We candidly say: Before the 28th CPSU Congress, out of 9,650 communists in Morskoy Rayon, 7,500-7,800 will remain. The Kalininskiy Rayon Party Organization will preserve approximately the same percentage. Most of the communists in those rayons have already made their choice. They are members of the CPSU. I think that at the end of the transitional period, when the process of separation is finished, the party organizations maintaining ideological and organizational unity with the CPSU will have 40,000-45,000 members. The independent Estonian Communist Party will have 10,000-15,000. As of 1 March, before the split, there were 105,000 Estonian Communist Party members.

The losses, of course, are very, very painful. Only actual work will prevent new ones. Both Central Committees must be placed under equal conditions, and let them show through deeds whether they are needed by communists and the people of Estonia. We greatly feel the lack of our own publication. However, even the second Central Committee has practically been left without any. Such is the paradox—the party has voluntarily abandoned its newspapers to other organizations.

3. The divorce in the party family did not occur very peacefully, but I am firmly convinced that two parties represents an unnecessary opposition. If their members are really faithful to the ideas of Marxism, and are prepared to defend universal human values and civil rights. So far, the words of the coalition Central Committee have not been backed up by deeds. On 30 March the Supreme Soviet adopted the Decree on the State Status of Estonia. The republic was proclaimed an occupied territory on which USSR statehood had been illegally established. Our Central Committee's plenum assessed it as clearly wrong, hasty and unconstitutional. It will complicate the already difficult relations between the republic and the country as a whole. But the Central Committee of the independent Communist Party has not yet expressed its attitude toward the decision, which is fraught with the potential for many problems.

On the other hand, that same Central Committee hastily, before anyone else, rushed to endorse the ukase of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on the

partial depoliticization of the Estonian SSR's law-enforcement agencies. According to the ukase, in the courts, procuracy, Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security Committee, party organizations are supposed to be abolished within a month, and it is recommended that communists suspend their party membership. In the future, "in hiring, preference will be given to persons who are not in parties, public organizations, or the executive bodies of public movements."

That would seem to be perfectly democratic, reflecting the development of a multiparty system. But so far official membership exists only in the Communist Party. Consequently, only its members are subject to a ban on occupations.

We have opposed that unconstitutional, plainly discriminatory legislative act. Supreme Soviet deputies from the Equal Rights group and the communist faction, with support from part of the delegates who are on the alternative CP, insisted on discussing the ukase in parliament. And it turned out that legally the document was feeble. It was sent back for additional work. If deputies from both Communist Parties had always acted in concert that way, it would have been possible to prevent a number of erroneous decisions. After all, of the 105 parliamentary deputies, 53 are communists. Alas, they are disunited.

4. Estonia has sharply shifted to the right. An anticommunist, anti-Soviet wave is growing. The ideas of revenge and restoration of the former state and former sociopolitical system are becoming increasingly popular. Attempts to deprive people of their political and civil rights are intensifying, and that means more than a half-million people who have arrived since the war.

It was in response to that that the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia was born. It was created by deputies to soviets of all levels, who were supported by the public of Kokhtla-Yarve, Narva and Sillamya, and the collectives of 160 enterprises. The committee's goals are to achieve the genuine equality of all the republic's inhabitants, and that is possible only through observance of the USSR Constitution.

That is why the sessions of those three cities' city soviets refused to recognize the Decree on the State Status of Estonia and the transitional period it introduces for separation from the USSR. Our Central Committee supported the decision of the northeastern industrial centers. Granted, we were immediately accused of being opponents of Estonia's independence and of its secession from the USSR. No, I personally do not consider that extreme step to be the only option for the future. That does not mean that I am opposed to the republic's constitutional right to self-determination. I am glad that we finally have a law defining the mechanism for exercising the right to secede. A law that guarantees protection of the interests of both those who want to secede and those who want to remain in the USSR. Unfortunately,

in our republic people have already hastened to reject it as out of keeping with Estonia's conditions.

**A. Ruutel, Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet:
'We Can and Should Remain Good Neighbors.'**

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] A multiparty system in parliament. Where does it begin?

[Ruutel] For many years the activities of the republic Supreme Soviet, like those of all the country's soviets, were determined by one party. I will not talk about how it did that job. But the very process of decision-making was far easier than it is today. Today the Supreme Soviet is a body of authority with a clearly expressed multiparty structure. Moreover, in contrast to Lithuania, for example, no single party or movement has an absolute majority in it. And that causes great activeness and tension in the work of the deputies and the parliament as a whole. We all have to learn a great deal all over again. Above all, learn how to conduct debate, make intelligent use of the parliament's rules, and discuss alternative draft documents. And finally and most importantly, learn how to reach accord and seek compromises. That is especially difficult: Practically all the republic's political forces—from the Party of National Independence to the Internationalist Movement of Estonia's Working People. As an accomplishment, I can note that for all the incompatibility of the views of the deputies representing various public movements, the discussions at the sessions do not go beyond the bounds of parliamentary rules.

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] But why, having begun so actively and having immediately passed a decree on Estonia's state status, did the Supreme Soviet suddenly lose both its activeness and its productivity? In the opinion of many constituents, the deputies have gotten drowned in debates.

[Ruutel] I do not agree with you and want to disagree with the constituents. The Supreme Soviet has been working fairly hard. Granted, the adoption of fundamental legislative acts has been held up. And that is perfectly understandable. Serious documents demand a great deal of time for preparation and expert review. The second reason is that the nature of the basic laws, particularly the economic laws, depends on solution of the main problem—the problem of Estonia's future. Along the path toward the restoration of our own statehood—and the Supreme Soviet expressed the will of the majority of the population in adopting the decree on Estonia's state status—dialogue with official Moscow is of exceptional importance. My Supreme Soviet colleagues and I, and the leaders of Estonia's government have had fairly numerous meetings with M. S. Gorbachev, N. I. Ryzhkov and a number of members of the Presidential Council. The sides' positions are clear. The solution, I think, lies in mutual compromise. And I am certain that it is possible to reach one that is to the mutual advantage.

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] Won't the 30 March decree on state status contribute to the success of the talks with the USSR leadership? It names all the solutions and dots all the i's.

[Ruutel] We know, and M. S. Gorbachev has spoken of this, that there really is a great deal in our decree that the USSR leadership does not like. In response I can say that there is also a great deal that we do not like, for example, in the Law on Secession from the USSR. I do not think we will get anywhere by enumerating what we do not like.

It is impossible not to take into account the experience that the years of perestroika have given us, with which they have enriched us. Let us recall the hostile reception that was given to the idea of regional cost accounting. Or the idea of a union treaty. It also traveled the path from complete rejection to acceptance at the highest level, and now it is already being proposed by the country's president.

I think that one can draw an analogy between physical movement and a social movement. It helps one understand the acuteness of the growing problems. The awakening of national independence is not just a regional Baltic process. The mightiest force of all, Russia, has joined the movement. It is impossible not to reckon with that. I think that in order for our dialogue with the USSR leadership to succeed it should be built not on tastes and emotions, but on a sober analysis of objective processes, mutual respect, and equality.

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] In any case, how do you assess the discussions that have been held in Moscow? What are the prospects for their development.

[Ruutel] They have been very frank and, at times, somewhat emotional, but within the limits of correctness. And it seems to me, useful for both sides.

Understandably, the state separation of one or several republics is a complex and painful process. A mass of the most diverse questions have to be resolved, disagreements eliminated, and compromises found. We are very closely tied together—politically and economically. Finally, we have been and will remain neighbors geographically. The present situation, as experience indicates, is not bringing great benefit to our peoples. And in striving to change that situation, we can and should remain good neighbors. An example is relations with Finland. The USSR, in my view, gained immeasurably both politically and economically from its having been formerly granted independence. I am convinced that, as a result of the work of bilateral expert groups and commissions, and meetings of the USSR and Estonian leadership, we will arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome.

[Kacheva and Levitskiy] The Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia, and the

three cities in the Northeast do not recognize the recent decisions of the republic Supreme Soviet. How do you assess that situation?

[Ruutel] I would add that the Committee for Estonia elected by the citizens' Congress does not recognize them, either. I personally take an absolutely calm attitude toward all this. In the first place, for all the protests and statements from various parties, there is no anarchy in the republic, as you yourself can see daily. The laws are functioning, and order is being maintained. In the second place, our people knows from its own experience what dual or triple power is, and that it leads to no good. And it will scarcely want a repetition of past unsuccessful experience. For its part, the Estonian Supreme Soviet is prepared for dialogue and cooperation with all political movements and parties whose actions do not lead to violence and tyranny.

Necessary Commentary

Tallinn, 22 May—The country's president has adopted an ukase "On Declaring the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet's Decree 'On the State Status of Estonia' Invalid." Aren't the interviews we are now publishing too late? We think not. They will help explain the reasons for what is going on. The readers have probably noted the criticism that A. Ruutel and E. A. Sillari level at the center for its unwillingness to listen to recommendations to the effect that the sooner a dialogue begins, the more effective it will be. But something else is also evident from a number of statements. Now the republic's new leadership is already putting forward knowingly unacceptable conditions. That is what has given rise to conflict. It created a split within the republic. Events in Toompea on 15 May showed that Estonia has approached the brink. Tension is mounting.

The Presidium has refused to respond to labor collectives' demands. The government has suspended the activities of the Russian-speaking population's sole socioeconomic organization—the Council of Labor Collectives. It has adopted a decision to establish an alternative security service—the Eesti Kondukaytse organization. More than 2,000 people have already joined it. Paid at their work places, they guard facilities and buildings. Such are the facts.

The parliament has passed a law and a decree regulating provisional procedures for the government of Estonia until the establishment of independence. According to those documents, the bodies of state authority and government, the courts, and the procuracy agencies no longer belong to the USSR's system. The union organizations and institutions remaining within its territory have been declared illegal organizations. Further relations between Estonia and the USSR are now supposed to be based on the Tartu Peace Treaty concluded between it and Russia in February 1920. and these are also facts:

In the opinion of many observers, the government, seizing the moment, has gone on the offensive against

those who disagree with its policies. That has evoked an answering reaction. On 21 May a general political strike began. The worker collectives' demand that a referendum on Estonia's secession be held immediately. A congress of deputies of all levels representing constituents and territories that do not recognize the decree "On Estonia's State Status" has been called for 26 May in Kokhtla-Yarve. Obviously, an interregional council and council of the national economy for the management of state property will be elected.

Political barriers coincide with ethnic barriers, which is making the confrontation more bitter. Parliament has chosen the simplest, but hardly productive, course—it has unilaterally declared the restoration of the republic's own statehood. As is now obvious, the term "transitional period" essentially changes nothing. Labor collectives are insisting that a referendum on secession be held in which the entire population would take part. It is impossible here not to recall the stabilizing role that the Estonian Communist Party formerly played. The change in its course and the split in it have sped up the split in the republic as a whole.

The president's ukases—and on 19 May the president declared invalid the parliament's legislative acts on temporary procedures for governing the republic—are an appeal to return the situation to original, pre-March events, in order to begin a dialogue on future status. And Estonian politicians should hear this appeal.

On 21 May, during the adoption of the agenda at a session of the republic Supreme Soviet, the For Equal Rights group proposed discussing the ukases of the country's president. The proposal was not supported. The arguments were that the Supreme Soviet had not yet received originals of the documents. That they were written in the spirit of the Internationality Movement. And that the ukases represented interference by the head of one state in the affairs of another. 28 deputies voted for putting a discussion of the ukases on the agenda, and 57 voted against it.

Strikers in Estonia Hold Press Conference

90UN1992B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 23 May 90 p 1

[Article by Yu. Surov: "Will We Live Until Saturday?"]

[Text] More than 30 representatives of the mass news media of Estonia, the Union, Great Britain, the FRG, Finland, Norway and even Ecuador took part in a press conference held by representatives of the republic's striking enterprises.

The strike really is occupying the central place in events in Estonia. Radio, television and the newspapers are giving preference to the subject. The attitude toward the strike at enterprises is mixed—referendums and surveys that labor collectives' councils have conducted show a considerable range of opinion. Unfortunately, at a number of enterprises even the surveys heat up the

atmosphere, since the opposing sides hold positions that are far from a readiness to compromise.

At the press conference it was reported that on the second day of the strike, as of the 19th, Tallinn's striking enterprises had been joined by two more enterprises had—the RET [expansion unknown] Association and the Electrical Equipment Plant imini Pegelman, as well as six enterprises in Kokhtla-Yarve, including three mines. The delivery of foodstuffs for plant cafeterias at the striking enterprises has been partially stopped, which has drawn a counteraction on the part of the Narva power engineering workers. A delegation from the Baltic and Estonian state regional electric power stations has presented a petition to Supreme Soviet deputies. V. Butuzov, a worker from Narva, said at the press conference that the power engineering workers' rally was very stormy, and that people's mood was one of resolve. Only the fact that changes in the regular supply of electric power could potentially cause serious consequences for the republic's economy and the operation of vitally important facilities has restrained the Narva workers from extreme measures. That is why it was decided to appeal to the republic leadership.

At the largest of the striking enterprises, the Dvigatel Plant, services that ensure the enterprise's continued operability are functioning, as is the system of plant housing and municipal services. The delivery of oxygen to medical services is being maintained. At the Metallist Plant, those who do not want to take part in the strike have been provided with work, and a similar situation exists at other enterprises. Granted, under conditions in which the production process is closely linked, and the work of one person depends on the work of another, that situation cannot continue for long without changes.

Some civil aviation flights have been cancelled. The delivery of passengers by bus to the Estonian islands is being provided by the Mootor Association. Transportation connections with Minsk, Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Petrozavodsk have been cut off. Connections with Helsinki by sea have been temporarily halted.

It was stressed at the press conference that the strike was begun in accordance with the decision of the rally in Toompea on 15 May, when the government and Supreme Soviet were presented with ultimatums to which there was subsequently no response. The strike is political in nature, since extremely important decisions were taken without consideration for the interests of substantial segments of the population. No time has been agreed upon for the end of the strike; the participants in the press conference confirmed only that it would be stopped by a decision of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia.

Some correspondents conjectured that the strike would not harm Estonia, since most of the striking enterprises' output goes outside the republic. That was answered as follows: All the same, a good deal of the output remains in the republic; moreover, about 70 percent of the

republic's budget is made up of deductions from enterprises under union administration. Nonetheless, the striking enterprises intend to make up for lost production after the strike is over, since its goals are political, rather than economic: to draw the attention of the country and world public opinion to Estonia's problems, and to remind the republic's leadership once again of the sore points. From every indication, this purpose has been achieved; therefore I shall risk the conjecture that the strike will not be long-lived and will end soon. It is highly probable that the signal for its ending will be the congress of deputies of all levels who support the unity of the Soviet Federation that is to be held on 26 May in Kokhtla-Yarve. It will consider questions of creating legislative and executive bodies for defending the interests and rights of citizens in connection with the adoption, by a numerical majority of the republic Supreme Soviet, of the decision to secede from the USSR.

From every indication, the situation of divided authority in Estonia will become further aggravated, and that means that the road to stabilizing the situation will not be a short one. Such are political realities today.

Estonian Government Warns Against Diarchy

90UN2075A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 24 May 90 p 1

[Appeal by the government of the Estonian Republic]

[Text] Dear fellow citizens!

The political process in Estonia has reached a limit today at which each of us must make his civic choice.

The Estonian people has made its choice—it is an independent Estonian Republic living peaceably with all its surrounding states. Our people has earned that choice by suffering with all the years of its lost independence, and it can be resisted only by new violence.

Which people will you go with, you Russians and Ukrainians, Georgians and Belorussians, all of you who have been living peaceably with us until now and who call Estonia your home? If you go with the Estonian people, that means building a new home; if you go against the Estonian people, that means breaking up what has not yet been completely built. The third path is the path of the wanderer, who roams in search of a happy life. For many centuries the Estonian people was not the master in its own home. It very well understands your anxieties about the fate of this construction project, and it proposes that you work in concert with it. When builders work together and in harmony, they will necessarily build a good and comfortable home for all.

In proposing the Program for the Transitional Period, the government of the Estonian Republic sees no alternative to a peaceful course of attaining national-state independence, and it calls on all sober-minded representatives of the republic's Russian-speaking population to resist the bad intentions of those who are trying to

establish a diarchy in Estonia by any means possible. Those who believe that the meeting of people's deputies slated for 26 May in Kokhtla-Yarve is an innocent affair are mistaken. That is untrue. In reality, everything indicates that an attempt is being made once again to stage a well-rehearsed political spectacle such as the one that has repeatedly been performed, on the "stages" of Budapest, Prague and Kabul, when political groupings, declaring themselves to be the state authority, appealed for outside help. That is how the Finnish war was conceived. That is how the war in Afghanistan began.

We call on you to think carefully once again before embarking on that path and severing the living thread that still binds the two communities in Estonia. Why doom all of us and our children to long years of cruel and hopeless confrontation?

The government of the Estonian Republic, realizing the dangerousness of such a course of events and striving to prevent it, is prepared for open dialogue with all interested parties without any preliminary requirements. Such a dialogue is already being conducted by us and is meeting with a positive response from people.

The government has begun a dialogue with representatives of the Armed Forces and duly appreciates the restraint and good sense that military personnel are showing in this difficult political situation.

But the government cannot conduct a dialogue with those who are engaged in the organization of mass disorders and political strikes, who speak in the language of ultimatums, and who are striving to gain power by illegal means.

The doors of Toompea are open for those who go in peace.

Plans for Rival Supreme Soviet in Estonia Denied

90UN2075A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 May 90 p 3

[Estonian Telegraph Agency Report: "V. Lebedev: 'There Will Be No Alternative Supreme Soviet'"]

[Text] Lately there have been occasional reports that on 26 May in Kokhtla-Yarve there would be a congress of deputies of all levels who support the unity of the Soviet federation. V. Lebedev, a member of the deputies' group For Equal Rights, informed his colleagues about that at a session of the Supreme Soviet. In a conversation with Estonian Telegraph Agency correspondent F. Kaazik about the upcoming congress, he mentioned the statement by the For Equal Rights deputies' group. It states that the opinion of the Russian-speaking deputies has not been taken into account and their proposals not adopted; in short, that they are being subjected to obstructionism in the Supreme Soviet.

V. Lebedev noted that the political situation is very tense, and one can say that it is approaching the point of

crisis. The Russian-speaking population has lost its confidence in the future and its confidence in social justice. The reason is that legislative acts are being adopted without taking the Russian-speaking population's opinion into account. V. Lebedev emphasized that it is precisely these circumstances that influenced the decision to convene the congress in Kokhtla-Yarve.

In addition, he said, at the end of this week a congress of the People's Front and the Congress of Estonia will be held. That has prompted the convening of deputies at all levels in order to discuss the existing situation in the republic, and also the problems of the Russian-speaking population and the economy. The government is following an antipopular policy in the areas of the economy. Fairly harsh economic measures are being proposed, but it is not being said how the economic situation of the low-income population is to be alleviated. Economic measures must be developed that will make it possible to change the content of the republic's economy and ensure our constituents' social protection. There has been a lot of talk to the effect that we are preparing to establish an alternative Supreme Soviet of an autonomous Northeastern Republic of Estonia. I have no information that just such a body will be established. I think that the deputies will realistically assess the situation in the republic, and there is no need to speak about some sort of Supreme Soviet of Northeastern Estonia. At the same time, I do not rule out the possibility that certain structures will be created. I would like to believe that they will, by and large, be economic in nature and, taking the opinion of the Russian-speaking population into account, help influence the government's policies.

Russian Deputies in Estonia Assailed

90UN2075C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 May 90 p 3

[Statement by the Narva Region of the DPE [Democratic Party of Estonia]]

[Text] The congress of deputies in Kokhtla-Yarve on 26 May is one more attempt to bring about the autonomy of Northeastern Estonia, thereby turning it into a preservation for Russians. Panfilov, Gusev, Malkovskiy, Zakahrov, et. al., our widely known "defenders" of the Russian-speaking population's interests, are preparing to govern it. Although that same Malkovskiy has on numerous occasions declared that he is opposed to autonomy.

Party leaders, seeing that the popular masses openly spit on all their historical goals and appeals to a radiant future, have seized on the last straw—they have undertaken to defend the idea of protecting the poor Russian-speaking population, which they claim has been subjected to discrimination since 1988. But in that connection they forget that it was precisely during the years of so-called "Soviet power" that we were second-class people, and we will remain such as long as their sort

are in power. Can it be that 70 years is not enough to open one's eyes and see who is who?

The guarantee of our civil rights is a free and democratic Estonia.

Considering the restoration of Soviet power in North-eastern Estonia, we declare the creation of a Committee for Defense Against Soviet Power. We ask those who wish to join, and also the victims, to write to the address 202000, Narva, a/ya 453.

Protest in Estonia, RSFSR Congress Linked

90UN2075D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 24 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Igor Gryazin, conducted by A. Birov of the Estonian Telegraph Agency, in Moscow: "A Political Struggle Is Being Given the Form of an Ethnic Confrontation"]

[Text] Moscow—[Birov] Igor Nikolayevich, how do you assess the events of 15 May in Tallin from the standpoint of a legal specialist, and what lessons should we all draw from this?

[Gryazin] In the first place, we learned that political actions should be calm and carefully considered. Moreover, on both sides—on the side both of the Estonian government, and of our partners in Moscow. I do not believe that these events were planned in Moscow, but they are the direct result of the USSR president's 14 May 1990 Ukase declaring our legislative acts illegal, and that the president does not recognize them. The connection is perfectly obvious, and I hope that such steps will be taken into account in the future by our Moscow colleagues.

In the second place, the 15 May events showed that they have nothing in common with Russian national interests, and that they are directed against national revival not only in Estonia but in Russia. The strategic goal of those who staged the 15 May events was to divert the democratic forces from what is going on at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. If the 15 May events, God forbid, had ended in a bloody drama, that would have unquestionably played into the hands of the conservative forces here, in Russia, and at the Congress of People's Deputies. And the democratic bloc's struggle would have been paralyzed. Do the participants in the events in Toompea recognize that they were playing into the hands of those in Moscow, at the Congress, who are opposed to the new democratic parliamentary state?

It is also important to recall that the conservative forces that are departing the political arena often grasp at the nationalities question as a last straw. And a clear-cut political struggle is given the form of an ethnic confrontation. I am afraid that a dangerous weapon is being used by the conservatives even now.

[Birov] If I understand you correctly, the struggle in Estonia and other republics and regions is not ethnic in nature?

[Gryazin] I am profoundly convinced that it is a political and social struggle, and that disguising it with nationalism is a demagogic trick. But one should not forget that it is a very effective weapon. Now people are increasingly beginning to understand that we must move to new political and economic structures and not remain in the same old bog from which there will be no way out.

[Birov] But it is necessary that this be understood not only in Estonia but, above all, in Russia.

[Gryazin] In the present situation, one can say that in some respects the pace of movement toward democracy and freedom at the Congress of Russia's People's Deputies is even ahead of ours in Estonia. But very many people have yet to decide who they are with: the democrats and democracy, or those who want to remain in the channel of everything old. And in that sense, the events of 15 May in Tallinn in many respects helped clarify the situation and identify the position of everyone of us.

North Estonia Forms Administrative Unit

90UN2075E Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 May 90 p 2

[Article by G. Komlev, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA staff correspondent: "Triple Union"]

[Text] The regular session of the city soviets of Narva, Sillamya and Kokhtla-Yarve was held on 23 May in Narva. Its chief result was the adoption of a document marking the de facto appearance on our republic's map of a new administrative and economic formation. The document is called a "Charter of Association of Local Government Units and Economic Units."

And so, the unification of three cities in northeastern Estonia has been proclaimed. The purpose of the unification is identified as protecting the rights and interests of the local soviets, enterprises and organizations, and the region's population, and accomplishing common economic, social, environmental and other tasks. Its participants intend to cooperate among themselves in all areas of social and economic life. They plan the establishment of an integral organizational structure of association: a coordinating council, a governing body of that council, their own mixed state and commercial bank, several collegiums, working commissions, a business office, and a financial and economic department.

It is proposed to base the work of the "triple union" on its own independent budget, formed from below.

The session also considered the question of the association's future practical activities. The deputies discussed the tasks of the three soviets in the area of environmental protection, and adopted a decision that speaks of the establishment of a working group on protecting the

environment and the health of the population of Virumaa, and specifies demands on Estonia's government in that area.

The problems of environmental protection in the region are the third major issue considered at the session. It was decided to form a "working group" to combat rising crime, and to once again ask the USSR minister of internal affairs to place the three cities' militia directly under the union ministry (they even agreed to send a special delegation to Moscow). The session instructed the three city soviet executive committees to draw up, by 10 July, a program of material, technical, social and economic assistance to internal affairs agencies.

It was decided not to take up the issue, which had been included on the agenda, of the attitude toward the restored union of Estonia's cities.

Social Democrat Independence Party Formed

90UN2075F Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 May 90 p 3

[Estonian Telegraph Agency report: "Estonian Social Democratic Party of Independence Formed"]

[Text] On 19 May the founding congress of the Estonian Social Democratic Party of Independence [ESDPI] was held. A founding meeting under the leadership of Maryyu Lauristin had been held in January during the time of the Social Democratic forum.

Attending the congress were Birgitta Dahl, Sweden's Minister of the Environment, and her husband [Enn Kokk], secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden and chairman of its Program Committee; [Johannes Michkelson], chairman of the foreign association of the Estonian Socialist Party, and [Yuri-Karl Seim], general secretary of the foreign association; [Ulu Ivori], general secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Finland; [Ingrid Norsteinsh], secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Norway's Storting [parliament]; representatives from the British Labor Party; like-minded people from Latvia, Lithuania and Moscow; and leaders of Estonia's other parties. Telegrams of greetings were sent by the leaders of Social Democrats in the United States, Turkey, Denmark and other countries. The new party was welcomed by Enn-Arno Sillari, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. Some of those who wanted to attend the congress did not receive entry visas.

The congress was opened by Maryyu Lauristin, chairman of the ESDPI founding assembly, who presented a report on the role of social democracy in Estonia's political future.

A discussion was held of the ESDPI program and statutes. The congress adopted those documents. A party chairman, governing board, and auditing commission were elected. Maryyu Lauristin was elected chairman of the ESDPI.

Estonia's Lauristin on Totalitarian Threat

90UN2063A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 26 May 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Marju Lauristin by Nelli Kuznetsova, place and date not specified: "Who Holds the Keys to Freedom?"]

[Text] How bad it is that we do not always listen to each other and understand the pain and insult of another, and look to see how our actions and intentions appear and how they are assessed and perceived. This applies both to members of the same family and to work comrades, and even more to the members of different national communities.

Today our interlocutor is Marju Lauristin. And it is, as it were, the view from the other side...

[Kuznetsova] I once happened to hear a journalist from Moscow who had interviewed you put you in the same category as such eminent women of our times as M. Thatcher, G. Starovoytova, T. Zaslavskaya, and others. As far as M. Thatcher is concerned perhaps there is some exaggeration here... Nevertheless, how do you feel to be numbered among them?

[Lauristin] Well, in my opinion this is not a proper comparison... I do not want to talk seriously on this subject.

[Kuznetsova] But you have undoubtedly played and are playing a major role in Estonia's political life. What meaning and main goal do you see for your political and public activity?

[Lauristin] I would say that the goal relates to what was said recently at the constituent congress of our Social Democratic Party. It is to achieve mutual understanding in society and cooperation and trust between people even if they hold different political views, and to achieve equilibrium and stability... Of course, this does not mean a compromise between the wolf and the lamb... But at least between lambs...

[Kuznetsova] And to whom do you refer as the wolf?

[Lauristin] If we have our situation in mind, then it is very complex and explosive, particularly in our days, to talk about imperial forces. This is how I define them... They are those forces that use all the methods known from Stalinist times and from many of the dark pages of history and continue the line that was started, for example, with the Finnish war and the events of 1940 in the Baltic, and including what occurred in Czechoslovakia, and what happened some years later in Afghanistan...

It is the very same line and the very same scenario. And I think that it is dangerous. Dangerous not only for Estonia's independence but also for the development of the democratic process in Russia and the country in general. And, if you will, for the world...

You know, there are people who simply prefer a totalitarian regime with its inherent power politics. Their thinking was inculcated under conditions which were normal for them. And they try to preserve this regime using every method. And this means catastrophe. It means, I would say, also a Russian national catastrophe. Strictly speaking, this has already started... But there is a reluctance to get out of it. It is being maintained exactly by those people...

[Kuznetsova] You are obviously following the course of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. There is much there that is new...

[Lauristin] Of course. And it is in no way fortuitous that those same forces that are acting here in the republic also have a negative attitude toward the democratic processes in Russia. It is one and the same position... I happened to be speaking with some of those who are actively involved in the movements that oppose the Estonian liberation process, and I heard how sharply they expressed themselves about OGONEK and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and so forth. That is, it is a question of sharp political opposition. This has been spoken about repeatedly. And the fundamental, perhaps basic question at the end of the 20th century is shall we extricate ourselves completely from this situation, in which there is always the threat of a return to totalitarianism? And this is what is being decided now in the Baltic. As, incidentally, it is being decided in the Ukraine, and as it is being decided in Moscow.

In general it has been said many times that the key to our freedom is to be found in Moscow. They are always reminding us of this...

And we are glad that the ideas born here, the idea, for example, of that same economic independence, later seized hold in Russia, and that the idea of regionalization of a United States of Russia has emerged—an idea that in my opinion is very promising. And there is the principle of self-determination and of free development in general, and the principle of choice of one's own path. And in general the universal principle. And as you know, all who act against this principle stand at the position of a monolithic, repressive autocracy. I would say that...

[Kuznetsova] I would like to ask you some questions that we are constantly reading in the letters sent to us and that we hear on the telephone. They are the questions that concern people and for which they want answers. And I would like to re-direct them to you as a people's deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet and one of the leaders of the People's Front, which is such an influential political force and largely determines the present situation in the republic. First, of course, they relate to the problem of restoring Estonian statehood and secession from the Union. You mentioned OGONEK. I recall that it was precisely in OGONEK that the well-known economist P. Bunich compared the country to a multinational ship

going onto the reefs and the passengers jumping overboard to save themselves. But surely it is more comfortable even on a bad ship than being alone in a stormy ocean, particularly if the ship is moving on the right course? Do you not believe that it is on the right course? For you yourself say that Estonia is the initiator of many of the processes that should also move things onto the right course.

[Lauristin] I think that this analogy with a ship that the passengers are leaving is not quite right. I would look at everything that is happening as an historical process.

Every individual, every people has the right to survive. And every person will fight for his life. The question is one of helping others to survive while fighting for one's own life, not the other way round. Let me offer another comparison. If we compare the fragile nature of our littoral pine forest with, say, the mighty taiga, what is the thought that arises here? What may be fatal for our forest, which stands on sand, would simply be a puff of wind for the taiga. It is the same with small and large peoples. Given the same adverse conditions, we as a small people will come much more quickly to the boundary or limit that will abridge our entire future. For in the 70 years of Soviet power about a hundred small peoples and nationalities have virtually ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. Is this not a serious threat that we must think about? And they included many of our Finno-Ugric peoples. They had lived for thousands of years, but during the last 50 to 70 years they have simply ceased to exist.

There are also peoples that are now part of the autonomous republics and oblasts but that obviously can no longer be independent, full-fledged peoples. Or too much time would be required for that. There are simply no spiritual, moral, educational or other resources. They already find themselves on the wrong side of that boundary of tragedy where as peoples they could be assured of any future in history. And the understanding of this, the presentiment of this boundary is for the small peoples the backdrop of everything, all life, all the processes relating to everything around them. It is precisely this yardstick that the Estonians are using to measure everything in politics and economics. The representatives of the large peoples do not understand this. Simply because for them there is no sense of fragility or of the ephemeral nature of their existence. We cannot assert ourselves through force and power, we can do this only by our rapid development, dynamic flexibility, and by constantly seeking out new possibilities. Simply in order not to perish...

[Kuznetsova] Opinions are expressed that it is precisely now that the haste with which the Supreme Soviet is reaching political decisions may entail serious consequences—the fall of M. Gorbachev, deeper contradictions between the USSR and the United States, which will not be advantageous for Estonia.

[Lauristin] Well, you see, I am an advocate of the approach that each political figure, and indeed any individual in general, should consciously make his own choice. And not shift blame to others... If the question is put so that everyone is to blame and Gorbachev is always right, then we shall return to the model we already know: for in this country there has always been a man who was always right while everyone else was to blame. And this gave him the right to implement any measures. The issue cannot now be posed in this way. The responsibility of a politician is responsibility for the country's strategic and actual course, for the decisions that would lead to an improved position, to a lessening of the contradictions that are now so sharp. And if he does not succeed in reaching those decisions in good time, then sooner or later the question of his powers will arise.

[Kuznetsova] But if the leader is not Gorbachev it is not known how the process of democratization in the country will develop, or whether it will develop at all...

[Lauristin] I think that this is not the way to pose the question. A politician on this plane and scale has two paths: Either he strains to find solutions to problems, that is, he develops himself, or he shifts this onto others and depends on those others, and the question arises again... Although it must be said that neither in Estonia nor in the Interregional Group are they deliberately putting obstacles in his way. But in general the question of an opposition is a fundamental issue of democracy. Democracy is impossible without opposition. There can be no such thing as democracy that is incapable of finding a mechanism to resolve contradictions by a method that does not infringe on anyone's interests. So that each person might act without losing the main thing. But with respect to the Baltic (as with respect to the Interregional Group) Gorbachev is acting by means of pressure precisely in the issues of principle, that is, he is trying to bring all others to their knees...

Up to now everything has gone successfully, while they had removed only the top layers, so to speak. But when things moved to the roots of economics and politics, that is, when it was necessary to move to another principle of statehood, to another principle of management, what had its effect here was not even personal indecision, no, but the inability to abandon personal ambition ... What has always been inherent in Russia, starting with tsarism, namely, to hand over all responsibility and all honor to one man, which leads ultimately to his downfall. For weariness may set in, some kind of limit of strength. What is needed is a balance of power, different viewpoints, allies. What is needed is a method for democratic interaction... I saw, incidentally, what happened in Moscow with the democratic wing, so to speak, how the deputies from the Interregional Group were transformed from allies into an opposition, and then from an opposition into true political rivals. It is the same in relations with the Baltic... For 18 months or two years ago we offered acceptable ways to resolve our problems. But it was useless. Simply, I think, because the solution just had to be his own, and all others coming from the side

were unnecessary, were not of interest, were not considered... It was decided beforehand that they could not be better than those born in Moscow...

[Kuznetsova] But it is a question of preserving the country and its integrity...

[Lauristin] Yes, this kind of political factor may exist. But it can be raised in a different way. Can the country be preserved by choking it with an iron band? But perhaps there is another way: moving away from the purely mechanical principle to the natural principle: natural integration based on mutual interests.

[Kuznetsova] And the special status for the Baltic that is being talked about at the center?

[Lauristin] We no longer believe in Moscow's sincerity if it pushes things through by force.

[Lauristin] Quite recently, at the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow, you spoke heatedly in favor of economic independence and regional cost accounting. Have you now abandoned the idea of testing that path?

[Lauristin] But they did not allow us that path... The question is precisely that we were trying to achieve a normal path of development so as to initiate immediately the democratization of the entire country, and then gradually for everyone to find his own model. But this did not happen. It seemed to be approved in words, but in fact the wish was to put the brakes on everything. There is no fundamental understanding that in this country that everyone can choose his own path of development. And while this is so there will be tensions everywhere.

If we are drawing analogies today, let me offer one other. The Soviet Union has now spoken out against the policy of Israel, which is resettling Jews that have come from the Union on lands won from the Palestinians. That policy has been called outright colonization. And it is. It is one of the methods known in the world for strengthening an occupation and annexing territory that historically does not belong to one, and supplanting the indigenous population and replacing it with settlers. But that same mechanism has existed here in Estonia. And now it is bearing its fruits. It was undoubtedly superimposed on some real needs of the Russian-speaking population and its everyday interests, and played to emotional and psychological sensitivities. And this is natural. Otherwise it could not have been successful. Here, the effect of the devilish ability to combine some kind of mass sentiments with far-reaching political plans has also been felt. And incidentally, fascism in Germany was born out of mass sentiments and real and actual problems. All totalitarian regimes have used these sentiments. But they are also created artificially. I remember all the appeals in Toompea on 15 May. For it can be seen that these sentiments were being heated up, and that certain myths were being created...

[Kuznetsova] Do you really think that this was a coup attempt? Emotions did run to extremes, and yes there were outrages and hooliganism, but that is still not a coup...

[Lauristin] But it is an element in the general scenario of a coup, in which another element could be played out in Kokhtla-Yarve... It is also a scenario that is already known, that is, the creation of an alternative government under the slogan of the struggle for Soviet power. The same thing happened in Finland when they created the Karelian-Finnish Republic and the Kuusinen government, all ready to install itself in Helsinki... The same thing happened in Kabul, when a government was formed that then asked for the help of Soviet troops... It is a scenario that has been played out I would think dozens of times. And now it is being played out right before our very eyes. And all Russian people, of whom the absolute majority are peaceful, fine, honest people, are simply unaware that they are now pawns in the political struggle, in a very dangerous game that runs counter to the real interests of the Russians.

We in Estonia all want to live peaceably with good relations among ourselves, and together find solutions for the problems that really do exist. But if now in the full sense of the word a boot is being placed on the throats of the Estonians in this matter which is so important and sacred to the people, namely their survival and independence, and they explain this by saying that certain everyday problems have arisen, then these are simply incommensurate.

[Kuznetsova] But the Russian-speaking population is also concerned for itself, for its rights, for its children. Do you think that they have no cause for this?

[Lauristin] They should be concerned. If the entire Soviet Union is now moving toward the brink of absolute collapse then it is high time they were concerned. But not because Estonia wants to become independent. If it does become independent then it will be like an Amen in church, and it will again strive to become an equal member of the international community. And those people who are now concerned have for decades really been deprived of any opportunity to know about how people live normally, how they should live in the 20th century...

[Kuznetsova] Nevertheless... Now, for example, the creation of the "Kodukaytse" detachments is a cause for concern. Some people believe that this is the road to national dictatorship, that it is essentially the end of democracy...

[Lauristin] Well, these sentiments are being stirred up by people like Lysenko. You know, if on 15 May all the militia, regardless of nationality, had carried out its professional duty to defend the government, then there would have been no need to summon the people and create the "Kodukaytse." From the balcony I watched militiamen just standing there laughing when the gates were broken down...

[Kuznetsova] Many people, including Estonians and Estonian deputies, have expressed the thought that both sides were staging a political show..

[Lauristin] No. That is absurd. How could that really have been? People came from their homes in response to the call, dropping whatever they were doing, and vehicles turned back into the city from the highway... Then the People's Front officials on duty were sent for, but that was done in order to prevent clashes between the two crowds...

In general, when we inside the castle saw that there was a possibility that the building would be broken into, particularly because there were many intoxicated people in the crowd, and we really were unprotected, did not even have any microphones, it was a critical moment... We did not know whether or not they would break into the building, whether or not there would be destruction. For those who were making the uproar outside would not even listen to the Russian deputies... And there was a feeling that we were totally helpless...

So why is no one talking about the Lysenko bands? Why do they not see the danger here?

[Kuznetsova] The checking of documents by members of "Kodukaytse"... This makes people indignant...

[Lauristin] At first much was spontaneous in these detachments. They had not undergone any training and each person acted at his own discretion. But it is simply necessary to outlast this... Work is under way, training is under way. But the detachments are necessary. For they are constantly trying to intimidate us. There will be bloodshed, bloodshed... And this is precisely what must be prevented through the efforts of the people themselves. And we do know about the events in Tbilisi, in Kazakhstan...

[Kuznetsova] But do you not think that if nevertheless A. Ruutel had reached out to people this kind of hardening would not have occurred?

[Lauristin] What do you yourself think about this? He knew quite well who would be meeting him. And I myself have repeatedly endured the same shouts and whistling and obstructions. What self-respecting leader of a country would humiliate himself in this way? Why do they think that the Estonians should always be on their knees? These are ultimatums... For they are attempts to force us to our knees... To humiliate and coerce and put us in our place... This is how it is perceived.

History repeats itself. They are taking those same pages from the textbook of Stalin's time and staging the same songs. Like a mechanical piano. "The restoration of Soviet power in Estonia"—that is what this action is called. But that happened as long ago as 1940... It was called the same thing then. But it was the Estland Republic. Is not what is happening now in Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva—all the talk about autonomy and

setting up their own government—similar to that scenario? And it is deliberately being played out now.

[Kuznetsova] And what happens next? How will we live? How will events unfold?

[Lauristin] All these strikes, even going as far as outright threats to switch off the electric power, show that the scenario has been thought through to its conclusion. And we must also think it through to its conclusion...

[Kuznetsova] Its conclusion?

[Lauristin] Of course. How can all this be harmless? For switching off the electricity is murder... What would happen to those who, for example, happen to be in resuscitation units? Should we be grateful that there has been no murder so far?

[Kuznetsova] The disagreements have gone too far...

[Lauristin] Have they gone too far? What is too far? Now, when Hungary and Czechoslovakia are being liberated, everyone is applauding them and believes that what is happening is a normal historical process. But when the Estonians want their freedom because of their historical right to it, it is thought that they have gone too far.

Why is it not understood that we simply have a feeling of doom. Look at the map. That is how many we are... How few. I would like to tell the Russian person that he should get off the carousel. Sit in an armchair and watch his children and think about things. And what shall I do? To what do I have a right, and to what do I not have a right? Do I want the land to be trampled and scorched, and will everything be fine for me? Or do I want life to be normal here, with normal good-neighborliness? Let him think about being part of a larger people, a truly great people, and that whether he likes it or not he represents that people here.

Why do Estonians cling together? In our consciousness—and this is seen in our songs and stories—we have a sense of the HIVE. The Estonian people—this is a hive. Everyone may be destroyed, but each person will defend his hive. And defend it to the death... This is how it was with those who responded to Savisaar's call. Do you understand? Well, you know that every hive has its queen bee. And in this situation Ruutel immediately became the queen bee. And they came to protect him.

There are many disagreements in the Estonian community. And on the question of the laws also... But if a sense of danger appears, this hive closes up. And every one has the feeling that at a time of danger it is essential to cling together. This is our only way of defending ourselves. For we have no other. A robber with a stick over the hive—that is the image which arises when I remember 15 May. And indeed, not only that... This is what he should think about.

[Kuznetsova] We should certainly try to understand each other, and the offense and pain of each party...

[Lauristin] Our hive threatens no one. We must find a way to co-exist. Not to look for the opportunity to suppress Estonians by force. This is absolutely the wrong approach. Estonians have been fighting for their independence for a thousand years. We have fought the Swedes, the Germans, the Danes, and the Russians. And we have never been aggressive. Because we never entertained the hope of beating someone by force.

[Kuznetsova] And pray God that we always remember that, so that force is never used. Neither in our relations with you nor you in your relations with us, that is, the entire population. Even if our viewpoints are different...

Amendments to Moldavian Constitution Published *90UN1978 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 12 May 90 p 1*

[Law of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on Amending Article 6, 7 and 49 of the Moldavian Constitution (Basic Law)]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic Decrees:

1. To incorporate the following amendments in the Moldavian Constitution (Basic Law):

"Article 6. Political parties, other social organizations and mass movements are to participate in elaborating republic policy, in managing state and social affairs through their own representatives elected to the soviets and also in other forms.

"Article 7. Political parties, other social organizations and mass movements are to operate within the limits of the Moldavian Constitution, the USSR Constitution and the current legislation.

"Not permitted are activities of parties, organizations and movements aimed at the violent alteration of the Soviet constitutional system and the integrity of the Moldavian state, the undermining of its security or the fanning of social, ethnic and religious hostility.

"Article 49. Moldavian citizens have the right to form political parties, social organizations and participate in mass movements.

"The social organizations are guaranteed conditions for their carrying out of their constituent tasks."

2. The current law comes into effect on the day of passage.

M. Snegur, chairman,
Moldavian Supreme Soviet
Kishinev, 10 May 1990

Outgoing Moldavian Leader Interviewed

90UN2231B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with P.A. Paskar, former chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, by N. Prikhodko; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA introduction: "Missed Opportunity"]

[Text] There is always something enigmatic about a departing figure. He assumes a particular aura of mystery for us. Because even today it is somehow not the done thing to explain why a person is leaving and whether he himself so wishes or whether he has been "let go." The lack of clarity gives rise to conjecture and rumors. At the readers' request we asked P.A. Paskar to comment in somewhat more detail than he had earlier, on his so unexpected departure from the office of chairman of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

[Prikhodko] But first about why you came here. In fact, you had already once been in charge of the Moldavian Council of Ministers and then worked for many years in Moscow, dealing with problems of a Union scale. And then you returned to your previous position.

[Paskar] I was on leave when I received the call. The awkward situation which had taken shape in Moldavia was outlined and, reference having been made to public opinion, it was proposed that I return and head the government. I confess that so unexpected an offer engendered misgivings also. But the desire to use the knowledge, experience, and extensive practical relations with the center and many republics of the Union which I had acquired to assist my republic in implementing radical economic reform and solving urgent problems, of which more than enough had accumulated not only in the years of stagnation but in the recent perestroika years also, won. I would note right away that there could have been no other personal interests.

[Prikhodko] But did you have an entirely realistic idea at that time of the situation which had taken shape?

[Paskar] Not entirely, I now realize. Although I had continually followed events in Moldavia closely. However, upon my arrival, the situation seemed different. But then came the elections, and the session started work. And initially the new Supreme Soviet could still have directed the increased assertiveness of the people's masses into the right channel if, primarily, concern had been displayed in practice for a rise in the well-being of all citizens of the republic.

Alas, this was not the case. The propitious moment for a turnabout in affairs in this direction was not utilized. Making good what has been let slip, on the other hand, is always more difficult. Which has been confirmed, incidentally, by the not that old example of our country. Thus I am profoundly convinced that we are exceedingly late as regards the coming price and monetary reform. It

should have been conducted immediately, in the latter half of 1985, as science recommended: There was not at that time the present commodity starvation, the huge "spare" money supply had not built up and society still trusted the leadership. And, judging by Gorbachev's statement in Murmansk, it also was ready for reform, but at the very last moment displayed indecisiveness—citing the fact that this would strike at the low-income strata of the population. The condition of the latter has deteriorated in any case, and the people as a whole have now been reduced to despair and panic. Today the reform will cost us all more.

[Prikhodko] Petr Andreyevich, in having conceived of the idea to help you obviously gave thought as to how to do this. What did you see as the way out of the crisis in which we had found ourselves?

[Paskar] Quite a wide-ranging question. I had, naturally, to give much thought as to what to begin with and how, as quickly as possible, to change the trend toward recession in economic development and solve most acute social problems. Strategically, of course, the calculation was based on the republic achieving genuine sovereignty and realizing a precisely elaborated program of the economy's transition to the tracks of a free regulated market.

The word combination "market economy" is currently very popular, but many people, uttering it in vain, still have an inadequate idea of what it means and how many ordeals are promised us by the embodiment of this concept in practice. It is naive, of course, to believe that all will be decided at once, of its own accord, to general satisfaction. Some people, for example, are seriously putting their hopes in an increase in the price of foodstuffs preponderant in Moldavia's exports. And forgetting here that we also will now be supplied at new—increased—contract prices with relatively large quantities of imports—liquid fuel, coal, gas, construction materials, lumber, grain and such. Nor are they taking account of the fact that, given the present food surplus in Europe and overall orientation toward the production of environmentally clean products, selling our basic commodities will be more difficult. There will be no "of their own accord."

It is necessary immediately to embark on study of the conditions of the intra-union and world market, a search for dependable partners in long-term contract relations, the organization of the manufacture of competitive export products and the creation of the necessary infrastructure, stock and commodity markets, marketing and pioneering centers, commercial banks, and developed information systems. It is essential to display concern for personnel capable of working under the new conditions and also for a precise mechanism of social protection, without which the low-income categories and people working in unprofitable enterprises and subsidized sectors could seriously suffer.

I believe it is clear from what has been said that transition to the market economy can only be effected with a scientifically substantiated, carefully considered program. In stages, I believe. How much time to allocate for each stage is another matter. The transition process itself could adjust the timeframe also. But this does not mean letting matters take their own course. Being led by those who, say, contest the legitimacy of the very term "controlled market," we run the risk of returning to the point which the developed countries long since left behind. There a self-regulating free market is dialectically combined with government regulation of its first principles—supply and demand—given preservation of the potential of the economic stimulation of production. So perhaps it is worth heeding others' experience? Learning something?

[Prikhodko] But it would then be necessary to study this in earnest. However, we have in the past couple of years in the republic observed with astonishment the growing indifference to actual economic issues.

[Paskar] The republic leadership is living, seemingly, solely with the thought of the speediest transition to a market economy, which, we would emphasize, is inconceivable without the creation of the fundamental legal basis. But whereas the Union leadership is performing a great deal of preparatory work (believed inadequate, nonetheless), this cannot be said of our leadership. The USSR Supreme Soviet has already enacted about 30 new laws which should create favorable soil for the development of the free market. And, it is acknowledged, it will be necessary to have enacted the same number again before the end of the current year. Understandably, Union laws may only serve as a basis for ours—the republic's specifics require its own laws. And our government has already prepared three laws, and a further six are nearing completion (on property, land, leasing, separation of management functions and so forth).

Unfortunately, in almost two months of work the republic Supreme Soviet has not even moved closer to an examination of just one of them. The session also took a very long time "getting around" to such an important question as the formation of the new government. The old one had essentially proven incompetent inasmuch as it was in a certain indefinite state of suspended animation. In addition, long prior to the session some ministers had been dismissed (I, incidentally, had repeatedly proposed that their appointment be speeded up), while others by no means felt confident that they would be recommended for the new cabinet. Correspondingly, it was difficult to expect from the ministries and departments which they lead either strenuous purposeful work, without which no results can be expected.

Throughout the four months that I was here I sensed no concern at this situation nor a desire to finally switch from particularly political issues to central, urgent problems. I did not, to be honest, perceive due support. In such a situation, given the overall instability, disarray,

and open unrest, mobilizing the government was, alas, impossible, to which, of course, I could not reconcile myself.

[Prikhodko] In this case your next step had been fully calculated. But it is odd that in his well-known statement at the 25 May session Mircha Ivanovich Snegur emphasized that he was shocked by your decision to relinquish your authority.

[Paskar] But precisely this outcome could, truly, have been foreseen in the course of events.

[Prikhodko] What, then, proved to be the last straw?

[Paskar] Half an hour before a sitting of the Supreme Soviet its chairman scheduled for its discussion, without prior arrangement, the report of the government on the political situation in the republic. You will agree, presenting such a report without preparation is difficult. Nonetheless, the opinion we expressed concerning the inexpediency of such a report announced in such hasty manner was not heeded. And inasmuch as it had already been announced, I delivered a brief report. After which certain deputies accused the government of an inability to stabilize the situation and sharply assailed the leadership of the law enforcement authorities. And no one tried to make them see reason.

Although the charges of inaction leveled at the law enforcement authorities were also barely substantiated inasmuch as they had hardly begun to operate before they were immediately accused of escalating the tension. In addition, on an order from above the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers had had to release without any punishment those guilty of the disturbances of 7 and 10 November who had been arrested. Nor is it fortuitous that to this day there has not been a single known instance of criminal proceedings having been instituted against those who in broad daylight beat up people's deputies. The republic's parliament's response to such extremist stunts was wholly inadequate. Is this not why, incidentally, the confrontation continues to intensify in the Supreme Soviet itself? Or is it the other way around?

In any event, a crisis situation was revealed: When the government, as the executive and administrative authority, was deliberately counterposed to the legislature and deprived of protection. Under such conditions I did not deem it possible to continue to perform the duties entrusted to me of chairman of the Council of Ministers, which I announced the following day.

[Prikhodko] And the final question. Do you not regret having come here?

[Paskar] I regret the way in which I am having to leave. I regret the unrealized intentions and unutilized opportunities. I regret the time which has been lost. Subsequently, of course, having come to their senses, people will rush to make it up, but a favorable opportunity will once again have been lost. I very much regret this missed opportunity.

Moldavian Central Committee, Bureau Members

90UN2227B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 10 Jun 90 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Perestroyka: Who Is Who": "Membership of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and Its Bureau"]

[Text] The republic's Communists, nonparty people, and public show great interest in the documents and other materials of the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress and the results of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, which took place after the congress. In particular, many have asked the party organs and mass media how the Central Committee elected by the congress is made up and which comrades belong to its Bureau. This article is an answer to those questions.

A total of 160 people were elected to the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. They represent communists of all the city and rayon party organizations and various types of occupations. Among the members of the Central Committee, for instance, workers and members of kolkhozes [collective farms] make up 15 percent, leaders of enterprises and organizations—3.1, party workers—40.9, workers of soviet institutions—3.1, workers of central organizations of administration, ministries, and state committees—10.7, workers of science, culture and art, education, public health, and the press—17.6, and trade union and Komsomol workers—3.2 percent. Women make up 12.6 percent of this leading organization.

The ethnic makeup reflects for the most part the ethnic makeup of the republic's party organization: Moldavians make up 59.4 percent, Russians—16.4, Ukrainians—14.5, and Gagauzy and Bulgarians—3.8 percent each. Of the members of the Central Committee, 86.7 percent have higher education.

As the press reported, five secretaries of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, now members of the Central Committee Bureau, were elected right at the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress. More comrades were elected members of the Bureau at the last Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. Brief biographical sketches of these men are given below.

Andriyesh, Andrey Mikhaylovich. Born 1933, Moldavian. Graduated in 1956 from the Kishinev State University imeni V.I. Lenin, doctor of physico-mathematical sciences, academician of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences. He began work in 1956 as a teacher of physics at a rural secondary school. He finished graduate study at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute imeni A.F. Ioffe. He has been working in the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences since 1964. He was promoted from junior scientific associate to president of the academy. He was elected secretary of the party committee of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences and member of the

Leninskiy Party Raykom [Rayon Party Committee] Bureau. He is chairman of the Moldavian Committee for the Defense of Peace. At the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress he was elected delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Baragan, Stepan Petrovich. Born 1952, Bulgarian. Graduated from the Soroki Technical School of Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture as a technical mechanical engineer. He began work as a mechanical engineer for labor-intensive processes at the sovkhoz [state farm] "Tsyganka" in Kakhulskiy Rayon. After serving in the Soviet Army he worked as foreman of production training at Kakhulskiy SPTU-18 [Rural Professional and Technical Institution], and since 1978 he has been an engineer for labor-intensive work and then an operator of an MPK-26 excavator at the "Yugvodstroy" trust in Tarakliyskiy Rayon. He was elected member of the party raykom.

Berdnikov, Yevgeniy Petrovich. Born 1948, Russian. Graduated from the technical school of oil and gas production and the Agricultural Institute in Volgograd and the Leningrad Higher Party School. He began work as a senior operator on the "Central Asia to the Center" gas pipeline. After graduating from the institute in 1975 he worked in Moldavia first as a chief engineer and later as chairman of the kolkhoz imeni F. Antosyak in Rybnitskiy Rayon. In 1979 he was elected second secretary of the Rybnitskiy Party Raykom, and a year later he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Rybnitskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. In 1987 he was elected first secretary of the Rybnitskiy Party Gorkom [city party committee]. He is a deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet and a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Gafton, Petr Vasilyevich. Born 1955, Moldavian. Graduated from the Kishinev Polytechnic Institute imeni S. Lazo and the Kiev Higher Party School. After his studies in the institute he was a senior electrical engineer at an enterprise for beef production and an association for breeding livestock in Yedinetskiy Rayon. From 1978 he worked with the Komsomol: He was an instructor, head of a department, second and then first secretary of the Yedinetskiy Raykom of the Komsomol, and head of a department of the Moldavian LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee. From 1988 he worked as deputy director of the "Plodselkhoz mash" Production Association. He was elected second secretary of the Moldavian LKSM Central Committee on an alternative basis, and in May 1990 he was elected first secretary of that body.

Dudeu, Nikolay Ivanovich. Born 1945, Moldavian. Graduated from the Kishinev Polytechnic School imeni S. Lazo and the Moscow Higher Party School. He began working in 1963 as a metalworker with the Feleshtskiy grain-reception point and then worked as a driller, a senior technician, and a senior technical engineer at the Kishinev Tractor Factory. From 1975 he was released to party work. He was second and then first secretary of the

Frunze Party Raykom and head of the Department of Production of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. In 1988 he was approved as deputy chairman of the Moldavian SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. In May 1990 he was elected first secretary of the Kishinev Gorkom of the Moldavian Communist Party.

Yevtodiyenko, Nadezhda Ivanovna. Born 1956, Russian, member of the CPSU since 1985. Graduated from Moscow Textiles Institute. She began work in 1972 as a worker at the Chernogorsk worsted cloth plant. After finishing the institute, she was sent to the Bendery silk plant where she worked as an economist, senior economist, head of the bureau of the automated administrative system department, and head of the production department. In 1987 she was released to party work and elected secretary of the party organization of weaving production, and in 1989 she was elected secretary of the party committee of the Bendery silk plant.

Lefter, Valentin Yakovlevich. Born 1949, Moldavian. Graduated from Kishinev Agricultural Institute imeni M.V. Frunze and the Kiev Higher Party School. He began work in 1966 as a teacher at a rural eight-year school. After finishing the institute he worked as a junior scientific associate at the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences and then chief agronomist of the kolkhoz "40th Anniversary of October," director of the sovkhos "Oneshty," and general director of the agricultural market association of Kotovskiy Rayon. From 1983 he was first deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kotovskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies and chairman of the rayon agroindustrial association. In 1986 he was elected first secretary of the Kotovskiy Raykom of the Moldavian Communist Party. He is a deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Lupan, Andrey Pavlovich. Born in 1912, Moldavian, higher education. Graduated from the school of hard knocks. He was an active participant in the underground revolutionary movement in Bessarabia. In the postwar years he headed the Moldavian SSR Union of Writers. He is a Hero of Socialist Labor, people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR, people's writer of the Moldavian SSR, academician of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, and a prominent public figure. At the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress he was elected delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Nidelku, Dmitriy Ivanovich. Born 1942, Moldavian, graduated from the Kishinev Agricultural Institute imeni M.V. Frunze and the Academy of Social Science under the CPSU Central Committee. He began working in 1963 as chief engineer at the "Biruintsa" kolkhoz in Vulkaneshtskiy Rayon. From 1969 he worked in Komsomol and party organs. Since 1984 he has been involved in trade union work and has been secretary and then deputy chairman of the Moldavian Republic Council of Trade Unions.

Olaru, Fedor Grigoryevich. Born 1948, Moldavian, agricultural electrical engineer by profession. Graduated from Leningrad Higher Party School. From the beginning of his career he has found himself in various areas of agricultural, party, and soviet work in Ungenskiy Rayon. Since 1985 he has been first secretary of Kelerashskiy Raykom of the Moldavian Communist Party. He is a deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet. He is a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Popushoy, Yevgeniy Petrovich. Born 1936, Moldavian, graduated from Kishinev State Medical Institute, doctor of medical science, professor. After work in the Komsomol, his entire career has been connected with the field of public health and the training of medical personnel for the republic. Since 1988 he has been dean of a pediatrics department, head of a department of social hygiene, and head of the organization of public health of the Kishinev State Medical Institute imeni N.A. Testemitsanu. He is a deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Strakh, Viktor Borisovich. Born 1935, Belorussian, secondary technical education. After service in the Soviet Army, he worked from 1963 in the city of Tiraspol. Presently he is an electrician at the factory for foundry machines imeni S.M. Kirov. He has repeatedly been elected member of the factory's party committee.

Tabunshchik, Georgiy Dmitriyevich. Born 1939, Gagauz. Graduated from Kishinev Agricultural Institute imeni M.V. Frunze and completed graduate studies at Kishinev State University imeni V.I. Lenin. He is a candidate of philosophical sciences. From 1962 he has done economic, party, and soviet work in Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon. From 1979 he worked as first secretary of Komratskiy Raykom of the Moldavian Communist Party. From 1987 he has been deputy chairman of the Moldavian SSR Gosplan. He is a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Chobanu, Yefin Shtefanovich. Born 1938, Moldavian, secondary education. He began working at the age of 14 at the "Biruintsa" kolkhoz in Kelerashskiy Rayon. After serving in the Army he worked in construction. Since 1980 he has been a team leader at the SU-52 Kishinev design and construction association "Monolit." He was elected delegate on an alternative basis to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Actions of Lvov Oblast Soviet Deplored

90UN1903A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
12 May 90 p 2

[Article by V. Lukyanenko, Zh. Rudenko and S. Ryabov, special correspondents of PRAVDA UKRAINY, Lvov: "Neighbors Are Not Elected... Notes From the Lvov 'Laboratory of Democracy'"]

[Text] A delightful young thing in a bright cap and embroidered Ukrainian blouse sings a beautiful Easter song in a voice that can bring tears to one's eyes. Above the hall tired from hard work, above the presidium table

heaped with loaves, packets of money, telegrams and bouquets of flowers, floats a pure heavenly call sent by children's voices: "Lord, give us unity."

Such a scene is almost the symbol of the session of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies which for several weeks now has been exciting the local populace. The flowers, loaves and telegrams are intended for the new elected representatives of the people. The money has been collected from all corners of the oblast for full and live broadcasting of the sessions. And the children's appeal is directed to all which exists.

How needed now is the spirit of unity and goodwill of the people of Lvov. Judging from the letters to the editor, the nonstop phone calls and comments of citizens to our newspaper's office, the oblast residents are alarmed by many, so to speak, "ambiguous" decisions of the local Soviets of the new convocation. And if all the worries, doubts and concerns are joined together, they can be divided into the following "themes:" national and state symbolism, the religious situation, and selection of personnel on a Party basis.

"Why is it that in the opera theater where the oblast Soviet session opened there were only yellow banners, where did the deputies put the national flags? Or will this be only Ukrainian power?" asks a Tatar resident of Lvov.

"I'm convinced that those of us who are Orthodox will have no life here. After all, over the city hall in Lvov is the 'national' flag, consecrated by Greek Catholics," cries a thin old woman.

Her friends spoke of another, young and energetic, excellently qualified for the job in the executive committee. The woman, a non-Party member, was given the suggestion to look for work somewhere else, with the hint that the problem wasn't her, but her husband, the secretary of a large Party organization, who could negatively affect her ideological views.

Looking at the facts and recalling the statements, addresses and names, one has to ask oneself: why should people be calm? After all, by decision of the majority of the deputies before their very eyes busts of Lenin are removed from many of the meeting halls or covered with curtains, and the Soviet way of life and the Communist Party are threatened from the official podiums. How can one reconcile the campaign platforms of many candidates who generously promised to serve the interests of all Lvov residents with the open discrimination against colleagues who are not members of the "Democratic Bloc?" Can democracy be permeated with suspicion, hostility, the aggressive desire to put oneself above other people's dignity and, at the same time, obedient to the collective? The ceremonial opening of the oblast session comes to mind, where only that was asserted which, in the opinion of the "democrats," corresponds to the Ukrainian national spirit and Christian thinking. The hymn "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina" was sung as though people were setting off for an heroic campaign. And

during the ritual prayer the camera's lens focused on the tense faces of the people's elected representatives, who had temporarily or permanently forgotten that behind them stand the voters—not only Greek Catholics, but also Orthodox, Catholics, Atheists and Baptists, representatives of Islam and numerous other religions.

The Lvov area has been proclaimed an "island of freedom" and a "laboratory of democracy," it is stressed everywhere that the present session is the first session of the democratic convocation. Defining its place in the correlation of social and political forces, the oblast Soviet "in its first words" declared its solidarity with those it considers genuine democrats: Lithuania and the Leningrad and Moscow Soviets.

And by the way, the Lvov soviet is clearly different from those to whom it send greetings. There is no debate here "among ourselves," no general pluralism of opinions. The majority here is unified and disciplined, it reminds one of a well-rehearsed orchestra in which a "false" note is quickly drowned out by a loud chorus.

They say it's better to see once than to hear a hundred times. The live TV broadcast of the session for which the oblast public has not spared the money, has made it possible to understand without explanations "who is who." The TV screen illuminated the real "quality" of the new representatives of power like an incorruptible X-ray. What type of deputies does Lvov have today? Probably the same as everywhere else: various types. Bold and cautious, smart and not so smart, honest and crafty, modest and publicity-seeking. It is a cross section of our society. And one can confidently predict what should be expected from them from looking at the elected representatives and listening to their debates.

For example, O. Vitovich, S. Khmara, Ya. Putsko, N. Drak, V. Paranyuk and many other faces flitting past appear over and over in a long line at the microphones, and you know beforehand that you will not hear reasons and sound arguments. They are replaced by the sharp swords of hatred, the carving energy of vengeance. Against who and what? Lenin, socialism, the Communist Party, our irreversible history, naturally. The maximalism of Oleg Vitovich is understandable, expressing the raging souls of his contemporaries. The aggressiveness of Stepan Khmara is understandable, a person who left his convictions in his places of imprisonment. But why is it that others now speak with accusatory rage—scholars, journalists, writers, managers of farms and companies, well-educated people with degrees and titles, who themselves built, praised, and theoretically justified—not without compensation—the systems of previous values, or who simply remained silent while witnessing the ulcers of society? It doesn't take particular courage nowadays to shout "Communists out of the soviets!" The CPSU, which suffered the horrors of the past together with the people, itself instituted restructuring in society and in its own ranks. So that democracy and just laws would triumph, so that Soviet people could begin to live like human beings.

However, real, authentic life barely broke through into the hall where the sessions took place. Austere-looking fellows in armbands were letting only the invited deputies in. Greetings, songs, poems, readings of letters and telegrams takes up minutes, hours, whole days. The single refrain was the celebrated words of Shevchenko: "Fight and Be Victorious!" And the struggle unfolds, but - alas - with the famous phrase "Whoever is not with us is against us."

Here the head of the budget and finance department of the oblast executive committee is being confirmed, and one of the commissions in front of the TV camera declares: M. Kulchitskiy's candidacy is okay, but his ideological platform isn't quite right. To which the chairman of the meeting responds half-jokingly: "We'll use him like Lenin used the bourgeois experts, and win him over to our side!"

It was only two weeks after the session opened that the chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet, V. Chornovil, congratulated the deputies on their first concrete, practical decision. And the oblast procurator L. I. Zosimov asked for the floor. He warned that in some cases the deputies violate basic Soviet law and infringe upon the rights and dignity of citizens. He also offered legal assistance to those who wished it.

An interesting relationship has developed between the new Soviet and the mass media. The local young people's newspaper writes about the session only in complimentary tones, it likes everything. It is true that it published the speech by the secretary of the Lvov Komsomol Obkom to the oblast people's deputy, as it was supposed to do. It contains the lines: "We appeal to the oblast Soviet to use all the power of higher state authority in the oblast to prevent the incitement of any enmity, between nationalities and between ideas. Only political discussions, the logic of arguments and facts, not crude pressure on people's emotions can preserve common sense and peace in our region today." Will this appeal be heard?

It appears that the new power in Lvov believes itself to be above criticism. It snubbed the oblast newspaper LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA for its restrained comments about the deputies. Our correspondent had his accreditation to the session lifted for publishing "The Lvov Mata Hari and the Mysterious Major." The recent comment in the national newspaper PRAVDA on the attempted "professional prohibition" for communists evoked a storm of protest.

A tug-of-war is under way because of the oblast newspaper VILNA UKRAINA. Declaring the Lvov Communists an ordinary public organization (they account for 52 percent of the deputies in Soviets here of all levels), the session replaced the acting editor with someone else and adopted the decision to transfer this organ to the management of only the oblast Soviet. That is why the party obkom for now is adopting only warning statements, which in no way reduces the social tension.

To not mince words, the first weeks of the oblast Soviet's work have been characterized by a unique dictatorship of the "Democratic Bloc." This occurs at precisely the time when public consciousness is concluding that without a constructive opposition, one which does not keep its mouth closed, democracy is at best detrimental, if it is possible at all.

It's a paradox: precisely those deputies who spoke out against the secretive nature of decisions, against political and ideological dictatorship, are now acting according to the principles of the dictatorship of the majority. Almost all the positions in the oblast soviet and executive organs have been filled on a one-candidate basis. A "passing grade" for the candidates and documents is that they have been proposed by a "preparatory committee"—a narrow circle of leaders of the "Democratic Bloc."

The chairman of the oblast soviet V.M. Chornovil, enjoying indisputable authority with the victorious bloc, conducted the first democratic session with a firm hand.

Of course, the victorious euphoria is passing. Will the methods and tactics of deputies' work, which does not honor to those who declare themselves democrats, pass away with it?

We believe they must. After all, the Soviet is people's power, there must be accountability to the voters. The congratulatory telegrams are fading and the loaves of bread growing stale; daily bread must now go from this presidium table to the table of each resident of Lvov. And the work defined by the Ukrainian parliament must now be done in the "laboratory of democracy."

There is reason for hope. In the confined space of the session hall sober voices have already been heard, persons can be seen who are evidently capable of calming the loose reins of the runaway with a sure hand. A "Lvov Sobchak" has appeared, deputy N. Gnativ. The young deputies Ya. Rybak and R. Lopushanskiy have approached the microphone not often, not with slogans, but with questions and very practical recommendations; military deputies are beginning to enjoy respect in the session. And, of course, Vyacheslav Chornovil is remarkable as the chairman. Hoarse but indefatigable, overcoming his rebellious nature for the sake of compromise, he alone is able to calm the stormy sea of deputy passions.

They were probably stopped for the first time on the memorable anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, when a woman from the tragic Poleskiy village stood at the dais. She said, "Thank you that Lvov offers refuge to my countrymen, people who are suffering from radiation. But, forgive me, we are afraid to go to you."

And then one of us, a Lvov woman, remembered her own nine-story apartment building. A Noah's Ark, it took in under its roof Ukrainians and Russians, Chuvashes and Jews, Poles and Armenians, communists and non-Party members. No doormat is shaken out on a religious holiday, no one insults the atheist on the red

day on his calendar. People know that neighbors and relatives are not elected, we are fated to live together. And our life depends on us.

Lvov Oblast Political Struggle Described

90UN1944A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 May 90 p 2

[Article by PRAVDA UKRAINY Special Correspondents V. Lukyanenko, Zh. Rudenko and S. Ryabov, Lvov: "Bitter Fruit of Confrontation: Notes from the Lvov 'Laboratory of Democracy'"]

[Text] [PRAVDA UKRAINY Note: Continuation. First part published in the May 12th issue] A fact that has not been widely publicized but that is revealing: The first session of the Radyanskiy Rayon Soviet Democratic Convocation in Lvov decided to file a suit against a people's deputy of this Soviet. The initiative was all the more startling since we are not talking about a criminal case. The people's representatives from the "Democratic Bloc" wanted to sue Ukrainian Communist Party Radyanskiy Raykom First Secretary V. Borodiye because he installed a yellow and blue flag over the Party raykom and the rayispolkom buildings.

Just another legal conflict on the shaky ground of resolutions by local authorities? Not at all. This is a policy that has been clearly formulated by Rayon Soviet Chairman V. Repetilo, "I will struggle against Bolshevism."

Political sympathies and antipathies are each citizen's personal affair. The authorities' decisions are a declaration of the nature of authority and its responsibility to the people. But the decisions do not leave any doubt of the biased attitude particularly toward communists. They are not admitted to elective office. They are encouraging [him] to leave the Party (They asserted that they had just obtained an assurance from the Radyanskiy Rayon Executive Committee chairman that he is leaving the ranks of the CPSU). They tried to "pull the wool over" the eyes of oblast public education leaders while barely protecting the principle of selection according to Party membership and nationality.

What has been stated are not facts extracted from the overall picture but a position common to all of the Lvov Soviets in which the "Democratic Bloc" provided itself with a majority.

At an oblast soviet session, People's Deputy Ye. Gryniv stated that the new personnel concept is based on a candidate's competence, but under conditions that the communists cannot occupy leadership posts. A single path suggests combining diametrically opposed premises: If you want to be elected, then put away [your] Party membership card. The few expulsions are more likely evidence of the high conscious discipline of the deputies whose candidacies are being supported than to any consideration allowed by the leaders of the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Union] and Rukh.

Everyday the television screen continues to develop the pre-election stereotype with praiseworthy openness and with people's deputies' words while covering the session's work: The situation in economics, culture and education in the oblast is just short of being catastrophic and the Party and the communists are guilty [of creating it]. Speeches rarely occur without bitter attacks against the Communist Party. The communists' "political inferiority" complex is being maintained and is being further developed.

This is today's reality: The poles on the political axis have changed places and the Lvov Party Organization has turned out to be the opposition. The overall picture has not been changed by the fact that the peoples deputies and communists remained in separate rooms in the local corridors of power (rayon and city soviets). Honestly speaking, we did not expect anything different. Everything went down to utter defeat and their fruit were not slow to ripen.

"There was the impression that the leadership, from the obkom [Oblast Party Committee] to the raykoms, was literally in a stupor," said Lvov Veterinary Institute Partkom Secretary A.I. Kolotnitskiy. "We did not wait for either a political sense of direction or the support of leading organizations. We went into the elections without coordinating our efforts and without tactics. This would not have happened had we at the institute managed to mobilize and to help our candidates in the election campaign. Communists were disoriented and a fog of debilitating instructions "from above" constrained initiative.

"The issue about a change of leadership and developing a policy initiative should have been resolved after the USSR people's deputies elections," said Kineskop PO [Production Association] Partkom Deputy Secretary A.N. Melnik after analyzing the situation. Party Obkom First Secretary Ya.P. Pogrebnyak "disappeared." It was already clear at that time that the policy of maneuvering at the tail of social processes had also failed. However, feeble talk about consolidation that has not been supported by deeds and casting from side to side have continued. The main justification advanced has been, they said, that the situation in the oblast has been quiet. What kind of calm was it: like a rabbit facing a boa constrictor? Social order and political struggle are altogether different things. Everyone needs order but we were deathly "calm" in the struggle for political leadership and for the electorate's trust.

Practically all of the people we talked with were Party members who assessed the situation exactly like that. You can tentatively compare it to the "Lithuanian version:" Other forces seized the initiative while the leadership vacillated and yielded, the views of communists diverged and they debated among themselves.

The former obkom first secretary personal greatly facilitated this when he surrendered his position. Today Rukh movement members who sharply criticized the

bureau headed by Ya.P. Pogrebnyak think that his action was directed towards a "weighty dialogue with the democratic force's bloc." But dialogue is a reciprocal initiative and progress along the path of compromise. Actually, there were only unilateral concessions, stealing someone else's ideas, and personal agreements of the leaders without the knowledge of the Party and Rukh masses.

The people who did not join the "common" course remained aloof from the leadership. Lvov Party Gorkom First Secretary V.V. Sekretaryuk was dismissed. Gorkom Executive Secretary A.I. Martynyuk was sent to work in Kiev. Obkom Secretary M.G. Vasiliv lost his job, having dared to campaign for a people's deputy mandate after defeat of "Number One." The grumbling of the Party masses, which was all the more distinctly heard, was perceived as the "indignation of tranquility"; that is how Ya.P. Pogrebnyak assessed the appeal of Lvov's major enterprise partkoms to all communists.

Logically, but for too long, the communists went to the obkom plenum which recently resolved the organizational issue. Various parties have accused this plenum of hastiness and unpreparedness. They beautifully accused their opponents while they themselves master the art of the quick political response. For instance, an example: The plenum's decisions had still not been made and a group of CPSU members from the environment of the creative and scientific intelligentsia hastened to announce in the newspaper MOLODA GALICHINA that, "Today the forces of reaction are trying to take revenge on the people for the election defeat and to form a political headquarters for the struggle against democratic forces in the person of the new oblast Party leadership."

An address by the Lvov partkom secretary the essence of which was, figuratively speaking, to set a new course in the near future, to put the ship in order, and to stop being driven by the will of the waves agitated those who had managed to swim with the current and those who openly oppose the Party. The obkom plenum soberly and critically analyzed the situation and unequivocally confirmed adherence to consolidating healthy forces and a readiness to honestly cooperate with the Soviets and in the Soviets. The plenum accepted Ya.P. Pogrebnyak's voluntary resignation and he confirmed it in a televised speech.

The appearance of Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Sekretaryuk, the new "Number One" in the political arena, caused a perceptible upsurge in Party organizations. It seems that communists took heart and are preparing to demonstrate their political competence and the constructive nature of their views and causes. A Party group has finally been formed in the oblsoviet that is turning the initiative around little by little (alas!).

The plenum's decisions also caused a massive (now growing) attack from the "Democratic Bloc" and especially its extreme supporters. The torrent of criticism is

no accident. The prospect of delivering the communists from organizational-political paralysis does not suit its opponents. For the first time in recent memory, they sensed that they could lose political comfort. The new Party leader is intellectually strong, democratic, decisive and is, even by today's standards, daring and he has begun to actively meet with workers and Party members to promote his original ideas.

People's deputies from the "Democratic Bloc" were so obviously nervous that, after speaking about "Number One's" first steps during the session (retold to the "masses" third hand) that they even forgot to consult with each other like it is done here, with "panova." It did not get that far. The meaning of the discussion was reduced to the fact that they needed to somehow suppress the obkom secretary's statement and to isolate him from the people. Now they are documenting all of his statements and, as was observed earlier, they are looking for "legal snags." The fury of the attacks are not even equal to the defamation of "dissidents" by Suslov-Brezhnev propaganda.

And all this despite the obkom first secretary's unambiguous declaration that there is no alternative to cooperation and joint work for the oblast's economic, national, cultural and moral growth. It is clear that the leader is not organizing the "democrats" and is not capable of gathering the losing side's tattered forces and putting forward a strong policy of constructive opposition instead of being a humble "tail end." He is obviously not capable of rallying the Party ranks: Of nearly 1500 Party meetings that took place in the oblast, only about two dozen did not support the plenum's decision. This is probably exactly what accelerated the oblsoviet's decision concerning the demarcation of the activities of Party and government organs. The question is obviously urgent and legitimate. But any lawyer explains that this is a legislative problem to be uniformly decided by the highest organ of authority. However, people's deputies decided to prohibit Party organs from interfering in the oblast's State, economic and cultural life. Party committees with enterprises and organizations are to "go forward." Those who disobey will be held responsible in a legal process of which...there is none. As far as the oblsoviet's decision, it is not law but only an attempt to trip up those who are setting out on a new path.

No matter how much we would like to see first of all a constructive foundation in the Lvov Soviet's activities and the triumph of positive thoughts that were thoroughly oppressed in the years of stagnation! Alas! The facts are evidence of something else. The session's political decisions were objectively directed towards confrontation beginning with proclamations about "national symbols" by a local (!) organ of power and to open steps toward the removal of those ready to cooperate with the opposition. Toward the removal of the Party, they noted, which remains in power in the Ukrainian State.

Any confrontation is dangerous. Confrontation from all directions is especially so. It is reckless and out of order

to try to paint the political canvas in one color (while declaring it to be authentically multi-colored) when society was already inclined to understand many variations and free competition of various views as a guarantee of democracy. This is the "beaten path" to dictatorship.

It seems to us that the "laboratory of democracy" is stumbling along with just such a bias of euphoria.

While considering the plant roundtable agreement, Kineskop Production Association Worker's Collective Soviet resolved to remove all socio-political organizations from [plant] territory. To ban any political activities within plant walls. The partkom's initiative, if we must go into it we will all go together, did not arouse enthusiasm and cannot be covered with anything. For the present, the situation is preferable for Rukh members since, you see, holding endless rallies is their "avenue" and Party emphasis is in the workers collectives. But time is passing, we are tired of conducting rallies, and we want a normal, secure life. Just who and how is the daily "black" work being organized?

Generally speaking, undertaking to "depoliticize" workers collectives is absurd if only because social structures and industrial collectives cannot be politically indifferent. Work time is time at work, this is thrice true. But it is simply impractical to leave persuasion, sympathy, and a world view at the [plant] entrance checkpoint.

Finally, what is to be done with a workers collective where various socio-political organizations have already come into contact and have developed joint plans? Let us say that they have worked with mutual respect for a long time at the Lvov Veterinary Institute Partkom and the Rukh section. Initiatives from both sides (free labor to the state on Saturdays, the "living chain", order in dormitories, the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church, etc.) are being discussed and adopted. What is to be done with these [initiatives] that have already been planned for use in the common cause, for example, interference (quite legally) in the educational process? What is to be done with the Ukrainian Language Society the bulk of which is communist? To remove everything or just the party committee means to strike a blow against organizing a consolidation of strength which is acquiring quite real contours without [resorting to] demagoguery.

"If the various forces deputies will bang their heads together, if they will bang heads with parts of the workers collectives and dictate their unilateral will, then neither the electors nor the workers will benefit," Lvov Raysoviet People's Deputy I.A. Tertichniy said with conviction. "In the parliament, factions are legitimate and permitted. But the people elected us to do specific work. This means that work, and not political debate, is of paramount importance. I personally intend to meet with the voters as often as possible, to inform them, verify

their positions, and listen to the people. The people will elect the person that works that way.

There is every basis to think that just such an understanding of the situation is becoming firmly established in all oblast Party organizations.

A meeting with the newly elected leader of the Lvov communists, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Sekretaryuk confirmed this.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Just what should the "constructive opposition's" course of action be?

[Sekretaryuk] I am not tired of repeating that we, as the party that lost the elections, should maintain psychological control of ourselves and under no circumstance strike a "pose." We have a firm policy of working together in the interests of all Lvov's residents. Whether anyone likes it or not, the current soviet is our people's authority. We need to bring our work closer together [with the opposition], to jointly resolve issues like it is done, let us say, with the gorsoviet according to the organization of the Lenin Soiree and the First of May Rally.

Communists and Party organs in particular have the rich experience of economic organization in the most difficult circumstances. There is a solid intellectual potential. It is simply senseless to throw it away. We need to combine experience with the initiative of new local authority.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] However you are nevertheless personally blamed for kindling the confrontation and they demand your dismissal from these matters.

[Sekretaryuk] The alleged statement that "I am conducting war with the Soviets" is irresponsible. The fact is that a certain feeling of resentment for past persecutions is still holding sway over the victor. And they are selecting the worst and oldest methods of pressure on the new path. This is a very dangerous trend: The dictatorship of new political powers is slowly growing. Do the people need this? I therefore propose that one of the tasks of the constructive opposition, yes and the peoples cause, is to prevent this "mirror dictatorship." And this is a campaign. A normal, political campaign within the framework of democracy.

And nevertheless, I think that relations are normalizing. We need a free search, without reciprocal ultimatums or dictate, for a civilized system of government in which various democratically elected political forces are integrated.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Yet they associate your "toughness" with the alleged appeal you delivered to delimit spheres within the Party organization and to allegedly prepare a "kompromat" for communists you do not like.

[Sekretaryuk] The Party group in the oblsoviet has already launched a protest with regard to groundless accusations. I generally think that delimitation cannot be

the goal. On the contrary, the main goal is unity. This is of paramount importance. I repeat in all of my speeches, today it is simple, if Party organizations are not intellectually, ideologically and morally strong, no one will consider standing with us. This means that we need to apply all efforts so that people in all leading organizations and in all workers collectives rally around the idea of joint practical work. So that public opinion rejects confrontation and destabilization.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] What processes are going on in oblast Party organizations right now?

[Sekretaryuk] There is no simple answer. Nevertheless it is clear; work is being livened up. People are shaking off the stupor. We have stopped the collapse of the Party's prestige. The greatest concern is that Party cadres move forward who are capable of expressing long-term [goals] and "outstripping" ideas and decisively and sensibly conduct business.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] But how is this to be done if they try to push communists away from the cause?

[Sekretaryuk] I must say that a discussion from a position of strength will get nowhere with us. We will not surrender to a political dictate. In conclusion, I assure you: No communists in the Lvov area will be discharged from their work because they are communists and no people because they are of another nationality.

Political Power Struggle Between Old, New Forces in Lvov

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[Article by Georgiy Rozhnov: "Certain Political Forces..."]

[Text] It seems that we are unable to fight against authority. A tested method: A crowd of many thousands gathers on the square in front of the main party building and the people shout "Down with them!" and in unison they demand the ouster of one first secretary or the whole bureau at once. The former can still dig in his heels and fight back, but if the people outside the window do not calm down and their demands are supported by his more far-sighted advisers, he will submit the demanded resignation to an emergency plenum, gather up his papers, and haughtily leave. This was the case in Volgograd with Kalashnikov. Almost the same thing happened in Tyumen with Bobomyakov. And something similar—in Sverdlovsk with Bobykin.

But I shall be more precise—in all three cities there was a struggle not so much with authority as with the authorities, to replace leaders who have lost the people's confidence with ones whom the people can still trust.

The struggle for power is something altogether different. Here we are almost ignoramuses when it comes to this. But where were we to acquire this ability if for more than

seven decades the very idea of this was seditious, counterrevolutionary and, later, anti-Soviet; if for so long it has been beaten into our heads that this struggle presupposes only conspiracies, rebellion, overthrow of the system, and the threat of destruction of all ideals of socialism taken together? If just yesterday a stigma was attached to concepts so natural in any rule-of-law state such as opposition, factions, and blocks? Having grown up in the camp of single-party totalitarianism, we laughed at the squabbles of laborites and conservatives, democrats and republicans, not understanding that their competition is a guarantee of both democracy and the society which has gotten used to being free.

But is it not because we took so long and proceeded so timidly, even during the years of perestroika, toward the first free elections in the country, was it not because of this there was such shamefaced timidity and allegories in the programs of many candidates? Do you remember the kind of question that could bring practically any candidate to an impasse at a pre-election rally? Here it is, used over and over again: "Are you trying to grab power? Do you want to sit in the management chair?" Do you remember who answered in the affirmative and when: "Yes, I am struggling for power. Yes, I want to be the chairman of the ispolkom." Perhaps the name of the deputy Obolenskiy has already become a part of history, the one who nominated himself to the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet—the courage of the insane! Was there any other case like that?

I can name one. At the end of last summer I was in Lvov at a mass rally and the highest leaders and informal organizations were participating in it. A good friend of mine, one of the leaders of Rukh, Irina Kalinets, before the beginning of the speeches showed me who was who and then suddenly stopped and said:

"And there is Stepan Davymuka—the next chairman of our oblast ispolkom. He is a cybernetician, a philosopher, and an economist."

I smiled politely—a couple of steps away from us stood the present chairman, and I saw how he drove up in his Volga with its yellow headlights, how the highly placed police officials stood at attention before him, and how confidently and impressively he made his way to the platform with the microphone. And here I am shown erudite person, much too young for such a position, and, consequently, dressed in an unseemly manner in jeans and a shirt without a tie.

"When will we be able to congratulate him," I asked Irina, still with the stupid smile on my face.

"After the elections, in April. If we win, of course."

I must admit that I immediately forgot the name of the person they said would be the future head of the oblast, and as to why I can give it now—more about this a little later. Something else is more important, the main thing: Rukh and its followers, united into the Democratic Block of the Ukraine (DBU), even in the first round of

elections fulfilled their task, which they had never concealed—they received a majority in the oblast, city, and all rayon soviets of Lvov. After the second round they received an absolute majority. And power? This is what we shall be talking about. I think this question bothers more than just Lvov residents. Let us pose it more narrowly. If the turnover of power in the soviets to yesterday's opposition had become a reality does this mean that they actually took charge of things in Lvov and the oblast? No matter how much I strain my member I cannot think of a single political scientist, sociologist, or economist who would be aware of a mechanism for accomplishing such a turnover. It is naive to hope that the soviets would gain the power immediately, as the Constitution guarantees them. The administrative-command system, which has encumbered the entire management network with its politics and economics, has no intention of conceding anything either in terms of principles or even part of its hard-won prerogatives with their borderline legality. Are we really so naive as to count on voluntary capitulation of its protectors? Can we really not guess that the apparatchik of the nomenklatura never seriously believed that the slogan on the wall, "All power to the Soviets," would become a reality even today? That all the perquisites of power—the private office with a secretary and an assistant, the telephone with the seal on the dial, the growing file of complaints, the black automobile with yellow headlights, obedient accomplices in the police department, the KGB, trade, polyclinics, ticket offices, specialized sovkhoses, editorial offices of newspapers, radio, television, and publishing houses—all these overt and covert privileges that come with position would have to be relinquished, leaving them with nothing? The danger hanging over the head of the nomenklatura will undoubtedly consolidate and embitter everyone who belongs to this clan. They will have to defend themselves, their wives, their children, and their grandchildren—a sea will swallow them up, a catastrophe worse than the ecological one, and so far they cannot see a corner in which they can take shelter.

For the meaning of the revolutionary song was distorted by many of them to the point of being literal: "And as one man we shall die in the struggle for this..."

These or almost these thoughts have disturbed and are disturbing the Lvov deputies and the people who elected them. Here is proof: A city which has become accustomed to meetings, demonstrations, and pickets greeted the victory in the elections with restraint. There was no euphoria—it was just like any other day.

Mama telephoned from Lvov at the beginning of April. She said: "On the town hall where the city soviet is they have raised a new flag—a yellow and blue one, and the old one—red and blue—is hanging there as well. It is easier to get soap, sausage is available, but there is no butter at all. I watched television—the mayor took his oath on the Bible, the people wept and made the sign of the cross, perhaps they will throw out some butter, at least by Easter."

I understood: The deputies are showing audacity and disobedience; an oath sworn on the Bible and an officially raised national flag (yesterday the matter was still in the courts, it was "nationalistic")—these are just their first steps in carrying out the promises they made to the voters. Butter—later.

But what about Kiev? When can we expect a step in response? And what kind of step?

On 14 April, Holy Saturday, I saw reports from Lvov on the program "Vremya." Crowds of thousands were in front of the building of the party obkom—a plenum was being held there. The voice of the announcer: "Comrade Pogrebnyak has been relieved of the duties of first secretary and bureau member because of his retirement with a pension; he was replaced by Comrade Sekretaryuk." I did not understand what the people on the square wanted.

Three days later it became clearer. In PRAVDA there was a RATAU-TASS report from Kiev: "No! to Political Extremism" Here is a bit of the text: "Recently in Lvov, Ivano-Frankov, and Ternopol oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR certain political forces, having achieved majorities in the elections to local soviets in certain cities and rayons, have begun to openly carry out their ambitious intentions. In this connection the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers have come out with a statement. It notes that national propaganda is being unbridled under slogans of restoration of national self-awareness. The idea of so-called 'Galician autonomy' is being foisted on the people and there are active appeals for the Ukraine to secede from the USSR and create an 'independent Ukrainian state'... A large-scale campaign has been undertaken to discredit the Communist Party, psychological pressure on communists is being increased, they are being threatened with being fired from their jobs, they are being forced to withdraw from the CPSU..."

"Youth are being actively recruited for the illegal nationalist activity. Leaders of Rukh, the 'Ukrainian Helsinki Union,' the 'Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth,' and other politicized groupings are calling for them to fight for a 'free Ukraine,' to refuse to serve in the Soviet Army, and even try to recruit volunteers into 'national military formations.'"

"It is emphasized in the statement that all these processes are becoming dangerous because they are frequently directed and organized by newly created power organs and people's deputies are participating in them directly. Even the first decisions and practical steps of the power organs, particularly in Lvov...show their destructiveness and separatist essence."

The conclusion of the statement is familiar: The labor collectives, and veterans of war and labor resolutely demand and resolutely condemn, and the high authors promise to take resolute measures.

In this statement I was surprised not by the language, not by the style, and not by the intonation—I did not expect anything else. Something else is remarkable: The authority existing in Lvov today lost a typical epithet in the text—Soviet.

Twice I stood in line and bought a kilogram of meat for Mama and flew to Lvov on the same day.

I went directly from the plane to see Bogdan Dmitriyevich Kotik, that same city ispolkom chairman who took his oath on the Bible, but he still could not get any butter by Easter—there was nowhere to get it from. I have already introduced in to OGONEK readers in one of my articles and therefore I shall just add a couple of lines. Kotik is a party member who has traveled the typical path of a functionary—he was a first secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] obkom and he occupied various official offices of the party gorkom and obkom during the years of stagnation. This did not keep him from winning the confidence and respect of residents of the city—he was elected people's deputy of the Ukraine and of the oblast soviet, and he is perhaps the only mayor in the republic who retained his post after the recent elections. The reasons for this success? His unmarred personal reputation, his tolerance of political opponents, and his inclination for dialog and constructive debate. Anything else? Charm.

I went to Kotik with a newspaper in my hands: Have you read this? Always restrained and smiling with soft voice and manners, Bogdan Dmitriyevich could not control himself at first; his talk was tough as he waved this same newspaper:

"As a member of the gorkom bureau and a candidate member of the obkom bureau of the party, I assert: The statement made in Kiev was fully consistent with the times of stagnation, an obvious lack of desire to consider the political reality of the present day. A gross mistake whose consequences have not yet been felt. Separatist attitudes? Slander! The idea of 'Galician autonomy'—a lie. I have lived in Lvov all my life and I am well aware of the hopes of the citizens. And so: Even those I would call extremists have never expressed such rantings. President Yaruzelskiy recently traveled through Lvov and stopped here of a day. Alas, they gave him a lousy greeting. Why? Because they had their suspicions: The president would try to tear the western oblasts away from the Soviet Ukraine. I agree that this is absurd but something else is important: Even a rumor of a possible separation of Lvov from the Ukraine brought thousands of disturbed city dwellers out onto the streets and I had to calm them down. Do separatists act like that? And the last thing. Both our legal experts and I are convinced that the just concluded session of the city soviet did not adopt a single decision that would contradict the USSR Constitution."

"Are you a believer?" I asked.

"In other words, why did I, a communist, swear on the Bible? It belongs not only to believers—but to all of us. It asserts precisely the same human values which I have sworn to uphold."

"Why did they remove Pogrebnyak?"

"They needed someone on whom to place the blame for their defeat in the elections—this is one thing. It was necessary to punish the first secretary for his recognition of this defeat, for his congratulating the winners, and for his readiness to cooperate with the new members of the soviets—this is the second thing. They needed a strong hand which could pound its fist on the table—that is the third thing. I was at the plenum; I spoke and then left immediately—I did not consider it worthy of myself to continue to participate in these apparatchik games and tolerate the dictatorship of the Central Committee representative who had come from Kiev. It was like personal insults against me."

"Did Pogrebnyak really sign a request for retirement?"

"You take a guess," Kotik smiled. "Or best of all, ask Yakov Petrovich himself—he is here in Lvov. And then think of whether or not such a statement could come from Kiev while Pogrebnyak was first secretary of the obkom."

I deliberately neglected to ask the mayor how the session of the city soviet went, what decisions were made there, and what principle he followed in forming his cabinet—what kind of discussion could replace the evidence of an eye witness, which I intended to become? If their days of development were already behind Kotik and his colleagues and the new leaders had taken over the offices of the ispolkom, the oblast ispolkom had neither leaders nor offices yet. I came to the session on the second day of its work after the Easter holidays—they were continuing to hear candidates for the post of chairman of the oblast ispolkom. It would be difficult for me to ask the reader to participate with me in the work of the session unless I discussed at least briefly the person who conducts it for from 10 to 12 hours each day—Vyacheslav Maksimovich Chernovol. A week ago he was elected chairman of the Lvov Congress of People's Deputies. He is 54 years old, he is thin, he is always pale, his voice is hoarse, and his speech is rapid and precise with irreproachable grammar. He graduated from the journalism department of Kiev University, worked on the Kiev newspaper MOLODAYA GWARDIYA, and was also engaged in Komsomol work. After 1965 he has spent 15 years in prisons, camps, and in exile. All for the same thing: "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." His books have been published only in the West. In 1975 he was awarded the Nicholas Tomalin Prize which the London newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES confers on foreign journalists fighting for human rights. I hope that it is now clear why Chernovol was given such long sentences. He has not yet been rehabilitated.

And so, the session was the morning meeting of 18 April. There were two flags at the table of the Presidium—state

and national. Of the 197 deputies 172 were in attendance. Among them 63 were members of the CPSU and nine were Komsomol members. The rest gravitated to various informal associations but officially they declared themselves to be independent of any parties. There was no clear division into factions—both Rukh and the Democratic Bloc created by it include many communists and Komsomol members. The deputies from the military stayed somewhat apart; they were the only ones who always sat together in a row, and on their left flank was a general.

Having spent six days at the session and talked with centrists, moderates, and extreme radicals, I was not sure whether it was worthwhile to include in my reports everything I saw and heard—it was all painfully familiar. From the broadcasts of the meetings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Believe me, it was all the same—the long lines at the microphones in the hall, the rejoinders from the hall, the polite urging of the chairman, the departures from the rules, and several times a day appeals for patience, mutual respect, and, of course, the achievement of a consensus. Sometimes one would hear statements that were, to put it mildly, ill-considered which struck one by their extreme judgments. The only difference was that in Moscow we heard appeals to prohibit cooperatives, leasing, and all perestroika in general in one fell swoop while in Lvov they suggested kicking October and Pioneer organizations out of the schools and sending volunteers for the international brigade to Lithuania. Incidentally, the reaction of the chairman here was harsher—from taking the floor away from the speaker to turning off the microphone.

But what was unique, local, still unusual for us? A good deal. If the chairman did not intervene (and this is a fairly rare thing), the deputy representing the minority was able to say everything that came to mind, and never once did the majority try to drown him out with applause. Therefore, this style of polemics is completely unfamiliar. I do not know whether the deputies in the Kremlin gave any thought to the cost of broadcasting their meetings—the discussion of money began the first day here, people learned about it in the city and the oblast, and immediately people started coming with their hands held out to the hall where the session was being held. I must confess that during the first two days I thought that the people crowding around the entrance early every morning had come to the deputies with complaints but it turned out that they had come with money. By the beginning of the fifth session around the table of the Presidium there were plastic bags with the immense sum of donations of 560,000 rubles. Sometimes the chairman of the soviet would read the letters that accompanied these donations—it was difficult to listen to them without shedding tears. There was an incredibly large amount of mail addressed to the session; practically all the large production and agricultural associations, VUZ's, and certain military units sent their congratulations and support for the decisions adopted by

the deputies. I always wonder if the authors of the statement I mentioned above were aware of this popular support for the new soviet authorities. Having already studied attentively the few decisions that were adopted by sessions of the city and oblast soviets of people's deputies and compared my impressions with the competent opinion of legal experts, I can testify that not a single one of these contradicts the constitution, and I found neither separatism nor nationalism, not to mention extremism, in a single one of them. Were the enthusiastic supporters of our ideological purity really so confused by the oath sworn on the Bible, the national flag raised along with the state flag, and the voices saying "Christ is risen!" which were heard at the session during the first days of Easter. Of course it was not only and not so much that we are now becoming more and more tolerant of religion. There is something else which is much more significant: Both the city and the oblast soviets in their initial appeals to the voters stated that they, in keeping with the Constitution, were taking all the power into their own hands and would not allow any intervention in their affairs by party organs or party organizations. In those same statements they discussed directly their awareness of the resistance the deputies could expect from conservative forces—if you will recall, we discussed this above.

And they were not mistaken! I thought that the statement from Kiev was the first sign of the beginning resistance from the old system and the new Soviet authorities—with the meager amount of information I had received from TASS I was mistaken. On 2 April, a day before the opening of the first session of the city soviet, the people's deputies received an ukase from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine of 30 March 1990 concerning changes in the structures of the ispolkoms of the oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies. They received them and they were shocked. The ispolkoms which were just about to be elected were from now on to be spared from leadership of the committee for radio and television, the state printing and publishing office, and, which is quite incredible, the internal affairs administration. To be honest, we should recognize the perspicacity, vigilance, and speed of reaction of Ukrainian President Valentina Shevchenko: As soon as it became known that at least in three oblasts of the republic the democratic bloc had won, its future ispolkoms were warned in advance—not all of the power would go to their newly elected soviets! Just try to take command of the militia now or to speak through the radio microphones or television cameras, or to stick your nose in the printing shops—you are not the authorities for them, you are not the leadership.

I asked the acting chief of the oblast internal affairs administration, a colonel in the domestic service, I. Gots:

"What kind of sign will there be on your building now?"

"The same one—'Administration of Internal Affairs of the Ispolkom of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.'"

"But you are no longer under the jurisdiction of that soviet. Whose jurisdiction are you under?"

"The Ministry of Internal Affairs?"—the colonel asked himself the question. "No, they have not ordered us to take down the sign."

"Who?"

The colonel pointed at the ceiling.

It is remarkable that his subordinates, especially the rank-and-file policemen, were quite disturbed about their alienation from soviet power and sent all kind of letters of protest to the session: To whom would they now address their requests for housing, space in kindergartens, or a garden plot?

I have no doubt that their dissatisfaction was one of the reasons why in the first days in April a mass grouping of workers of the republic procurator's office and internal affairs ministry came to Lvov. High-ranking officers from Kiev are now in each rayon division and in each internal affairs administration—all the chiefs and the majority of investigators, operatives, and state automotive inspectors are under their supervision. Having too many big wheels around has upset the subordinates: Now they have the first deputy minister of internal affairs, the deputy chief of the political administration, the deputy chief of the administration for maintaining public order, the deputy chief of the state automotive inspection—a total of 111 high-ranking ministry officers are in charge of them!

The deputies at both sessions were gripped by a quite understandable uneasiness and the population—regular panic. The city, which has not yet recovered from the bloody police battle of 1 October, had every reason to see in those who were sent there something that was by no means a good will mission. The republic deputy prosecutor Sinyakov and the first deputy minister of internal affairs Durdinets tried to placate the deputies: The republic law enforcement organs were alarmed by the outbreak of crime in the city and oblast and had come to render concrete assistance.

Colonel Gots, whom we met before, told me in this regard:

"The crime level in Lvov and the oblast is below the average for the Ukraine. The majority of those who came here are only getting in our way. And how am I to explain to the people's deputies the more than strange fact that the brigades of the procurator's office and the internal affairs ministry arrived right on the eve of the opening of the first session of the city soviet?"

Knowing from my own experience how such revelations to the press end up for internal affairs ministry workers, I ask General Durdinets not to be too hard on the colonel

and it cannot be ruled out that this person truly believes in glasnost and the right to have one's own opinion. And it is not the person with whom I spoke but I who am drawing the logical conclusion from what has been said: Both with their ukase and their sending high emissaries to Lvov, Kiev has dealt a significant blow to the legally elected organs of power who are disobedient to them.

But regardless of how strong it may be, the center cannot pursue its policy in the local areas this way: Do they really intend to send all the members of their departments here? They need their own people there.

Was Comrade Yakov Petrovich Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the Lvov party obkom, such a person? Up until quite recently—undoubtedly. As was the custom in Kiev, Pogrebnyak maliciously and threateningly fulminated against the first secretary of the party gorkom, Volkov, and the mayor, Kotik, with whom we are already familiar, for their sincere desire to conduct a dialogue with that same Rukh or the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic church, which has been persecuted until recently: "Make advances!"

One cannot accuse Pogrebnyak of being spineless either: Both in March of 1988 and in October of last year when the police used clubs on the demonstrators the first secretary was somehow on the sidelines of this indecent conduct—he did not approve of the extremes nor did he condemn them. In last year's and this year's elections Yakov Petrovich received neither the Moscow nor the Kiev mandate but he still became a deputy of the oblast soviet. During the pre-election marathon Pogrebnyak understood the main thing—he plays to the people who have the locals behind them. So Volkov and Kotik were right: It is necessary to cooperate with the informals, make reasonable compromises, and support a cause the people have in common. These thoughts of the first secretary, which were expressed by him in the obkom bureau, at rallies, and on the television screen, sharply increased his ratings, as it is now fashionable to say, and sent an alarm signal to the center, to Kiev. Pogrebnyak heard this signal and estimated—there was a month and a half left before the party conference and it was necessary to manage to present his viewpoint in the party organizations and labor collectives, and not forget about the party club "Democratic Alternative" either: Somehow it was hard to believe that they had brought things to the point of a split. He could manage!

And here on 14 April there was the plenum and retirement.

I waited until the recess in the session meetings and invited Pogrebnyak to have a bite to eat in the cafeteria. Both the session hall and this cafeteria are shared by the party obkom and oblispolkom and therefore the deputies were fed in the previous style and even with a certain refinement. The waiters in their dinner jackets, the dinner service on the long tables—whatever you want, just take it and eat. Yakov Petrovich asked only for a cup of coffee, he stirred it for a long time in its small cup, it

shook slightly, he noticed this, became angry with himself, and place the spoon on the saucer. After some thought he decided to have a fresh cucumber and a couple of small sausages. He arrived at the meeting early, sat in the back rows, and read newspapers. I knew that he was still in power. There was something different from those meetings long ago—his frequent smile. Was it sad, or comical, or tormented—I did not know at the time.

"Yakov Petrovich," I asked, "did you really submit your resignation? And was it your own idea?"

"You should try the sausages," he said. "When was the last time you ate sausages without cellophane?"

He finished stirring his coffee and slowly drank the cup down.

"I really did turn in my resignation. Yuriy Nikiforovich Yelchenko, the secretary of the Central Committee, called me."

"And what did he say?"

"On that same day the announcement had gone to Kiev, through official communications channels. That was on 5 April."

On that day when we met Pogrebnyak had been a pensioner for four days already. When we were standing in the cafeteria deputies would come up to us from time to time—officials, informals, two colonels, a clergyman—they shook hands, smiled, and gave us a couple of good, cheerful words. In the morning when the former first secretary went to the session hundreds of people standing at the entrance greeted him with an ovation. The next day I saw a videotape of the actual demonstration which took place in front of the obkom building during the plenum—a couple of seconds of it were shown on the program "Vremya". We were accustomed to having such demonstrations signal the removal of first secretaries. Here they had protested against this removal. There were many communists from plants, from the university, and from the polytechnical school; there were also those we still call informals. I saw Viktor Furmanov, the chairman of the committee for protection of citizens' rights, in one of the still frames and I remembered: After the police slaughter on 1 October he stood in front of the same kind of crowd in front of the same building and shouted: "Down with them!"

"Viktor Afanasyevich," I asked, "why are you defending Pogrebnyak?"

Furmanov answered:

"It is not only Pogrebnyak. If they assure us that the party is the initiator of perestroika, why is it that here in Lvov the leaders from the times of stagnation are assuming power? Why is a conservative replacing a reformer? Do you know who the first secretary is now? Sekretaryuk! He was the top man in the city 15 years ago, at the beginning of the seventies. First he was chairman of the city ispolkom and then first secretary of the

gorkom, and he was removed in 1987. Is he not a conservative? Just look at the decisions adopted by the party obkom during the first hours of his leadership and just listen to his speech to the railroad workers—and you tell me he is not a conservative?"

Another frame of the videotape: Correspondents from Central Television were trying to get into the plenum meeting hall, and on guard at the tightly closed doors was the deputy minister of internal affairs of the Ukraine, Lieutenant General Durdinets, and there were the stern faces of the demonstrators, their banners held over their heads.

The first secretary of the Lvov party gorkom, V. Volkov:

"On the eve of the plenum I was visited by secretaries of the large party organizations: the bus plant, a number of scientific research institutes, and the Lvovpribor Association; they represented thousands of communists. They had one demand: Not to accept Pogrebnyak's resignation and to conduct the elections of the first secretary at the party conference. I informed participants in the plenum of this before the meeting began. They did not listen to me. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Yu. Yelchenko, stuck to his guns and one got the feeling that Pogrebnyak's retirement had already been predetermined. The plenum was unusually undemocratic; the meeting was not broadcast on radio or television; and not a single one of the speeches of obkom members was published in the newspapers. Why all this secrecy? I think that far from all communists know that a member of the party obkom working at the production association imeni 50-Letiye Oktyabrya, Dudykevich, announced her withdrawal from the CPSU or that obkom members—the chairman of the committee for the protection of nature, Lyaskovskaya, and the chairman of the board of the Union of Artists, Professor Sadovskiy—left the meeting. The chairman of the gorispolkom did the same thing."

Volkov is not in a pleasant position today—he is the one who in June 1987 was replaced in the position of first secretary of the party gorkom by V. Sekretaryuk, who heads the obkom today. Therefore I understand why Viktor Aleksandrovich does not want to say what legacy was left to him at this recent time. And I myself am not inclined to blame anybody for his past and judge a leader of the time of stagnation from today's positions. Therefore we should look and see what the new first secretary of the party obkom, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Sekretaryuk, has done during the first days he has spent in this post which was so unexpected by him and many Lvov citizens. Let us look first of all on the plane of the continuation of our discussion about the relationship between the party authority and the Soviet authority; more concretely—the work and decisions of the session of the oblast soviet. That memorable plenum, chaired by Sekretaryuk, adopted a resolution whose echoes are being heard to this day: "On oblast newspapers." It is short, and therefore I shall quote it in full: "In spite of the separation of the functions of party and soviet

organizations that has been implemented, the plenum thinks that the newspapers VILNA UKRAINA and LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA should henceforth be published as organs of the Lvov obkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. In the event that the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies disagrees, the oblast newspapers are to be published as organs of the party obkom and the oblast soviet should be ordered to solve the problem of its press organ according to the established procedure."

This resolution was barely proclaimed at the session of the oblast soviet and all the questions earmarked for consideration were set aside. The seats in the hall were instantaneously emptied—the deputies were standing in long lines waiting to get to the podium and the three microphones. Their main questions: If the newspapers are to be published jointly, why did the obkom not consult with the session when deciding their destinies? Why does the decree give such a free interpretation to the constitutionally reinforced separation of the functions of the party and soviet organizations: "In spite of.."? Why does it allow itself to usurp the right of publication of the two newspapers, and uses the tone of an ultimatum with the soviet: "ordered"? And is it really so hard to understand that if the question of publishing a Soviet newspaper is resolved in keeping with the "established procedure" then it is not likely that the reader will see its first issue before next year: Where will they find the paper and the printing facilities and how will they break through the bureaucratic obstacles of this procedure?

Every action generates a counteraction, the more so in the political sphere. The session is making its own decision on the spot: to leave LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA for the obkom and to take VILNA UKRAINA for itself. Understanding quite well that the implementation of this decree will be suspended in air, the session is demanding a minimum for the time being—in both newspapers to remove the reference to their belonging to the oblast soviet. During all of those six days when I was in Lvov the session officially insisted on its demand six times and each time it was ignored. One of the deputies said to me: "I have the impression that we are not conducting a session of the highest legislative organ of Soviet power on the Lvov area but some kind of unsanctioned rally whose resolution is not mandatory for anyone."

The chairman of the oblast soviet, V. Chernovol, asked an oral question of the editor of the newspaper VILNA UKRAINA, N. Ilnitskiy:

"Do you feel obliged to carry out the decision of the soviet authorities?"

The editor answered:

"As a citizen I must but as a communist I cannot."

I hope that now we are beginning to understand more clearly the method of struggle of the structures of authoritarian power that have developed in our country with its disobedient soviets. There are at least two of them. The first is an attack on their rights (recall the ukase of 30 March). The second is to boycott or block the decisions that are made (recall the position of the obkom and the response of the editor). Blocking is the most effective at the state level which is backed by the law. An example: The session of the city soviet makes a decision to turn the cathedral of St. Yura to the Ukrainian Catholic Church but the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine immediately overturns it.

They have not forgotten about another tried and true method of fighting against the soviet, at least in Lvov Oblast: compromising it in the mass media and in public statements. The two Lvov newspapers that are the subject of the dispute report the work of the session so meagerly and with such prejudice that one is ashamed of one's colleagues. The Kiev newspapers responded with immense articles in the spirit of the announcement we already know about, and PRAVDA—with a cartoon on the first page. And you have to take it and say nothing because oblast soviet does not have its own newspaper. There is (I cannot call it anything else) an overt provocation of social unrest because, no matter what happens, the oblast soviet has been elected in legal general elections and can demand respect for the will of the people, at least respect and consideration.

But polemic is polemic and offenses are offenses, but the voters are expecting from the session an answer to at least one question: Who will be in charge of the oblast? Who will take the executive authority into their hands?

After the discussions and after a comparison and analysis of the programs of five candidates for the post of chairman of the Lvov oblispolkom, the session chose Stepan Antonovich Davymuka—yes, the same one whose rise to the peak of local power was predicted to me as early as August. He was 43 years old and a graduate of the polytechnical institute here; he worked as chief of the special design bureau of the Mikropribor production association. He was a member of the CPSU and now has no party. He presented his program with winning honesty and he disarmed people with his logic. I am convinced that the Lvov area accumulated a good deal of economic potential during the years of Soviet power and that in this sense it is the leader among the eastern oblasts—there industrialization goes far back and here it is relatively recent. There is much less obsolete equipment in the plants and factories than there is, say, in Kharkov or Poltava, and a number of enterprises are quite unique in the newness of their technology. Where except in Lvov do they already produce television sets of the fourth generation and—the miracle of miracles—personal computers? The peasantry here is also stronger than anywhere else; the feeling of being the master in farming has not been rooted out—45 years is not the same as 73. Well, it also has the same troubles, problems, and misfortunes that they have throughout the country.

Discussions of autonomy and breaking with the Union are regarded as nonsense, the result of illiteracy, and rubbish that is not so much political as economic. Economic independence, freedom in conducting reforms, and the unacceptability of a dictatorship of the departments are another matter. The principle of the selection of command means a high level of professionalism on a general educational basis, democratic views, and an orientation in regional political situations.

Of the 171 people who participated in the voting, 142 gave their vote to Davymuka. An indisputable majority. The sound of the applause in the hall merged with the noisy enthusiasm of thousands of people outside the windows. The chairman stepped up onto a slightly elevated surface and placed his hand on the Bible:

"I, Stepan Davymuka, by your will, esteemed colleague-deputies, have been elected chairman of the executive committee of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies..."

When this brief celebration was over I approached Mikhail Ilich Kirey—a minute ago he had ended his 10-year tenure in the pose of chairman of the oblispolkom. I asked him this question: "What do you wish for your successor?"

"Why are you talking to me?" Mikhail Ilich shrugged his shoulders. "I am unemployed."

The next morning a local photocorrespondent and I occupied a position at the entrance to the oblispolkom. The subject of the future photograph: The new chairman of the oblispolkom drives up to the driveway—a frame. The new chairman enters his office—another frame. The first visitor or the first ring of the telephone or the first paper for his signature—another frame. We had to hurry—in three days Davymuka left for Kiev for a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

At 9:30 my colleague assumed his stance: He recognized the Volga that was driving up. Out of the car came Kirey, the unemployed. The policeman saluted him. We still waited for Davymuka—he came running up, panting, and straightened his tie. "To hell with these streetcars." We were naive people—the former chairman was in no hurry to give up his office or his automobile. A couple of days later I saw Mikhail Ilich driving up in the same Volga to the opera theater and he sat down in the first row of the presidium of the festive meeting on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary. It was his custom.

Stepan Antonovich signed the papers that were thrust at him, either in the first office he came to, or on the window sill, or on his briefcase in the session hall. I asked if he would hire a professional assistant with a party card. In the ispolkom would there be the persecutions of communists that were discussed in the statement I have mentioned several times?

The chairman stopped smiling: You will get your answer now, at the session. After dinner V. Yavorskiy, a CPSU

member who had held the same position under the previous soviet, was elected deputy chairman of the oblispolkom.

To a certain degree I understand the people who have their doubts: Will yesterday's humanitarians who have spent years in jail and in exile without gaining experience in state service, be good managers today? That same Vyacheslav Cerhnovol, the chairman of the oblast soviet? Fortunately, Vyacheslav Maksimovich asked himself this question. He does not intend to point the finger at the builders, land reclamation workers, scholars, or peasants—this is why one creates the apparatus (and where would one be without it?) of the oblispolkom with professionals in each branch. As concerns the soviet's political course, its strategic directions, here a group of consultants have come to his assistance—among the people's deputies there are jurists, sociologists, and political scientists, not to mention people employed in narrower specialties. And it is their concern to make sure that the decisions are not made offhandedly, that they are carefully measured against existing legislation.

We are already tired of dissension and conflict, and the majority do not want to invest any more in the "struggle for THAT."

With all of their imperfections the old authority structures are still realistic and still alive, and they can and should coexist and interact with the authority of the new soviets, not matter how much disagreement there may be.

This is especially apparent in Lvov: The party obkom and oblispolkom are in the same building, there is one entryway and one stairway for all. The obkom is on the third floor and the ispolkom on the second. There are only 33 stairs up and down. Would it really be so difficult for them to meet one another half way?

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Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Newly Computerized

*90UN1968A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
15 May 90 pp 1, 2*

[Article by V. Nikipelov, "Your Microphone Is On, Comrade Deputy..."]

[Text] The V.M. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences has developed a unique automated data system to service the operations of the republic Supreme Soviet.

The last preparations were under way yesterday at the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet building for the upcoming session, which in many ways will be unique. And this is perhaps why its technicians are nervous as never before. This is not surprising, since for the first time a whole series of very interesting achievements of modern electronics and computer technology will be

used here, enabling a substantial increase in the technical services available for the deputies' daily activities during sessions.

I am sitting at one of the seats in the meeting hall. Before me is an unusual console. Here is a slot labeled 'recording.' A deputy puts his special tape cartridge into it upon entering the hall, and it is automatically recorded in the computer center. The cartridge cannot be removed without pressing a special button. And when it is removed an emotionless computer records in its memory when this happens and makes an appropriate correction in the master list of deputies participating in the session at a given moment.

The computer also records those wishing to take the floor or to say something from their seat. How will this take place in practice?

"Look here, in front of you is a button labeled 'remarks from the rostrum.' You press it, and the signal you send is received by the computer center," explains my guide, the director of the financial management department of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Yu.V. Dobrovolskiy.

"Then, the computer formulates lists of those wishing to speak in the order they come in and 'feeds' them to the chairman's display screen. He can see who should be given the floor first of all, or leave the decision to the computer in the order in which requests for the floor are received. But you understand, this is a question of procedural rules."

"And if a deputy during the debate wishes to ask a question or make a rejoinder from his seat?"

"He has another button, labeled 'remarks from the floor.' When it is pressed, the machine records the request and transmits it to another display screen in front of the chairman."

"So let's say the chairman has given the floor to deputy Ivanenko at his seat, what happens then?"

"The operator enters the appropriate command in the computer, the deputy's name appears on two information boards located along the sides of the hall, and a signal appears at the deputy's seat."

"And the deputy doesn't have to go anywhere," adds the chief designer of the automated system, L.B. Baran. "He has a miniature, but very sensitive microphone built in in front of him."

"And what if someone has already posed a similar question so it is no longer needed, or several others have discussed everything that a deputy wanted to discuss from the rostrum?"

"For both cases there are special cancel buttons. When they are pressed, the computer instantly deletes the deputy from one or the other list," explains Leonid Borisovich.

I'm looking at a small magnetic tape the size of a pocket calendar. It is a deputy's unique calling card, one of which is issued to him against a signature sheet. The strict control is justified, since it contains the deputy's personal code and is his personal work tool during the sessions.

Each representative has a permanent seat with a special panel containing his name. But he can find himself somewhere else in the hall to work out a collective position on something or for any other reason. What then? The automated system, many parts of which are being patented, allows the deputy to vote from any seat in the hall, thanks to his personal magnetic tape.

It has one other noteworthy feature enabling its owner to participate in secret votes. The tape is placed into the recording slot by its other end, and any data on the voter is blocked from being transmitted to the computer's memory. The computer center can only conduct a total count, who voted for and who against, who abstained, and who—and this fourth item is appearing for the first time—did not take part in the vote while they were in the hall.

"Specialists guarantee that such voting is completely secret, they are prepared to undergo any testing," notes Yulian Vladimirovich Dobrovolskiy. "But nonetheless traditional ballots are being prepared as well. They can be used, for example, when electing the head of the republic."

There are no domestic systems comparable to the one developed in Kiev. Besides counting votes during balloting, it also contains a special recording system which enters data on all deputies and—at the first stage—provides a powerful data reference service. Later on, computer centers of the Council of Ministers, republic planning ministry and other ministries and departments will be linked to it.

In addition to the personal computers, the system uses entirely local technology: powerful modern computers, networks, display boards—all developed at the Glushkov institute and manufactured in Ukrainian enterprises. I should point out that the system in Moscow by the Phillips firm (costing five million dollars) only counts votes and records the participants in the voting.

"And what happens if the system suddenly goes down?" I ask its chief designer.

"Breakdowns and failures happen in even the most sophisticated technical systems," my interlocutor notes. "This happens even in space technology, both here and in such a technologically advanced country as the USA. That's why I would like for deputies and TV viewers to have an understanding attitude towards such emergencies. As for this system, it has a backup capacity. The switch to the backup takes place in an insignificant period of time, on the order of 40 milliseconds."

"What were the main difficulties to be overcome?"

"Besides the purely technical aspects: the deadlines. At first we just couldn't really grasp them. At the meeting in Moscow on the conditions for introducing such a system the representatives of several leading foreign firms asked for one and a half to two years. We signed the contract on September 15 of last year and began developing, designing, manufacturing..."

In addition to other problems, one of the most complex was the connection of several hundred microphones. Specialists from the Kiev radio broadcasting network were especially helpful in this. Some twenty kilometers of wiring were laid and soldered by specialists of the "Yug" model assembly administration, connecting all parts of the system. And of course, many workers of various offices of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet also actively participated in the assembly work.

The equipment was tested day and night. It is now undergoing its first test.

Rukh's Yavorivskiy on Movement's Plans

90UN2132A Moscow SOBESEDNİK in Russian
No 21, May 90 p 4

[Interview with V. Yavorivskiy, deputy chairman of Rukh, conducted by correspondent Mikhail Sokolov; place and date not specified: "Rukh: Standing its Ground and Getting Stronger"]

[Text] *The writer Vladimir Yavorivskiy was one of those who a year ago called for the creation of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika—Rukh. Today there is hardly anywhere in the republic, perhaps, where the Rukh organization is not at work. V. Yavorivskiy, deputy chairman of the Rukh, has himself been elected people's deputy of the USSR and the Ukraine. Our correspondent talks with him.*

[Sokolov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, what is the Rukh today? What kind of evolution has it undergone in the year of its most assertive political activity?

[Yavorivskiy] The Rukh is the Ukraine's first mass social and political organization uniting on the basis of the ideas of Ukrainian national revival practically all radical forces of the republic. But I would not say that the national idea has been the sole one. Together and on a par with it there are the ideas of the establishment of democracy and re-creation of a normal economy and civil society. We take account of the difference in the national mentality of the western and eastern regions. Whereas in the west of the republic the national feeling is heightened, in the east it has been lost to a large extent. Since our policy has been balanced, Rukh has been supported not only in Galitchina but also in the Donbass.

I fear that we Ukrainians would have taken much longer to awake from our political slumber had it not been for recognition of the planetary scale of the Chernobyl catastrophe. This tragedy roused and politicized people, who saw that the old authorities were unable to tackle the problems of the casualties and were covering up the dimensions of the disaster.... Rukh, on the other hand, immediately made of paramount importance the problem of glasnost. Young physicists from the Kiev Nuclear Research Institute conducted independent expert appraisals of the contaminated areas. Thanks to their public-spirited work, we managed to get the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] leadership to declassify the data on the contamination. We also embarked on specific assistance to the casualties. The cover up had led to the West's assistance being minimal. With the aid of the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States, Canada, and Australia we organized the Children of Chernobyl Assistance Fund, collected substantial amounts and commenced supplies of medicines. In a word, we established ourselves in society primarily by action.

[Sokolov] Nonetheless, Rukh and its activists have spent this year under the fire of criticism of the republic party press.

[Yavorivskiy] A clichéd "enemy image" was purposefully made of Rukh for our petty bourgeois. Methods of the Stalin times were employed: We were branded on behalf of veterans, peasants, workers.... But there was in this attack one positive aspect: Defending ourselves against the attacks of the old structures, we became more united than ever. After all, Rukh incorporates people of various political views. For example, leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (now the Ukrainian Republican Party) created by former political prisoner dissidents L. Lukyanenko, V. Chernovol, and M. and B. Goryn (they were the first to distinctly and unequivocally pose the question of the sovereignty of the Ukraine and suffered a great deal for this). Rukh was created also by radical Ukrainian communists, social democrats, deputies who supported the Interregional Group, the writers I. Drach and D. Pavlychko, the economist V. Chernyak.... Thanks to our unity on the common platform of rejection of the former policy line, the Shcherbitskiy legacy, we were able to stand our ground, become stronger, and win the people's support.

[Sokolov] Many people in the Ukraine currently are saying that the appearance of new political parties will lead to a split in the Rukh.

[Yavorivskiy] I believe that a normal process of crystallization of new structures is underway. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union has been converted into the Republican Party, the "Greens" have announced their presence, and organizing committees for the formation of peasant and democratic parties are at work. It is now as essential as the air we breathe that the country break loose from the one-party anchor, which is tying us to the past. The fact that new parties are emerging from the heart of Rukh by

no means signifies that the people's movement is breaking up. On the contrary, all the organizationally structured forces in opposition to the present Communist Party of the Ukraine are united within its framework.

The possibilities of such a bloc were shown by the election campaign, which proceeded under very complex conditions. The apparatus did everything to cut off the progressive candidates at the registration stage. I, for example, was not registered in Kiev and had to run in Kirovograd Oblast. We did not have our own press, and our candidates did not appear on television. Nonetheless, the election results did not disappoint me.

[Sokolov] But the Rukh deputies were unable to win a majority in the republic's parliament....

[Yavorivskiy] In the Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Soviets, deputies of a progressive persuasion have a stable majority. In the Ukrainian SSR we have the firm support of one-fourth of the deputies.

There are many members of parliament for whom the idea of Ukrainian national revival is not that pressing, but they are entirely in sympathy with our socioeconomic program and support the policy of the democratization of society. Some simply have not yet determined their position. We will conduct a dialogue with them and seek mutual understanding on specific issues. I believe that on a number of problems the Rukh platform could win the support of half the members of parliament.

[Sokolov] What are you taking to the first session of the Supreme Soviet?

[Yavorivskiy] The most important thing is to prevent reactionary laws, which could throw us back into the past, being pushed through. In such cases we will walk out and block the work. And this is not a question of personal ambitions. The fate of priority economic reforms will depend on the decision of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet: denationalization of property and revival of private farming.

We are offering also our draft law on the republic's sovereignty. It will not rock the boat: What has been permitted in Lithuania is currently impossible for the Ukraine....

[Sokolov] I would like a clarification of your position on the sovereignty issue. As far as I have seen for myself, there are in Rukh both supporters of the Ukraine's secession from the USSR and supporters of a confederation. Whose side are you on?

[Yavorivskiy] The Republican Party, which is popular mainly in western Ukraine, sets as the task the Ukraine's secession from the USSR. The Organizing Committee of the Democratic Party, of which I am also a member, is far less radical. Of course, the Ukrainian Republican Party has the constitutional right to pose the question

strictly, let it break with stereotypes, but we are formulating our task differently: a sovereign Ukrainian state in a community of European peoples.

Account needs to be taken of the opinion of considerable numbers of Ukrainians. Except for the brief interlude of 1918-1919, our people have not had their own statehood since the times of Bogdan Khmelnytsky. And this was 350 years ago. Relying on the historical memory is practically impossible. This is the fundamental difference compared with, for example, the Baltic. Considering political realities, we are unwilling to force events. A transitional period and confederation are needed.

[Sokolov] You would now in practice support a draft constitution like that drawn up by A.D. Sakharov?

[Yavorivskiy] Yes. Insofar as it ensured the real sovereignty of the states which would create such an alliance of Asian and European countries.

[Sokolov] But ideally you nonetheless aspire to an independent Ukraine?

[Yavorivskiy] There are, obviously, people for whom the Ukraine's independence is a goal. For me and my fellow thinkers this is a method of its economic and cultural revival. I believe that movement toward a new form of interstate relations would be a boon for the peoples of Russia and the other republics. Toward coexistence. It is necessary to break with imperial stereotypes, which are destabilizing the situation in the country, and seek ways to ensure that there is more democracy in the world. But not taking a running jump in an atmosphere of disintegration and chaos but taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by perestroika for revival rationally, by parliamentary methods, not pulling the people into the horror of civil war....

[Sokolov] Do you believe that there is such a danger?

[Yavorivskiy] In the Ukraine there are no objective reasons for interethnic conflicts, but some people are attempting to exacerbate the situation. Dirty leaflets were distributed in the winter concerning impending Jewish pogroms. Representatives of all nationalities of the republic together opposed the provocateurs at a 100,000-strong meeting organized by Rukh, declaring their solidarity in the struggle for democracy. This show of unity reassured many people. But the authors of the pogrom appeals are, after all, biding their time somewhere nearby!

[Sokolov] I consider the problem of the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars explosive. A people which has undergone savage punishment aspires to return to its historical homeland....

[Yavorivskiy] If we wish for a revival of the Ukraine, it would be dishonorable to wish it only for ourselves. We are for all the peoples who reside on republic territory having their own press, theaters, and schools. Democracy means one for all. And we are obliged to rectify the consequences of Stalin's crime. The people must return

and restore their autonomy within the confines of a democratic Ukraine or separate from it by way of a referendum.

But we are faced with another problem: Considerable resources, which the state lacks, are needed to build housing. The solution is to conduct with the leadership of the Crimean Tatar democratic movement negotiations on how to regulate the resettlement process, make it organized, and avoid conflicts with the present population of the Crimea.

[Sokolov] There is the opinion that the conversion of the Ukraine into a federal republic consisting of states of the U.S. type or lands, as in the FRG, could do away with many interregional problems.

[Yavorivskiy] The authors of this concept rightly point to the fact that the east, west, and south of the republic have considerable differences in levels of economic development and national self-awareness. But it has to be considered that the path toward the reunification of our entire people in a single state was very difficult. I do not consider the idea of a federation disastrous but its realization is premature as yet. It is necessary that the economy begin to breathe, that social life be normalized....

[Sokolov] In my view, you are extremely cautious for a reformer. Your opponents from the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, on the other hand, are accusing Rukh leaders of destabilizing the situation and thirsting for power.

[Yavorivskiy] We will leave the talk about "destabilization" to the conscience of the people who have brought the republic to the end of its tether. As far as the question of power is concerned, the aspiration to it is natural and normal. We cannot be twittering away from rostrums about changes and not aspire to the realization of our program! It is for this that we need to take hold of power. But this does not mean waging war. We will win the people's trust at elections.

[Sokolov] Rukh gained a mandate of trust in three oblasts. How is this influencing the situation in the republic?

[Yavorivskiy] I would not want to be euphoric. This is a tremendous responsibility. It is easy to remove the police officer from the entrance to the executive committee, but negotiating the stage of the test of power and achieving an improvement in the people's life are more difficult. If the new leaders have sufficient professional attributes and the new soviets show themselves to advantage, their example will be attractive. But they will by no means be working under hothouse conditions. They will encounter both sabotage and attempts to compromise them. The Ukrainian center, it seems to me, is beginning to pursue an imperial policy in respect of these regions. Some people cannot stomach the fact that people voted for Rukh and that the former dissident V. Chernovol has become chairman of the Lvov Soviet. And the very first

decision on hoisting the historic national Ukrainian yellow and blue flags alongside the official flags also was an excuse for persecution on the part of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee. We heard the shocking charge that certain forces had "seized power." Who had? Democratically elected deputies! The leadership of the Communist Party of the Ukraine has not recognized, evidently, that under conditions of pluralism the Communist Party is just one equal party. But the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee preserves as yet a monopoly on information. And it is not even a question of the majority of the republic's party papers being fully under the control of the apparatus and extremely biased (only VECHERNYY KIYEV manages to be relatively objective). The printing plants and the funds for paper are in the hands of conservatives. As television newsmen told us, there is a tacit instruction against showing on the screen certain people's deputies. I also am on the black list. But the situation is not hopeless: We have succeeded, albeit with great difficulty, in having three issues of Rukh's organ—NARODNAYA GAZETA—published in an edition of 20,000 in Zhitomir and have managed to negotiate the sale of it in Canada and the purchase of paper with the foreign currency thus earned, dozens of informal publications are appearing, and it will in the western oblasts, perhaps, be possible without scandal to divide funds for paper and printing plants between the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the soviets....

[Sokolov] There was a scandalous incident at a Rukh activity—the environmental mass meeting on 22 April—during the march along Kreshchatik. A group of activists of the Independent Ukrainian Youth Union (SNUM) behaved indecently at the Lenin monument. What can you say in this connection?

[Yavorivskiy] I conducted the meeting, at which the creation of the "Greens" Party was announced, together with the writer Yuriy Shcherbak. Then a march, in which tens of thousands of people participated, began. We walked along Kreshchatik, and I was surprised that the Lenin monument was cordoned off by the police. Did the authorities know that SNUM activity was being prepared? If so, why were we who were responsible for the activity not warned? I believe that we could have averted the scandal. My position is this: When people hurl to the ground, trample on, or burn books, whoever's, this is reminiscent of terrifying pages of world history. A book is a book. Doing violence to it is indecent. Thank God we have lived to see the times when it is possible and necessary to argue with Lenin. We have removed a deity from his pedestal, and we have before us a politician and his ideas. We may struggle against ideas and may reject them, but operating by such methods is impermissible.

[Sokolov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, many people currently are puzzled by the fact that the leaders of Rukh are citing among the national heroes of the Ukrainian people such figures as Hetman Mazepa, S. Petlyura, S. Bandera...

[Yavorivskiy] Our history has been written to the dictation of the system. The 20th century is drawing to a close, but we have no authentic written history of the Ukraine. It ended with the works of Grushevskiy. We need to investigate everything. Both the activity of Mazepa, who endeavored to restore Ukrainian statehood, and S. Petlyura, who in 1918-1919 headed the Ukrainian national republic. Objective material on them has now come to be published.

Separate mention should be made of S. Bandera and the Bandera campaign. We need to analyze seriously how it came about that a movement which started out as a political movement degenerated into gangsterism. I consider unacceptable just one thing: In place of old stereotypes, establishing new, polar-opposite ones. Earlier all were painted black, can everyone now just as indiscriminately be whitewashed?

Our history is appalling and tragic, but I hope that we will finally be able to tell the whole truth about the civil war, when brother went against brother, the famine of 1932-1933 artificially organized by Stalin, about what happened in western Ukraine during and after the war, and about how by the efforts of Shcherbitskiy and Brezhnev the Ukraine was brought to the present crisis.

[Sokolov] People have begun to speak of you recently as a candidate for the office of president of the Ukraine. Can you imagine yourself in this office?

[Yavorivskiy] I have no time for trying out some chair or other. I believe that we have many worthy candidates for this position. I see my place in the present Ukrainian political hurly-burly simply at the epicenter of events.... There is another important point: If a president is to be elected, it should not be on the basis of deputies' "fratricidal war" but publicly.

[Sokolov] Politics has captured you so strongly, seemingly, that we will not soon be seeing new books from you.

[Yavorivskiy] It is very annoying, but I have had to set aside part two of my novel about Chernobyl and preparation of a book on Hetman Razumovskiy. I will evidently regret having detached myself from my desk merely if the Ukrainian people do not acquire freedom in the coming years.

Ukrainian Parliament Fails To Elect Premier

90UN2253A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Sergey Tsikora: "The Parliament Seeks a Prime Minister"]

[Text] Kiev—When a second candidate for the post of the head of government of the Ukraine failed to get elected, the deputies understood that the parliament was facing a crisis.

This situation began to emerge immediately after an announcement on the results of voting for the first candidate. Because of a "failure to show up" by 90 deputies, the votes cast in favor of the contender for the post of prime minister, though constituting a majority, turned out to be insufficient for his confirmation in this position. Then V. Ivashko, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, nominated a new candidate for the post of prime minister—Vitold Pavlovich Fokin, who currently heads the republic's State Planning Commission. He was urgently called back from Moscow where he was on a business trip, and was delivered to the podium in the auditorium of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet literally from the railway terminal.

V. Fokin, one of the most cultured leaders in the last composition of the government of the republic, spent two and a half hours on the podium, telling the deputies about the ways he saw to solve acute economic and social problems in the republic. The improvised presentation of the program caused several pointed questions from the floor. However, honest answers were given to them though, perhaps, not to the liking of some people. Even opposition representatives in the parliament called on their members to support the candidacy of V. Fokin as a mature leader to whom the management of the republic economy may be entrusted during a complicated period of transition.

By the end of the day, the results of a secret vote were announced. The candidacy of V. Fokin was supported by 208 deputies, and 164 came out against him. This meant that the new contender failed to get the necessary number of votes, like the previous candidate (226 votes are required to win). Once again, 75 deputies did not take part in the voting. Where were they, why did they not vote? The parliament does not know the answers to these questions.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine did not have a third contender lined up. Under the circumstances, V. Ivashko called on the territorial associations of deputies and various groups in the parliament to submit to him the names of their candidates for the position of the head of the republic government.

Rising Crime Rate Traced From 1924

90UN2032A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in
Russian No 22, 2-8 June 90 p 8

[A compilation of statistical information by A. Petrov based on questions answered by Prof V. Luneyev, the chief academic at the Institute of Law and Government of the AN SSSR [Academy of Sciences of the USSR]

[Text] [Boxed item, a reader's letter] In one of the issues of "AiF" it was written that the press sometimes distorts the real picture of crime. This was termed "information-criminality" [breaking the law by giving misinformation]. What is the real state of affairs?

L. Lavrov, Ulyanovsk

All the calculations are made on the basis of a ratio accepted in the academic world—the number of crimes committed per 100,000 individuals.

Until 1960, we did not keep statistics on the crime rate, and that is why I can only give you the data we have for convictions: in 1924, per 100,000 individuals in the RSFSR there were 2,910 convictions; in 1926—1,774; in 1935—720. Before the war this figure fell to 540 (if one does not take into consideration "counter-revolutionary" and "labor" crimes committed; i. e., missing work days). During the war (1941-1945) the coefficient of convictions of individual citizens wavered between 482-542.

After the war, the crime rate began to rise, reaching its peak in 1947—809. And in 1954 it fell to 399.

In the second half of the 1950s, the crime rate increased much faster than the rate of the population.

In the years between 1957-1962, the criminal law's sphere of activity in the USSR narrowed; it became "more liberal." In connection with this, until the middle of the 60s the growth of the crime rate was unsteady. In 1965, the coefficient for crimes committed was 324, and [the coefficient] for the rate of conviction—249.

During the years of "stagnation" the authorities tried to unjustifiably enlarge [the extent to which one could be prosecuted for] criminal responsibility, a move which was related to the degeneration of social and lawful relations. In 1966, the CPSU Central Committee accepted only 15 resolutions, aimed at strengthening the struggle with crime, but there were about about 350 changes and additional clauses made to the criminal laws. But the crime rate increased. If in 1956 there were 579,116 crimes registered, i.e., 287 per 100,000 individuals, then by 1990 there were 2,461,692 crimes committed, or 852 per 100,000 individuals.

The growth rate of crime during the middle of the 33 years [for which there are statistics] amounted to 9.8 percent, but the [growth rate of the] population amounted to 1.2 percent. The pace in the growth of crime in these years varied; in 1989, it amounted to 31.8 percent.

One can explain this in various ways. For example, in 1983, the growth was caused by a deliberate "reduction" of negative [statistical sums], a shift in the politics of criminal law. The so-called "Andropov effect" appeared.

If one calculates the undisclosed number of crimes committed, the number of crimes committed is in fact significantly higher

The level of crimes for profit [or: white collar crimes] has climbed considerably: in the middle of the 60s they made up 40-45 percent; in 1989, they rose to 65 percent. In reality, crimes committed for profit have risen to account for more than 75 percent of the crimes committed, but many of these crimes are not calculated into the statistical tables for a variety of reasons.

The overall crime rate in 1966 increased 2.8 times, and crime for profit rose—3.8 times. Theft of government properties increased 4 times, and of personal properties—7 times. The number of crimes linked with narcotics grew 26 (!) times by 1986.

Domestic and monetary crimes increased at a much slower pace: in 33 years the embezzlement and misuse of office increased 1.5 times; bribery—1.8 times; speculation—3 times. And in 1988, bribery already decreased 37.2 percent; in 1989, [it decreased] by 12.9 percent. However, this calculation does not reflect a hundredth part and by some estimates even a thousandth part of the real picture. Citizens who have suffered, as a rule, report to the organs of the militia. But the embezzlement of government properties is not always reported. Indeed, often the report should come from those people, who are guilty of embezzlement, who control the embezzled valuables or conceal them.

Organized crime can conditionally be divided into "criminal" and "economic" types of crime. The latter is more dangerous, since it exists parallel to the government structures and has at its disposal the "bureaucratic" and "market" spheres of activity.

According to the Minister of Interior Affairs of the USSR, V. Bakatin, in 1989 there were more than 1,600 criminal groups, which is 60 percent more than in 1988. But these figures only partially reflect the struggle with the most obvious part of organized transgression—"criminal."

USSR MVD Official on Organized Crime, Corruption

90UN1987A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in
Russian No 21, 23 May 90 p 12

[Article by Aleksandr Gurov, chief, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Department for Combatting Organized Crime, and Yuriy Shchekochikin, commentator: "Lion Hunting or Shadow Boxing: Is the Mafia Also Ready for Reform?"]

[Text] Now we can already talk about how, almost two years ago, after our first dialogue with A.I. Gurov (who at that time was still a scientific associate of the USSR MVD VNII [Scientific Research Institute]), entitled "The Lion Has Sprung!", special conferences were held in two cities—Moscow and Leningrad. At these conferences the item published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was subjected to an extremely thorough and careful analysis. The conferences were conducted in an atmosphere of strict secrecy, behind closed doors, so to speak. But we have managed to discover that they were upset there regarding the newspaper item in question and expressed their annoyance ("If the press has begun to proceed like the heavy artillery, then the 'shell-holes' will follow."). But optimistic notes were also sounded at the same time ("Don't worry: the 'mentors' will swing back and forth for a very long time.").

I hope that you have already guessed that these conferences were held not in houses of political education: the leaders of the Mafia "families," along with some invited "legal thieves," wanted to get their bearings amid the new circumstances. At that time, in 1988, the organs of law and order were compelled to officially acknowledge the existence of organized crime in the USSR. As a result, the Sixth Administration of the USSR MVD was created in order to combat it.

Not long after our first dialogue, entitled "Under the Mafia's Control," it was proposed that A.I. Gurov (who, at that time, was already a doctor of sciences) quit academic science, switch to the practical struggle against the phenomenon which he was studying, and head up the new administration. And recently—I hope that this is likewise well-known to our readers—A.I. Gurov became a member of Russia's body of deputies.

So now let's proceed to the gist of our conversation. What is happening nowadays?

First—a statistic. Our country now has a total of 1200 policemen who are employed in six divisions and administrations (we are not speaking now about criminal investigation and the BKhSS [Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation]). A total of 1200 from Brest to Vladivostok of those who have the duty of uncovering not individual crimes, but entire criminal communities; they must meticulously trace all the connections, and they are empowered, regardless of the person or his position, to destroy that dense web of corruption which, under the conditions of our economic system, is also the true godfather—or, to be more exact, the godmother—of our Mafia. Corruption into which our country has sunk as if into a peatbog. And here we have only 1200 staff persons. Not many—even though they are headed up by A.I. Gurov.

But there is more to be said about this.

"These new subdivisions have not been defined specifically enough," A.I. Gurov considers, "and this has led to the local authorities beginning to put pressure on them. In one locality the fellows even wanted to declare a

strike! They cited the fact that people were meddling in matters which were none of their business. But what is meant by 'none of their business?' The Sixth Division goes to the 'top,' and it is on this 'top,' let's assume, that the UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] chief depends. And sometimes the usual types of reprisals are begun under various pretexts such as the following: one of our lads was given a reprimand because his car was bumped by a bus. Nowadays, with their greater degree of independence, the UVD has manifested a greater freedom in meting out reprisals."

In the present-day situation A.I. Gurov agrees with the proposal made by Minister V.V. Vakatin concerning the establishment of inter-regional subdivisions for combating organized crime and having them vertically subordinate to Moscow, i.e., creating a "special police," like the American FBI. But no money has been provided for this.

"Therefore, I would like," says A.I. Gurov, "to put the following question to the financial organs: Where does the money obtained by the MVD disappear to? Because, of course, this amounts to tens, or even hundreds, of millions which are earned in the 'colonies.' Where, i.e., into what cash-box, do the tens of millions of rubles confiscated from criminals go?"

"Well, how much money is needed?"

"More than 20 million."

On the one hand, a small apparatus, a constant "brake" on the locality, is refused financing. Well, what about "on the other hand"? What kinds of persons are our lions these days?

Here's the picture as of May 1990.

There is an ongoing, further consolidation of the criminal groupings: small groups are forming larger ones on the basis of negotiated agreements. There is also an ongoing seizure of territories and, in connection with this, an exacerbation of the struggle for spheres of influence (the rackets act as a kind of catalyst). This is A.I. Gurov's first conclusion. The second is the merging of economic crime and common crime. The third is the Mafia's intrusion into the state economy and the distribution system (for bribes, entire trains have been turned into different directions). Fourth is the intrusion of organized crime into politics with the help of corrupted officials (in A.I. Gurov's opinion, there have already been attempts to push actual repeat offenders into soviets). Fifth: in contrast to the West, our country's Mafia actively utilizes teenagers for its own purposes. And, finally, sixth: our Mafia is beginning to go out into the international arena.

On this last point, I asked A.I. Gurov to provide a somewhat more detailed explanation.

"We have information that hard-currency criminal cash offices—the so-called 'exchanges'—have already been set up. Our Mafiosi travel to the West in order to

establish ties with their colleagues—primarily from among our own emigres. A year ago in Poland an international congress of the criminal world took place. It was here that the 'Soviet' group participated for the first time."

"In my opinion, this integration does not suit the West so much, right?"

"In America, as I know, a special effort is made to seek out policemen from among our emigres because the latter know the specifics of our criminal world...."

"But, of course, a struggle against the Mafia has begun! Although, judging by the latest press reports, the rackets have become a symbol of the Mafia. Is this not so, Aleksandr Ivanovich?"

He did not agree.

"Racketeering is merely one type of the 'crime business,' which, by the way, is not completely 'organized'—only by 30-40 percent."

Gurov explained as follows: "Instead of thoroughly studying the strategy and tactics of organized crime and exposing the ties of corruption, the still sparse, understaffed Sixth Divisions are hurled, like crews of firemen, into the fight against racketeering. But this is a matter for the ordinary criminal investigative organs. The hullabaloo about racketeers, in my opinion, is even advantageous to the criminal world, inasmuch as it diverts the police from more serious matters."

"Nevertheless, racketeers are being caught! And that's a good thing!"

"Nobody has yet caught the really big racketeers. What is the real racket? Here's what it is! The criminal organization has installed itself as a kind of security service for entrepreneurs, and the latter—in exchange for a guarantee of security—agree to pay the criminal organization a 'gift' or 'tribute.' That is, there is a merging of economic and common crime. And nobody complains about anyone."

"Then just who," I asked, "are those racketeers against whom our press is constantly making such a noise?"

Gurov calls them the "shadowy tax inspectorate," since the state inspectorate of the type that instills fear in Western entrepreneurs is still in the embryonic stage in our country.

I cannot fully agree with A.I. Gurov. Yes, naturally, the racketeers take advantage of our given system of chance—to "milk" those cooperatives which engage in somewhat "shady" deals, but, of course, these are not the only ones doing the "milking"! Other persons pay "visits" not with pistols and knives, but with threats to close down the cooperative for violations of "sanitary" or "fire" regulations. Or they simply create such a schedule of checkups that the cooperative will be doomed to bankruptcy.

"Yes," A.I. Gurov agreed, "a new term has even emerges—'state racketeering.' I can state with complete assurance that hardly a single cooperative has begun its existence without bribing somebody. In Moscow alone, according to press reports, approximately 30 million rubles have been handed over by cooperatives in the form of bribes."

"I get the impression, Aleksandr Ivanovich, that nowadays, with the change of political power in our country, many officials of the old apparatus have a presentiment of losing their comfortable armchairs and are hurrying to take as much as possible."

A.I. Gurov added with bitterness that certain police officials are not averse to accepting large bribes in order to immediately write a report closing out the case. Therefore, a strict purge is being conducted.

"They tell us: show us ties involving corruption based on an example of a specific criminal case. But corruption is a phenomenon for which our law has no definition."

"That is, the Criminal Code needs to be amended?"

"It's not just a matter of that. We need a law concerning the fight against corruption. It should include political, economic, and criminal measures. And we must create a mechanism for combatting corruption which would provide a punishment for everyone—I repeat—everyone! who turns out to be involved in corruption. Nowadays (and my words can be corroborated by any honest police official) many persons are taking advantage of another privilege—withdrawing from responsibility with the aid of titles, ranks, positions, posts, and even government awards."

I asked A.I. Gurov about something that has recently struck me as strange: shouting loudest of all about the fight against the Mafia are the representatives of the administrative-command system; they blame the democratic circles for the very emergence of the Mafia. They shout "Down with the Mafia!" and "No to the Shady or Gray Economy!" at meetings; and they call for a struggle against those market relations to which the country is finally making the transition (we cannot remain the world preserve of long lines!).

"On the one hand," A.I. Gurov considers, "the bureaucrats, in calling for a struggle against the Mafia (but not doing anything to bring this about!), want not to remain behind the times. On the other hand, they are diverting the people's attention from the truly guilty parties: because, after all, it's easiest to put the blame for our empty shelves on those very same cooperative operators."

A.I. Gurov made the following proposal:

"Let's trace the chain of events. The system engendered the 'shadow or gray economy'; the latter, in turn, engendered organized crime, which then gave life to corruption. Alas, nowadays we are fighting against a shadow. So what if a criminal group is eliminated, and then ties of

corruption are exposed? The trouble is that new ones immediately spring up to take their place. Because, you know, so far socioeconomic relations have changed in words only! And that's the reason why this happens."

And he went on to say the following:

"Today our businessman is still compelled, on the whole, to become a profiteer. Why is that so? It's because he cannot obtain anything or sell anything, i.e., he is a profiteer willy-nilly, forced to be so by the state. But what if the law were on his side? But the racketeers come and take from him some of his lawfully earned money, and this after he has already paid a reasonable—and I emphasize, reasonable—tax. What will the entrepreneur do then? Immediately run to the police! Nowadays the law on responsibility for profiteering is dictated by the economy."

In his opinion, during the transition to a market economy many crimes will die out on their own. Other crimes will begin to appear: non-payment of taxes, illegal banking operations, etc.

But the most difficult period will be the transition to market relations.

"Organized crime will rise precipitously," Gurov is convinced. "We will have to experience a shock. The Mafia will be virulent for some length of time."

"What length of time? And what will happen then?"

"Some of them will go into legitimate businesses, after 'laundering' their money, as happened, for example, in the United States. Nowadays the Americans are no longer worried about the 'Cosa Nostra,' nor are the Italians concerned about the 'Camorra' ('We are keeping tabs on it,' they told me). The West is disturbed only about the new wave of drug trafficking."

"That is to say, the Mafia has its place in the West?"

"Precisely. Its place and its types of businesses. The police are keeping tabs on them. But in our country there is no 'place' for the Mafia in the society. It is everywhere. And therefore, when the transition to a market begins, the Mafia will have to seek out its own place."

I asked him to explain in somewhat greater detail what he meant by the Mafia seeking out its own place.

Gurov sees two types of "shadow economy" in our country: one is criminal; the other is "willy-nilly."

"Just what is the distinction to be made between them?"

"The criminal type includes robbery, theft, larceny, and embezzlement on a particularly large scale. It would be criminal to legalize it. And the second type includes those persons who, for various reasons, do not want to work under the state 'tabs.' They must be provided with the most favorable system possible."

"But the criminal type also wants to 'launder money.'"

"Everyone wants to, but not everybody will be able to. If they were to be legalized, we would have nowhere to put them. And the remaining ones need to be hit hard."

"But for many long years pressure from the state has made our businesses accustomed to criminal relations!"

"Sometimes I look at the criminals—at the 'economic' ones—and I think the following: if, under the conditions of a totalitarian regime, they learned how to develop their 'underground' production so cleverly (for example, that same Ivanov in Moscow Oblast!), it signifies that an enterprise director cannot produce much of anything within the framework of the law!"

"Yes," I agreed, "the gray economy is flexible and mobile; it reacts quickly to demand. And it has 'educated' in its ranks many 'economists' such as our Gosplan never even deamed of. I remember how, many years ago—during the time of Brezhnev, Rashidov, Shchelokov, et al.—I wrote two articles about one man in Tashkent whose nickname was Mardo. He had created an underground syndicate which was supplying the entire republic with timber, spare parts, iron, etc. Yes, in exchange for bribes; yes, by creating a genuinely Mafia-type 'family' around himself; yes, by either buying out or eliminating his opponents. Yes! But he was capable of doing this while having only a second-grade education, as well as three court convictions. I could not call Mardo the 'hero of our times'—and not even because the 1980's had just begun, and it would have been strange to designate him as a hero when another person was pinning one hero's star after another on his own chest. At that time I was interested in the psychology of an important official who was prepared, in exchange for a miserly pittance, to run errands like a little boy for this Tashkent wheeler-dealer. And, to this very day, I'm grateful to the newspaper for publishing my articles entitled 'Business People' and 'Mohs' during 'those' years. Even at that time I understood (and in Tashkent I became convinced with my own eyes of that which can now be acknowledged without running away from there) what kind of shadow lay upon our country. I understood that I had come across not simply some 'wheeler-dealers' but the Mafia. But at that time I also understood and wrote the following about Mardo: 'What if the energy which he has were to be put to good use?' As I wrote this, I myself was thinking: But Mardo cannot be defined or confined within the Gosplan. So he will become just another bribe-taker or a quiet, unnoticed destroyer of our country."

"And I uttered the following thought aloud: Perhaps it is advantageous for the administrative-command system to have such wheeler-dealers remain underground. What do you think?"

"Perhaps," said A.I. Gurov.

I asked the following question: "Isn't the criminal world also preparing to make the transition to the new economic system? Hasn't it begun to master new crafts and

trades, the businesses engaged in by the Western Mafia: drugs, gambling houses, and the like?"

A.I. Gurov considers that this process has not yet begun to speed up. In his opinion, our country has no drug-type Mafia.

"But why is that?"

"Why risk it when there are many methods of enriching themselves by easier means, such as racketeering, controlling prostitutes, embezzlement, and profiteering? After, all, you know, there are 200 ways to embezzle state property just by utilizing one's official position. In what other country can you still see this? But when we close off these channels, then the drug business will grow stronger here in our country."

"And what about the arms trade?"

"The arms trade is proceeding very actively because demand has manifested itself."

"Is the arms business strong and intense?"

"So far there is no powerful organization. There are mobile groups—ranging from 10 to 15 persons each—which are engaged in seeking out and buying up arms.... The military men say that these dealers simply form 'alliances' with some garrisons: the latter sell various items such as cartridges and gun-barrels.... There has never been such a flare-up as this. Arms are very expensive. This may already be termed a sphere of business.... All the more so in that there are very many arms in our country...."

Our conversation occurred several days ago in A.I. Gurov's office on Zhitnoy Square, in that very same office about which so many rumors are circulating through the criminal world these days: What do they know there? What do they not know? What plans are they working out...? The possibility is not excluded, I thought, that these same global problems are also being discussed in another house in Moscow, but by "other persons."

"What can these 'other persons' be talking about nowadays, Aleksandr Ivanovich?"

"About a new strategy. About how to 'launder' money, how to deposit it in a bank abroad. How to chase some groups from a certain airport and establish themselves there. How to 'ransom' one of their own people who has gotten into trouble. With which of the bureaucrats they should establish ties, while there are still some left to establish ties with...."

And, in conclusion, let me talk about a recent encounter.

It was on Easter Eve. Some friends and I were standing in a crowd a few steps from Gorkiy Street, waiting, like everybody else, for the religious procession. And suddenly I heard my last name being called out. I looked around and saw that a stranger was smiling and looking

at me. "Yes?" I said expectantly, while looking at him. And then he gave me his own last name. "So he gave it out...right on the street openly in public?" I recall that this thought flashed through my mind.

I had found out about this man, whom I had never seen face to face, about three years ago. I found out a great deal, although I will never be able to prove anything. However, when he was arrested, nevertheless, it took a few weeks for his "case" to be requested in high places, and he was set free. When we began to study his biography, a messenger showed up at our editorial offices; he was a former official of the Moscow Party Gorkom. "Are you concerning yourself with such-and-such a case?" he asked point-blank. "Where did you get that information?" I asked him. "He knows that you are concerning yourself with his case." And then he spent a long time trying to find out what I know and what proofs I had.

Yes, upon seeing this "Mister X" then on Easter Eve, I recalled everything and again understood everything. What interpretation should be given to these "things that I know"? What interpretation should be given to the enormous amounts of information possessed by A.I. Gurov, as long as the system itself—like no other—is amenable to the existence of the Mafia?

Roundtable on Prison Reform Measures

90UN1988A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 90 p 4

[Roundtable materials prepared by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA legal observer L. Nikitinskiy, "Is the Age of Freedom Nowhere To Be Seen?"]

[Text] Our newspaper regularly discusses the issue of criminal punishment. We are not looking for sensation behind the high walls with barbed wire. But the "zones" are closely tied to "freedom." Those in jail are not sentenced for life. What will they be like when they get out?

Our articles on this topic never fail to evoke considerable mail from our readers. It includes many letters from current and former prisoners, prison system officials and family members of prisoners. At the roundtable the editorial staff is representing not only the newspaper, but also this circle of our readers.

Participants in the roundtable are: Yuriy Isakovich KALININ, administration director of the Main Administration for Correctional Affairs (GUID) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Vladimir Alekseevich BUKIN, deputy director of the administration, and Viktor Aleksandrovich VIKULOV, department chief of the GUID. Science is represented by doctors of juridical sciences Aleksandr Solomonovich MIKHLIN and Genadiy Fedorovich KOKHRYAKOV. Valeriy Fedorovich

ABRAMKIN and Marina Vladimirovna RUMSHISKAYA are representing the still little-known public organization **The Public Center to Promote Humanization of the Penitentiary System.**

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In order to make our conversation more substantive right away and to get an idea of the scale of the problem, we would like to specify how many prisoners are now serving a sentence with deprivation of freedom?

[Yu. Kalinin] Colonies of all types of conditions presently hold around 762,000 persons. It can be noted that in the last several years the corrective labor system has noticeably "lost weight."

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Let's begin the discussion with a letter. We chose at random one of dozens of such letters. Anatoliy Prikhodkin, a former prisoner from Tomsk, shares his impressions of our penitentiary system: "In the term 'corrective labor colony' the word 'corrective' has crept in by mistake. The colony does not correct, it deforms and enrages, being essentially a school and seedbed of crime. If there are not radical changes soon, we will be overwhelmed by a wave of cruel and carefully conceived crimes. But the USSR MVD prefers to talk rather than undertaking radical reforms..."

[A. Mikhlin] The time has in fact arrived for changes in the corrective system. But the author of this letter is wrong about our inactivity. We constantly raise with lawmakers the question of reforming the correctional labor system. If such a reform is overdue, then it is because of the total volume of urgent legislative work, and not by our fault. Scholars and practitioners have worked out a new concept for the Foundations of Criminal-Corrective Law; a preliminary draft has been published.

We are devoting considerable attention to differentiating the conditions of imprisonment.

Under the draft, in all cases punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom will begin with conditions of strict isolation. The prisoners, at least those who have committed violent crimes, will spend the first six months to a year (depending on the type of regime) in deprivation of freedom in locked facilities. To a certain extent this can be viewed as making the regime harder at the initial stage.

But later on, if the prisoner conducts himself positively, he will be transferred to better conditions, perhaps to an easier regime. The number of rights and privileges available to the prisoner is being noticeably expanded: visitors, packages, possibilities for spending money earned in the colony, etc. This will create an effective incentive for correcting prisoners' behavior.

There are now substantial restrictions during conditions of deprivation of freedom on contacts with family and friends. The result is that, according to statistics, half the families of all female prisoners and one-third of the

families of male prisoners break up. We are working on making contacts easier. In addition to increasing the number of meetings and transfers to improved and easier conditions of imprisonment, in addition to complete removal of all limits on correspondence, privileges are being introduced such as telephone calls to relatives and even leave for prisoners, including those with good behavior, with travel outside the colony. An experiment is already underway to "break in" these privileges, which are contained in the draft of the Foundations of Criminal-Corrective Law.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Many readers in their letters cannot understand the unjustified limitations of the regime in the colonies. For example, why are there any limitations on correspondence? Why can packages only be received after half of one's sentence is completed?

[Yu. Kalinin] I've been working in the corrective labor system for 20 years, and have gone through practically all its levels. During that time, I have seen how the regime in the colonies has eased—perhaps slowly, but steadily. So the reform draft briefly outlined by Professor Mikhlin continues existing trends. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that a sentence contains an element of punishment and must be reasonably strict. It would be wrong to make the living conditions in a colony the same as those in freedom.

[G. Khokhryakov] The approach to the problems demonstrated in the draft by the MVD's GUID and its research institute seems to me to be unconstructive. You're wracking your brains about how to make prison a good place. But can it be made good at all? Of course the draft is a step forward compared to what we have today. But it can also turn out to be a step to nowhere, since it lacks a firm philosophical foundation. Our position today is that punishment is a benefit for society. But punishment in all cases is evil. And before drafts are written thought must be given to ways of reducing this evil and its consequences. The question must be considered more widely: in the framework of our state's entire criminal law policy.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Nonetheless, let's look at the draft. Judging from it, there will soon be substantial changes in the life of prisoners. It would be interesting to know what the interested representatives of society think of this. But first, Valeriy Fedorovich, briefly tell our readers about the new public organization you head.

[V. Abramkin] The Public Center to Promote Humanization of the Penitentiary System was founded recently, a little over a year ago, under the International Fund for the Survival and Development of Mankind, at the initiative of Academician A. D. Sakharov, several peoples deputies and our public group "Prison and Freedom." The main directions of our work are: first, sociological and other research in corrective facilities and among

former prisoners, and preparation of appropriate recommendations; second, offering assistance to the extent possible to present and former prisoners.

The Center has 23 full-time employees and several dozen volunteer assistants. We are supported both by the International Fund for the Survival and Development of Mankind and by donations from cooperatives and individuals. Our funds are used to pay the Center's employees and to assist prisoners in the form of packages, medicine and distribution of literature of a moral and religious nature. We also engage lawyers to write appeals requested by individual prisoners for wrongful sentences.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How did the idea for such a center arise?

[V. Abramkin] Very simply. I myself am a former prisoner, having served two three-year sentences under the famous, no longer existing Article 190 for "deliberately disseminating false ideas defaming the Soviet state and social system." At that time, we were called "dissidents." I went first to the Butyrka, then to a colony in Novoaltaysk, where I began to study the world of prisons, since I am a researcher by nature. As a result of my curiosity, I received my second sentence in the first colony a few days before my release. But this gave me the chance to study both the general and strict regimes in one of the colonies of Krasnoyarsk.

Released at the end of 1985 at the end of my sentence and allowed to return to Moscow only in 1988, I began to form around myself a group of people with similar ideas, which we at first called "Prison and Freedom." The gradual democratization of our society has enabled us to become legal and to officially pursue our research and philanthropic work. But for the time being we prefer not to advertise our organization due to our lack of manpower and funds. We can barely cope with the flood of correspondence we now receive.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So how do you evaluate the draft reform of the penitentiary system being prepared?

[V. Abramkin] It seems to me that in its approach to the issue the new doctrinal model is in no way different from the existing corrective labor codex. And excuse the sharpness of the expression, but this approach is completely unscientific. Yes, a certain humanization is proposed. But mechanical humanization without a radical change in the foundations of the system and of attitudes towards it can only engender a new wave of destabilization in the prison system.

A rational approach to the question requires that the goals of the system be defined first of all. Ideally, colonies exist to correct the prisoners; nobody would seem to argue with this. But what does "correction" mean? Those who work in the corrective labor system unthinkingly cite three characteristics: first, fulfilling quotas; second, participation in amateur organizations;

and third, no violations of the regime. But these aren't indications of correction, of correctability, but of controllability.

Of course, it's more convenient for a colony official to work with controllable people. But the paradox is that a colony releases not corrected people, not individuals, but concealed accommodators, deprived of initiative, independent thought and firm moral foundations. They are broken people. They will be equally controllable in a gang, which they fall in with when they cannot find a residence permit or work after release.

I think that if a person has learned how to "fit in," to find his place in prison, then he will not be able to live normally after his release. The so-called "persons who have firmly set out on the path to correction," who are the first to be released before their sentence is up, are in fact the most dangerous from the criminological standpoint. As to those remaining in prison after all the amnesties, the colony continues to break them, until all their personalities are ground away, and prisoners are turned into controllable robots...

[Yu. Kalinin] I'd like to differ with Valeriy Fedorovich. But before that I must say that those of us working in the corrective labor system are prepared to cooperate with the Public Center; we would be glad to get acquainted with them. Our goals are not contradictory, and our methods complement each other. We can search for mutual understanding. And now to the point.

A person who adapts himself in prison is dangerous, but someone who maliciously violates the rules is no less dangerous. All the more so since those who adapt are educated not only by the colony, but by all our system, of which the colony is a part. But I am not going to start naming as accommodators all those who work well in the colony and participate in amateur organizations. I am even more opposed to identifying the so-called "refuser," characterized by refusal to carry out the administration's instructions, as the colony's best people. On the other hand, I agree that the colony levels out the personality, that the administration needs to focus more on work with individuals. There is a shortage of strength and resources, as well as knowledge.

[G. Khokhryakov] It's not a question of know-how, but of the fact that levelling of personalities is a goal of the existing punishment system. It replaces education and correction. It's this attempt to level out the personality that to a large degree creates the "refuser." These are often people who want to save their own personality from the destructive, blind impact of the prison conditions, from perverted ideological rape, from deadening monotonous work.

[V. Abramkin] The motive force of the colony today is not cooperation but conflict. Two orders cruelly contest with each other: the formal and the informal. Both sides use underground methods of fighting in their blindness: the administration suppresses the prisoners, the prisoners revolt and take hostages; it is an outright war. For

the administration, the prisoner is the enemy; for the prisoner, everyone in a uniform is an enemy.

The war is conducted because of the firm lack of interest in compromising, cooperating, finding peace; there is not even an attempt to somehow bring together the formal and informal orders in the colony. The prisoners create their own structures against those imposed by the administration; the latter fights against them without even trying to understand the prisoners' goals.

I think radical changes must be effected in the structure of corrective institutions. The MVD must not remain a monopolist. The same agency must not perform the functions of both protection/punishment and correction/education at the same time. The punishment function forces prisoners to regard the administration as an alien force, with which they cannot cooperate. The MVD organs should retain only the prerogatives of protection and prison operation. Education should be the function of people without uniforms, who the prisoner will see as potential allies, prepared for cooperation. Medical services must absolutely be taken from the competence of the MVD.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Today, all the possibilities for radical transformations in the system of corrective labor institutions are limited to the fact that the GUID has in fact become an industrial ministry within the MVD. Many readers, including personnel of the system of corrective labor institutions, stress in their letters that the industrial plan weighs like a stone on the necks of the colony administration, preventing it from concentrating its attention on reforming prisoners.

We would like to know the opinion of the MVD's GUID employees on this subject. What role does production play in the colony's life? Is it appropriate in corrective institutions? And if labor is a means of education, must it be forced into the framework of fixed production indices?

[V. Bukin] In the GUID, I have been working for many years on questions of production, so allow me to try to respond to the question. You are quite correct that the GUID today functions in part as an industrial ministry, producing a wide range of products. We earn a profit of around one billion, one hundred million rubles each year from this activity. The average annual output per prisoner is around 13,000 rubles.

We are constantly asking to be relieved from the pressure of a rigid production plan, to have our enterprises transferred to local Soviets and be given the right to work according to our actual capabilities. But over many years, beginning in the 1930s, the corrective labor system has been firmly embedded in industry, linked to it by economic ties and obligations to deliver spare parts. We are linked by direct contracts, in particular, with firms in automobile manufacturing and agricultural machinebuilding. If we now simply throw off the plan, this will create difficulties in the country's economic sectors.

Colonies' production work is presently directed towards three goals. First, all prisoners must be ensured useful labor, which serves their reeducation and allows them to earn money for themselves and their families. Second, we are now trying to shift colonies to self-financing, to cost accounting with the possibility for using cost accounting resources to improve the living and working conditions of both camp workers and prisoners. Third, we are obliged, whether we want to or not, to fulfill the product output orders of directive agencies.

What do we believe should be the goal of restructuring in the production sphere of corrective labor institutions? We now give to the budget about two thirds of our profits; one third we keep and use in accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise. We want to raise our share from one third to ninety percent, to use all resources to strengthen the material basis and improve living conditions of camp personnel and prisoners.

We are also proposing to strengthen prisoners' material interest in the results of their work. As is known, 50 percent of a prisoner's wage, without counting deductions for food and clothing, now goes to the state; the lion's share of these funds goes to the budget. We believe it necessary to change this standard, preferably to fix it at a set amount, such as 50 rubles a month. This will create a real incentive to work in the corrective labor system. But this will require a fight with the USSR Ministry of Finance.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Allow me now to quote the letter of prisoner Vyacheslava I.: "There should be only free labor in a colony. Unfree labor creates a revulsion towards labor." How would you evaluate the degree to which labor in the corrective labor system is mandatory? Can this be eased somewhat?

[V. Bukin] The general level of consciousness of prisoners does not allow us at present to speak of free labor, at one's own wish, in the colonies. In addition, many prisoners are burdened by alimony and lawsuits in compensation for damage to others; these peoples' interests must also not be forgotten.

Prisoners' labor can become freer if we could in all cases offer them a choice among several types of work and professions. Unfortunately, such a choice is most frequently impossible under present circumstances.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But in fact this is slave labor.

[V. Bukin] What does "slave" mean? They are not slaves, they're criminals, sentenced to deprivation of freedom for serious crimes. Even relevant international conventions do not prohibit, but rather recommend that prisoners engage in useful labor.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] And how do "Prison and Freedom" and former prisoner Valeriy Fedorovich Abramkin look at this question?

[V. Abramkin] You cannot say to a prisoner today, "Work as much as you want." I repeat once again that fundamental changes in the system are needed; without them, such "free labor" will only lead to its further destabilization. But certain steps in this direction are possible. Prisoners must be given a choice among colonies, and thus among types of work. For example, not just anyone should be sent to the forests, but only those consciously recruited for such work. And so that people would be willing, the incentives must be drastically increased, and unjustified limits on wages removed, as the representative of the GUID correctly observed.

In addition, it must be made legal to engage in a craft in the colonies. They contain many handy people, genuine craftsmen. There was recently a successful exhibit in Sverdlovsk of prisoners' craft work. The products of such creativity could be sold by cooperatives. New forms of labor organization must be developed in the colonies as well, including leasing. That is how I see a degree of liberation of prisoners' labor at present.

[V. Bukin] We fully support these ideas.

[M. Rumshiskaya] Our Public Center's correspondence contains many complaints about incorrect actions of the administration, about a lack of limits: concrete facts are cited of beatings and harassment, refusal to provide medical aid, extortion. How real are these facts in the corrective labor system, and what should we do with these letters?

[Yu. Kalinin] As to individual signals, all of them need careful investigation, without which I cannot comment on a given letter. Such complaints should be directed to us, we will look into them.

[M. Rumshiskaya] Could these investigations include the participation of representatives of our Public Center?

[Yu. Kalinin] I suppose that's possible. The concrete forms of such participation would have to be considered. We do not hide the fact that instances of incorrect treatment of prisoners and illegal extortions have not been completely eradicated in our institutions, although the system's management and the procurator's organs overseeing us should consistently combat them.

The cause of such a situation lies in particular in the fact that our system is experiencing substantial personnel difficulties. This affects above all the first level of guards.

The profession of working in the corrective labor system is losing prestige, which by the way is promoted by certain ill-considered publications in the press. It is also becoming more dangerous. Last year there were 78 cases recorded of attacks on personnel and taking of hostages in colonies and investigatory isolation wards, with 11 persons killed and 80 injured. Our personnel's living conditions are hard, especially in the forestry institutions. The present wage structure does not compensate for these negative factors. We are now trying to bring our

guards' pay up to the level of at least an ensign in the Soviet Army. But financial problems arise here as well.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We have thus far been discussing problems within the corrective labor system. But there is also a group of no less urgent questions, related to the release and adaptation of former prisoners.

[V. Vikulov] I am the head of the GUID department which handles these questions. According to our data, only 80 percent of those released somehow manage to reintegrate themselves, 20 percent cannot make their way without special assistance. These people make up the main reserve of repeat criminals. The barriers to normal reintegration of former prisoners into society are first, unjustified passport restrictions and refusals of living permits; second, the lack of interest on the part of enterprises and organizations in providing jobs to such people. These two problems have been under discussion for years, including at the minister's level, but so far the issue remains at a standstill.

[V. Avramkin] Helping former prisoners adapt to freedom is also one of the problems which our center works on. We have several suggestions. First, we believe it should be the rule that punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom occurs in municipal correctional institutions at one's place of previous residence only. Where a person lived is where they should be imprisoned and released. The prison officials will thus not be indifferent to what kind of former prisoners they are releasing and how they adapt.

Second, an integrated program of social adaptation should be developed, including special preparation of prisoners for release. For at least the last six months they should live in conditions approaching those in freedom, wear civilian clothes, be able to go into a city and establish useful contacts. It might make sense to create special rehabilitation centers where recently released prisoners could live and work if they have no other possibilities. Such centers should have a special social and psychological rehabilitation service.

[V. Vikulov] I must note with satisfaction that our views here fully coincide. This also with respect to municipal corrective institutions and rehabilitation programs in special centers in the colonies, which are already being created. The idea of easier conditions in a colony during the last months of one's sentence is also very timely. It is included in the draft of the Foundations of Criminal-Corrective Law being prepared.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In closing the discussion, we would like to note that all the questions touched on demand the close attention of the legislature, the USSR Supreme Soviet, its relevant committees and individual deputies. The problems of the normal operation of the penitentiary system are closely linked with those of repeat crime and public safety. The corrective labor system must cease being regarded as a milk cow. It must not be something from which money is extracted,

but something in which money is invested, the way we invest it in the education system, without considering this money wasted.

Uzbek Militia Crack Down on Illegal Trade

90UN1965A Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 90 p 2

[Article by correspondent N.Shakarov: "Roadblock on the Way of Deficit Goods, Or Who Tries to Take Food and Manufactured Goods Out of the Republic"]

[Text] On the eve of the holiday, an angry citizen came to our office. Without catching his breath, he began to speak:

"What an outrage. Who can protect us? I cannot even carry out my filial duties—"

"Please, comrade, calm down, do not rush," I tried to quiet the visitor. "Explain your complaint from the beginning. First of all, let us introduce ourselves to one another."

He took his business card out of his pocket; it read: Uzmanov, Rustam Turdyevich, chairman of the board of the apiary kolkhoz "Dustlik", Andizhan Oblast.

"I am totally opposed to the republic Council of Ministers resolution on limiting exports of certain types of consumer goods from the Uzbek SSR," Rustam Turdyevich explained his gripe. "It is a blow to the interests of the peasants. My parents live in Kirghizia. Every week I used to send my old folks 4 or 5 kilos of meat, fruit and vegetables. It was my filial duty. What kind of resolution is this which makes it impossible for the son to care for the father who raised him?"

I tried to explain to the visitor that the resolution had been passed to stabilize the internal market and that it was a temporary measures supported by the majority of the republic's population. I was unable to convince him and we parted retaining our own opinions.

However, our conversation was a pretext for me to meet department heads of the Uzbek SSR MVD GAI [State Motor Vehicles Inspection]. On the request of the newspaper, Militia Colonel Akhmadzhan Erkabayev, deputy department head, commented on the situation a week after that resolution was passed.

Considerable work has been done to implement the republic Council of Ministers resolution "On Limiting Exports of Certain Types of Consumer Goods from the Uzbek SSR". First of all, explanations were provided to the collectives of motor vehicle enterprises, mechanical and tractor garages of kolkhozes and sovkhoses and motor vehicles cooperatives. Seminars on this issue were organized at all divisions of the GAI.

Inspections were increased on all roads. To prevent exports of forbidden types of goods, 70 additional checkpoints were set up at the borders. They were equipped

with necessary technology, such as telephones, radio transmitters and patrol vehicles. To set up those additional checkpoints, they asked the Gossnab to supply 50 mobile homes.

This is as far as organizational work is concerned. As to the implementation of the goal set by the resolution itself, the situation is as follows: during the first 6 days 64 trucks were stopped attempting to export 63,013 kilograms of food products, 168,070 kilograms of agricultural products, 791 units (24 types) of industrial goods, 35 cubic meters of timber and 5,000 kilograms of lacquer and paint products.

Incidents arising at GAI checkpoints help describe the actual situation. On April 26, at the GAI post "Rishtan" in Fergana Oblast, a KamAZ-5410 truck, license plate number 89-91 OGG belonging to the Orenburg cooperative "Stroitel" was stopped. Its cargo consisted of 17 refrigerators, 50 washing machines and 61 vacuum cleaners. No such goods are to be found in stores, but comrades from the Kuvinskiy Rayon consumer cooperative chose to sell this deficit consumer equipment not to their own countrymen but elsewhere.

Furniture is also among goods that are in extremely short supply. Especially complete sets. Ordinary mortals probably find it as hard to buy such sets as birds' milk.

Yet, for A.Demichev and V.Shkadrov, drivers of the vehicles with license plate numbers 10-70 KES and 10-72 KES belonging to the Abakan experimental mechanical plant in Krasnodar Kray, it did not seem to be a problem. They were taking out of the republic four furniture sets. Where did they buy them? As of now, the drivers are carefully guarding their secret.

The GAI checkpoint "Uch Kakhramon" in Tashkent stopped a MAZ-500 truck belonging to the kolkhoz "Dustlik", Andizhan Oblast. Its driver M.Rashidov attempted to export from the republic 9,000 kilos of honey.

At this point, let me interrupt Akhmadzhan-Aka. It was the very kolkhoz whose chairman, Rustam Usmanov, had come to our office to complain about the "unjust" resolution. This was his problem, as it turned out. In this part of the world, people cannot find even a spoonful of honey, whereas barrels of this precious product go to parts unknown. What would our countrymen think of such entrepreneurship? As to the chairman, he felt insulted and began to knock on various official doors complaining that "the interests of the peasants are being harmed."

My interlocutor mentioned a number of other examples. I was amazed to hear him. I decided to see those trucks with my own eyes and to visit a GAI checkpoint. Before I left, A.Erkabayev told me also about problems GAI employees face when they enforce this resolution. They do not know what to do with the goods they seize. This issue was to be solved by the Ministry of Trade and the "Uzbekbriyash", but they have not yet addressed it.

They are yet to determine to which stores or public catering enterprises confiscated food products and consumer goods could be sent. The issue of pricing has not been solved either. Commissions at local soviets of people's deputies should be set up, but no one has thought about it seriously yet. Various misunderstandings arise between owners of the goods and GAI employees. They can not resolve this issue on their own. The goals set by the resolution would be achieved only if everybody joins in to work on them. Otherwise, the good resolution will not work, nor will the goal it set be achieved.

The post "Uch Kakhramon" forms something of a gate at the northern entrance to the capital. Through it passes the road to Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and the RSFSR. This busy thoroughfare goes to Chimkent; it is a never-ending stream of trucks and passenger cars.

"Of course we have more work now," admitted Militia Captain Ubaydulla Babanazarov. He heads the recently created MVD GAI special prompt response force.

"Last night, our guys seized some 10 trucks which tried to transport deficit goods outside the republic," he said leafing through his notebook. Then he began to list them: "T.Zevernayevev, the driver of the truck license plate 89-89 OMO, was arrested attempting to transport 85 color television sets from Namagan to Omsk. His partner was taking 52 color television sets and 7,250 meters of oilcloth in the truck license plate 55-57 OMO. How those goods were purchased is a complete mystery to us. BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] agents are looking into this matter. Last night we also stopped a GAZ-24 license plate 18-22 TNA. It looked like it was heavily loaded. Driver Zakhidzhan Zakirov was carrying 223 dishes stolen from a china factory. The Tashkentskiy Rayon internal affairs department is handling the thief."

We were still studying the registry when GAI employees brought in the papers of a driver they had just stopped. The routing documents of I.Tulapov, the driver of the KamAZ-5410 license plate 94-69 KZL, stated that the truck was carrying 7 tons of seed rice. Rice growers are planting their crops now and such cargoes should not be delayed. Nevertheless, a decision had been made to open the bags and they turned out to contain not seeds but shelled rice which is useless for planting. Well done, we could have said to the enterprising sender of the cargo, the Uzbek Rice Scientific Research Institute. They ship edible rice instead of seeds. This is a veritable scientific breakthrough.

We are outraged by high prices at farmers markets and by the lack of staple goods in stores. Ministries and agencies have been criticized for this, but the situation has not improved and has even worsened. It turns out that we were totally unaware that our native-grown goods flowed out of our republic in a broad stream along our own roads. Now, there is a roadblock on their way. But it must be admitted that the exit to the deficit is not barred completely. And if the dam is flimsy, water will seep through it.

This analogy is quite apt when applied to the situation on our roads. GAI employees stop only large vehicles. Almost all passenger cars pass freely. Why? I was told that the issue of searching passenger cars is yet to be resolved. Second, they need some reception center where confiscated food products and consumer goods could be sent. Otherwise, militia employees can do nothing. Suppose the road patrol service stops a driver exporting 3 or 4 kilos of meat, vegetables and other types of agricultural products. What to do with it? Moreover, they have no right to prevent the driver from continuing on his way or to arrest him. All these problems described by GAI management I saw with my own eyes. They must be solved immediately.

Soon, crops will start maturing in our sunny land. Fruit and vegetables will ripen on kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields and on private plots. It is natural that native peasants wishing to sell their output will look for convenient buyers, and the desire to export goods outside the republic will arise. Many people are worried about these problems. But real native peasants have nothing to worry about. The resolution instructed the Uzbek SSR State Committee on Collective and Communal Agricultural Farms, the "Uzbekbriyash", the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Council of Ministers and oblast and Tashkent city ispolkoms to develop proposals on the order of exporting agricultural products from the republic starting on June 1 and to establish an association of private vegetable and fruit growers. This means, of course, that the interests of native farmers will be protected.

There are some who love to create panic by stating that in this situation the life of native peasants will not improve but, rather, the other way around. But it is hard to agree with this statement. The fruit of our orchards and fields is being taken out of the republic by various dealers who have nothing to do with agriculture. It is being stolen from our fertile land by unconscionable speculators who sell wondrous fruits at farmers markets charging inflated prices. Of course such people dislike the resolution of the republic government. There is not a single native peasant among those who try to take goods out of the republic. Because a true peasant would not go to faraway cities in search of buyers: he simply has no time for it.

New Editor of Literary Journal MOSKVA Outlines Plans

90UN1927A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 p 3

[Interview with V. Krupin, Editor-in-Chief of MOSKVA magazine; 13 May, in Moscow, by correspondent L. Fomina: "What Will MOSKVA Magazine Become?"]

[Text] V. Krupin replaced M. Alekseyev in the post of editor-in-chief of MOSKVA magazine. Many readers in connection with this are interested in what will be the further course of the publication, what is new that awaits subscribers, changes in the editorial board that will occur, and to what extent the attention in Moscow will be given. Our correspondent L. Fomina met with Vladimir Nikolayevich Krupin and asked him to answer these questions.

[Krupin] I was a member of the editorial board of NOVYY MIR for a long time, was published in NASH SOVREMENNİK, and maintained positions at both publications. Therefore I am now often asked: the line of which of these two journals will MOSKVA continue? But why be another NOVYY MIR or another NASH SOVREMENNİK? MOSKVA should have a "look of uncommon expressiveness." I want to say right away that whoever would come to the editor-in-chief's position should fulfill obligations given to readers of the journal during the subscription campaign. So that the basic works announced for 1990 will be published even if I do not agree with them. But on the whole I support M. Alekseyev's line, and I do not like it when many authors, just arriving into the editorial office, begin, alas, to abuse their former bosses.

This is a true sign that they will also abuse me in the future, and a sign, unfortunately, having arisen not from the writer's environment, but from the sociopolitical environment of our system.

MOSKVA in a good sense became famous by the publication of Karamzin's "History of the Russian State." At the same time, having finished publication of this work, the journal lost several hundred thousand subscribers. And now one of the main questions is—how do we get these readers back? Publication of Anastasia Tsvetaeva's novel "Amor" does not achieve the desired result, although this writer's name, and the fate of the author, is undoubtedly interesting. But the work is short on artistic fabric and novelty of information, and there are many long-winded passages. M. Pylyayev's stories about old Moscow are important for connection of times. However, your newspaper for a long stretch of time becomes familiar with its readers' material, and the book is already done. So that the suspension of this publication is entirely possible.

I would like to see the sought for perspective of a journal in publications, which would not contribute to a schism, but the drawing together of people. To a drawing together in spirituality. This undoubtedly is what I.

Shmelev's work "Old Valaam" answers, which our readers can read. We are preparing for the printing of V. Rasputin's work about saintly Sergius Radonezhskiy and the meaning of Russian emigration to foreign lands. V. Soloukhin offered an article to the journal about Voykov, about new facts connected with the execution of the tsar's family. He also promised us the continuation of his work "Laughter Over the Left Shoulder." We hope to make readers happy with the work of an editorial board member of our journal and patriarch of Russian literature Leonid Leonov, on which this timeless author is now working. We are printing the ending of P. Proskurin's trilogy.

The unquestionable interest calls to mind the Nobel laureate H. Hesse's novel "Siddharta: Along the Path of Wisdom," which is being published for the first time. Now we are examining the question about the possibility of publishing S. Moem's "Christmas Vacation." We turn to Plato's legacy, which more intelligibly talks about the present time than some current orators. We would like to print his meditations about government and democracy. The works of G. Fedotov, Metropolitan Antony, and Ioanna Zlatousta sound equally contemporary and enlightening. And I can announce the publication of V. Maksimov's "Karantin."

However the reputation of each journal is upheld by its discovery of new names. With this, of course, it is always complicated. I am glad that included among our authors is G. Golovin, who now is very popular. But indeed MOSKVA supported him in a difficult period when the writer literally did not have the means to exist, having published the short story "Jack, Little Brother and Others." Now you can read his new work "Nadenka and Chemodanov."

New stories by V. Bogatyrev, B. Shishayev, E. Bogdanov and Y. Leonov will be published. We are printing I. Shafarevich's article about Daniel Andreyev and unknown poems of this fine poet. Of the contemporary poets we are granting pages to Y. Kuznetsov, A. Reshetov, M. Vishnyakov, N. Rachkov, and L. Safronov.

There is no shortage of material, but unfortunately, for the time being there is nothing that can be called a discovery. The present period is difficult because of the fact that authors who have been previously rejected come to me as the new editor. I understand that the reason for rejection sometimes can be inattentiveness while reading, and lack of objective criteria, but more often it is due to a lack of high artistic value and mastery—of that I must be convinced.

However there is a magnetic force in expectation: an author will come, I will read his work, and I will rush away with him to the USSR Academy of Sciences World Literature Institute imeni A. M. Gorkiy with the cry, "A new Gogol has appeared!"

To the point—about literary criticism. If it is prose and poetry, this occurrence is not dependent on the editor, not the author himself, but what God gives can and

should be guided, I think, by publicism and criticism. Although, of course, without command methods. In my view, breaking of critical lances is senseless, as are animosity and finding out an "adversary" of some kind of flaws in the past. But one cannot stand "above the fray," one must really reflect the literary process, for which now there is a characteristically sharp division of poles. However criticism, like literature, should give people moral reference points and hope for life. I think of those who follow V. Korolenko's line from "In Front of the Fire," and from criticism would like the same. We would be glad if P. Paliyevskiy, A. Lanshchikov, S. Selivanova, V. Kozhinov, V. Sakharov, M. Lobanov, and G. Kunitsin would collaborate with us—criticisms brilliant and distinct.

In the meantime the editorial board diminished, but this is a natural process. S. Smirnov, V. Sidorov and Y. Verchenko are leaving. Both their workload and age play a role here. I would like for the editorial board to be younger, but it should also be sufficiently authoritative and comprised of persons holding the same views. We intend to propose that some of the brilliant Russian literary figures from abroad enter the editorial board, having maintained their intellectual ties with Russia, and also representatives of the clergy for leading a division of so-called uplifting reading.

Of course we intend to continue publication of materials connected with Moscow. Just like your newspaper, the decline of cultural and historical values of the capital and other problems of the ancient Russian city trouble us. A

"round table" is being prepared concerning these questions. A series of publications on the history of Moscow plants and factories is also being planned. Moscow is famous not only for its temples, private residences, art salons and literary arcades. Working Moscow should be known and revitalized, too.

It must be confessed that there are not many Muscovites among subscribers to MOSKVA. And in general Muscovites as readers are a particular, metropolitan people, loving to amuse themselves with "Kremlin secrets," and various kinds of exposes. This, of course, is curious reading, but with no prospect for cultivation of the soul. We will try to give not only to Muscovites, but also to all our subscribers works leading to the light, to spiritual values.

Of course the path as editor of a literary monthly is unusually difficult, and many difficulties, unfortunately, concern purely the production process—paper, equipment, funds, on which much energy and time is spent. But nevertheless a star shines on such publishers as Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Nekrasov, Sytin, Marx... In relation to my own work I am prepared to repeat after the poet: "Keep silent, accursed books, for I never wrote you." But this does not mean that I am breaking with creative work: publishing is a creative business, the most interesting and necessary business. Necessary, even if it is a pity for the readers, thrown into a stormy sea of printed pluralism. But in the open sea—allow me to quote a Chinese source—"It is impossible without a helmsman." I would like very much if our journal would turn out this way.

Deputies Ask Halt to Construction in Chernobyl-Contaminated Zone

90UN1948A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 12 May 90 p 1

[Article by S. Butkevich, staff correspondent for Vitebsk Oblast: "With Concern for the Environment"]

[Text] Acute questions of environmental safety were raised at a session of the oblast soviet. The newly elected deputies adopted an appeal to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet to complete stop all construction in the zone contaminated with radionuclides.

As is known, throughout the past four years Vitebsk construction workers, to the detriment of the oblast's interests, have spent considerable time, resources and money building housing and production, social and cultural facilities in Belorussia's southern regions, where, it now turns out, it is dangerous to live and work. A group of deputies directed an anxious inquiry to V. P. Kulakov, chairman of the oblispolkom, concerning the prospects for the joint Soviet-Italian Vitalia enterprises in Orshanskiy Rayon. In reply to public protests, the Orshanskiy city committee of the Belorussian Communist Party and the gorispolkom deemed it inadvisable to build facilities for tanning leather without guarantees of their safety for the environment and people's health. V. P. Kulakov, acknowledging the economic feasibility of building the Vitalia enterprise, reported that the Italian partners have not yet received consent from our side to build the enterprise, and that the problem would be studied with a view to the complaints of local residents.

Chernobyl Union Refutes Allegations of Extremism

90UN1948B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 13 May 90 p 3

[Statement by G. Lepin, chairman of the board of the Chernobyl Union: "We Are Indignant and We Protest!"]

[Text] The Chernobyl disaster did not choose its victims according to political or national, occupational or religious, social or any sort of other features. And in that sense, the organization of Chernobyl residents has been directed from the outset toward protecting the interests and rights of all citizens who suffered from this national disaster, regardless of any specific attendant factors in the problem. The humanitarian orientation of the Chernobyl Union goes beyond the boundaries of political action.

Our Chernobyl Week program included exclusively humanitarian, peace-promoting and environmental actions. And there was more than enough work in those areas. It included the visiting of sick children in the republic clinic, of orphans in Belaya Tserkov who had been evacuated from the evacuation zone, of children in schools Nos 259 and 270 in Kiev, of patients in the VNTsRM [All-Union Research Center for Radiation

Medicine] and Hospital No 25, and of residents who have settled without authorization in the evacuation zone. It also included the visiting of the graves of those who have been killed and died in connection with the accident, and the organization of assistance for those Chernobyl residents who are especially acutely in need of it.

In addition, the preparation for the Chernobyl Union congress, which is scheduled for 15 June, has entered its final stage. The Chernobyl Telethon held in Moscow also took considerable work. Because of all this, we were simply incapable of carrying out any sort of independent actions on Earth Day, 22 April. Therefore, we proposed taking part only in the Earth Day activities that were being held at the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy in Moscow, and in the environmental demonstration in Kiev. And the rumors of the Chernobyl Union's participation in organizing that political action were, to put it mildly, "greatly exaggerated." Not even the leaders of the Chernobyl Union were able to take part in the environmental demonstration. We barely managed to organize any significant participation whatsoever of Chernobyl Union members in that demonstration.

And suddenly we encounter, in the republic and central newspapers, mention of the Chernobyl Union among the other organizers of the 22 April activities in Kiev. Our union has found itself practically at the center of attention. In that connection, there is a need to sort everything out.

In the first place, the Chernobyl Union is not a political or politicized force, and no one will succeed in dragging it into any sort of actions of a political or ideological nature.

Second, political or any other sort of extremism or adventurism does not belong to our range of actions.

Third, in the given, specific situation we cannot accept even the very smallest degree of "credit" for the acts of vandalism and political and moral irresponsibility that took place in the course of the environmental demonstration.

Fourth, we demand an answer, and it must be a public one, to the question of who got the idea of crying "Stop, thief!" and also who made the decision to thoughtlessly, without any attempt whatsoever to verify objectivity or even plausibility, defame the activities of an organization that has set itself exclusively humane objectives. We are indignant at the unfounded charges against us, and we protest against them.

On the eve of the fourth anniversary of the disaster, the Chernobyl Union counted on finally turning the attention of the peoples of our country and foreign countries to the truly disastrous situation of people who have suffered from the disaster. These people must be rescued, and rescued today. For many, tomorrow will be too late. That can be done only with the most active support

and assistance of the people. It must be said that we have not been deceived in our hopes. We have already been able to provide real help to Chernobyl victims, especially children. But unfortunately, accusations that the union took part in the outrages that occurred in Kiev on 22 April have confused our potential helpers and sponsors. We have lost sizeable potential donations both to the Chernobyl Union account and to the Chernobyl Union Children's Fund account. Well, the organizers of that crude escapade, who have not made up their minds to accept responsibility themselves, and have exposed the unfortunate victims of the Chernobyl disaster, who have already suffered enough, to a blow, may rub their hands in satisfaction. Many thousands of Chernobyl victims who are awaiting help will not receive it today.

I think that after the parties who are truly guilty for what happened are established, a fine should be imposed on them, and the sum should be allocated for providing assistance to those Chernobyl victims who they deprived of the possibility of receiving such assistance.

And a few words about those who, after such "objective" information in the press, changed their minds and decided that Chernobyl victims did not merit their help. It is hardly possible to justify in any way such a drastic turnaround in one's attitude toward the Chernobyl victims. After all, the problems of the Chernobyl victims have not disappeared on account of that outright lie. Maybe those who managed to be deceived should try to rectify the situation. And your help is very much needed.

Volgograd Public Ecological 'Court' Examines Volga-Don Canal Project

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14 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 6*

[Article by Special IZVESTIYA Correspondents Ye. Manucharova and V. Kornev: "In the Name of the Volga"]

[Text] Volgograd. The verdict is in on the system which gave birth to the "project of the century," ruinous to both man and nature.

The first public ecological court was held in Volgograd, where it heard the case of the Volga-Don-P [perebroska—transfer] canal. The court aroused increased interest even at the preparatory stage. What is it? An exotic invention by social activists, or an event which will have serious consequences? Now that the session has been held, we can confirm—it is an event. A real opportunity has appeared to take nature under the protection of the court, and to determine from a legal standpoint the liability of responsible officials for damages wrought to nature.

The structure of the ecological court, naturally, is somewhat different from a traditional court. Chairman V. Rabochiy is a lawyer. Members of the court are also lawyers, both the prosecuting and defense attorneys. And

then there are the jurors: these are scholars and specialists of various profiles, members of various parties in our country, as well as representatives of the faithful—Father Dmitriy (Nesterof), priest at Svyato-Nikolskaya Church. Members of the court and witnesses as well are residents of several Volga oblasts: Astrakhan, Saratov and Volgograd Oblast, of course. The side of the plaintiff is represented by the Committee to Save the Volga, the Ekologiya Society, the Volgograd Voters' Committee, and deputy groups among which is a group of People's Deputies of the USSR.

The court was a long time in preparation. On the eve of the hearing we once again drove out with the plaintiffs, to the site of the ecological crime. Here along the canal route, everything is going along as if the sense of the decisions taken on this construction project was to put the canal into operation ahead of schedule. And not to put a stop to it, and not conservation—as is in fact the case.

Every 15 days work brigades from Moldavia and Stavropol are replaced. A lot of the construction workers are Vietnamese. Work is carried out by the watch method, through 23:00 hours, with no days off nor holidays. The builders make no secret of the fact that they plan to present the country with a fait accompli. This will mean the inevitable transfer of waters from the Volga to the Don. And inasmuch as the water balance of the Volga is negative, the next step would be to transfer waters to the Volga from the Pechora, from the North.

This prospect becomes all the more real with every newly-excavated meter of the channel (yesterday, today and tomorrow). And that is why it is not only a question of the canal, but of the fate of the Volga and the northern rivers as a whole. Speaking for the plaintiffs, L. Saveleva, chairperson of the Volgograd affiliate of the Committee to Save the Volga, spoke of the fact that there must be an official declaration, that the Lower Volga has been turned into an ecological disaster zone.

The agencies have not come to grips with the fact that the ecological situation has reached a critical stage. And it is precisely the agencies and the organizations which are helping to implement its plans, that were brought to trial as the defendants.

They are: the Volgograd Party Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] and Oblast Ispolkom [Executive Committee]; the USSR and RSFSR Minvodkhkh [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources] and their planning institutes; and also the "Volgo-Don-Transfer" (the actual title) canal construction directorate. When the chairman of the court was questioning those present, it became clear that there was only one person representing the defendants: a legal advisor who was carrying out the instructions of the professors at an agricultural institute. It must be stated that the court was most disturbed by the failure of the obkom officials to appear. We would point out that the new chairman of the Volgograd Oblast

Soviet, V. Makharadze, who is not a defendant, did appear in court, even though he is just as busy as the others.

Those who ordered the start of the construction project were barely mentioned at the trial; interest in Murakhovskiy or Vasilyev has already faded. The baton of the destruction of the land has already been seized by others. The prosecutors put it as follows: "We cannot dislodge the Minvodkhoz projects without 'our own people,' without the 'top people' in our Volga oblasts."

The witnesses gave everyone their just deserts. Here in court they spoke openly of the chairman of neighboring Astrakhan Oblast, I. Dyakov, as a protector of the Volga. But they call their own people, the Volgograd Obkom secretaries, "guardians of the ideals of Minvodkhoz." First among these was V. Kalashnikov. Before coming to Volgograd he was RSFSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources—a real "flip-flopper." After he became a secretary, he took the very same positions—disregarding the opinions and interests of the people of the Volga. But with the change in the political winds, before departing for Moscow, he began to speak about "saving the Volga."

A. Anipkin, the Volgograd Obkom secretary who came to replace him, knew how hateful the canal is to the people of the Volga, appeared to side with the people at the pre-election meetings.

A tape recording of the meeting was played at the trial: in the recording, the secretary indignantly declared, "Personally, I cannot at all understand why no ecological analysis of the canal was ever done." The speech at the meeting also contains this phrase on the construction of the canal: "This question did not depend on us."

But the court showed that all this was election campaign rhetoric, and divulged the contents of a letter which Anipkin had sent to Moscow, which were in conflict with his public utterances, and which were kept secret from the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. In his letter he asked that the canal work not be closed down, but that it be completed. It would provide only one-tenth as much water as planned, but it should be finished in order that the oblast could build irrigation systems on the land bordering the canal, and turn these lands into a garden for other oblasts.

The letter exposes not only the insincerity (I'll say!) of the first secretary, but also his complete ignorance of the region. For his "garden" he chose Panshinskiy Sovkhoz, the very one which suffers the most from the construction project. The canal cuts it in half, threatens the demolition of its homes and the destruction of its ancestral burial places ("The cemetery will be destroyed"). The sovkhoz lands, which until recently had been fertile, will be inundated, become salinized, and will be turned into a swamp. The builders cut down forests, and ruined the Sakarka River so that the fish have disappeared. N. Popov, party committee secretary on Panshinskiy Sovkhoz testified to this at the trial.

"We appealed to Minvodkhoz and to local authorities with our problems," said Popov. "But what happened? No response whatsoever. The promised housing would be built anyhow." This is a well-known trap of the agencies: when they start any kind of project, they guarantee that part of the assets will be spent for social needs. But they are in no hurry to carry out their promises. The main thing for them is—their own purposes: that enormous billion-ruble state order, which was received for the canal.

The public court was unable to determine the dimensions of all the physical damages the transfer-canal project caused. But certain figures from experts led to an addition to the official conclusion made by GEK [State Examining Commission] of USSR Gosplan (which was read aloud in court). Specifically the depth of the canal for the watershed between the Don and the Volga was specified as—40 meters. But the hills have already been cut up in such a way that they cannot be restored.

The conclusions of expert witness V. Suslovoy, scientific associate at the Saratov Fishing Industry Institute: "The damage which the canal will cause to the fish population was determined by the clients themselves, and therefore the data were intentionally scaled down. The figures cited are far too low. We have made our own calculations, and it turns out that the total damage to the fish population is measured in many thousands of tons, for a total sum of about 27 million rubles."

Expert witness V. Azovtsev, a fellow at the Institute for Soil Study imeni Dokuchayev: "The plan for the canal does not at all reflect the fact that the soil will become salinized. According to our calculations, that process will take in thousands of hectares of land."

What does this mean? That our Volga will perish? It is we who will perish—the people of the Volga!... That is the sense of the witnesses' testimony. But that does not signify that it was only the purely economic damage that concerned them. The plaintiffs and witnesses were bothered most of all by the flouting of moral principles and legality. In resisting this, the public has selected the proper form for its defense and its protest—the court.

The people have made a very precise case of why the immoral behavior of today's leaders seems even worse than that which took place under Stalin or Brezhnev. Then, a great deal was hidden from the people. But today they pay no heed and openly carry out illegal construction projects, convinced that they are engaged in its conservation.

The jury, in delivering the verdict, summed up as follows:

"We must condemn the economic system, in which non-specialists and party apparatchiks interfere in economic activity. Activities not founded on scientific knowledge are criminal."

The determination reached by the public ecological court is a simple one: to satisfy the demands of the plaintiffs. The materials of the public court are to be sent

to the USSR Procuracy in order to bring criminal charges. Material compensation must be made to the physical damage to the people of the Volga.

Of course, the public has not yet learned how to conduct a completely proper trial. People get excited, and they

forget that every session must be opened in the traditional manner. Before the verdict was handed down, the very youngest of the plaintiffs, school-girls, burst into the courtroom and warned the adults: "Sit down, sit down—here come the judges!" Oh well... Formality will come, with time. We hope that the defendants will come to hear a sterner phrase: "All rise! Court is in session!"

New Filmmakers Union Chief Profiled

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No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 p 11

[Article by Ivan Podshivalov: "Surprise Choice"]

[Text] At this hour there were already no secretaries, experts or leaders of guilds in the corridors of the Union of Film Makers. But the guard was not the only man carrying out his duty on that mild June evening. The other person at work was speaking to a visitor in Tajik in his big study. "Hop," he ended his talk and turned to his next visitor, who was already waiting at the door.

A New Man for an Old Office

Davlat Khudonazarov was born in 1944 in Khorog, in the Pamirs. On June 7, 1990 he was elected as Chairman of the Union of Soviet Film Makers with a terrific victory over his three rivals, one of whom received only two votes out of nearly five hundred. Khudonazarov came to the 6th Congress of Film Makers on the last day of its work and received 400 votes. "If I'd known this I wouldn't have come, I would have stayed all day at the USSR Supreme Soviet. Before he was elected, Stanislav Govorukhin said: "We don't need those who want to, we want those who don't want to."

Many think that his election was simply a reproach to Moscow from the Republics, especially the central Asian Republics, and would like to see this as the reason for his stunning victory. But it was Andrei Smirnov, author of the "Byelorussian Railway Terminus" and Davlat's predecessor in the office on Second Brestskaya, who recommended Khudonazarov to this post. The Republics supported a man who worked at a film studio from age 14, and at 16 became a cinematography student.

For two years he hasn't made any films. He became a people's deputy of the USSR—he was nominated by the secondary school where he used to study. The meeting of electors one after another disqualified his five rivals even though the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan sent six emissaries so as to prevent Davlat's victory. He was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, where he spends nearly all his time. At one of the recent meetings he voted against the government's draft on taxation. He is a member of the Interregional Group of Deputies and the auditing commission of the Central Committee of the communist Party of Tajikistan. His diploma work "Lullaby", a 10-minute documentary about life in a Tajik village—so contrasted with official documentary films that it was banned. "Davlat, you probably have a lot of enemies among the leaders of the Republic?" He refuses to comment.

Davlat's actions during the February riots in Dushambe are already well known. "Please don't. I can't bear to read any more about how I came out onto the square and stopped the frenzied crowd. It's not true. The people were going to a meeting, when their path was obstructed by tanks and troops. Even though a day before we agreed

with the authorities that the people would be let through to the meeting. While talks were in progress and I tried to phone Boriss Pugo the crowd grew and passions rose. But then it all turned out for the best. I think they were in the right. I told them that they must keep calm and I'd lead them to the square, offering my life as a guarantee. That's all. After that I had to chair the meeting."

On the square Davlat was wearing a deputy's badge. When he arrived for the last day of the film makers congress he took it off so as not to embarrass his colleagues. And, unfortunately, lost it. A cleaning woman found it later.

His films are hard to see, especially those for which he wrote the screenplay. He finished the institute with special training as a cameraman and worked mainly in this sphere. Before 1985 all his films were devoted to the people central to the early years of the Tajik Republic. "That time was a crossroads. Today is a crossroads too. The people are choosing the direction they want to follow." For a long time Davlat collected photos of those who were shot in 1937 and who refused to believe that Tajiks did not exist as a nation. "I looked at them and in a moment realized how much older I grew."

The Chairman of the Union of Film Makers looks and is considered to be young, maybe because his hair remains black to this day. He is married and has two children. The family is of course dissatisfied that its head lives in a room at the Moskva Hotel. "And where will you live when you become Chairman?" "I don't know, I never thought about it. Probably where I live now."

Pope Asked to Help Ease Religious Tension in Ukraine

90UN1953A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 13 May 90 p 3]

[An Open Letter issued from Kiev and Ternopil on 10 May to Pope John-Paul II by Reverend Leonid Lutkovsky, chairman of the Republic Committee in defense of believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Reverend L. V. Protas, the vice-chairman of the Committee in defense of believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: "An Open Letter To His Holiness the Pope of Rome, John-Paul II"]

[Text] Your Holiness!

The Republic Committee in defense of believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is appealing to You; this committee is composed of believers of various confessions, members of the Red Cross and "Compassion" [Myloserdya], members of the Children's Fund of USSR, representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the Orthodox clergy's representatives from all of Ukraine's oblasts.

Your Holiness! As a result of the democratic transformations in our nation, achieved by means of President

Gorbachev's initiative, conditions have arisen for normalizing the situation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which is under your Holiness' jurisdiction.

However, today with grief we are forced to make the statement that the process of legalizing the Ukrainian Church of the Eastern rite in Western Ukraine has assumed a character of religious aggression against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and terror in regard to the Orthodox believers in this region of the nation.

A violent expulsion of Orthodox clergy and laymen from their churches, threats to commit physical harm to their family members, efforts made to forcibly convert Orthodox believers to the Ukrainian Catholic faith (of the Eastern rite), picketing of Orthodox churches, a blasphemous attitude taken towards the Orthodox divine services and the Orthodox sacred objects—all of this is a list of those methods being used by members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to "legalize" it, with the support of separatist, nationalist movements not involved with the church, and the support of anti-Orthodox, local authorities in Western Ukraine.

Your Holiness! Now in many areas the Orthodox believers are forced to pray in the street, because they fear that the Uniates will seize their churches. The fiery intensification of hostility between Catholics of the Eastern rite and the Orthodox believers has reached such a point that Galicia may become a Ukrainian "Ulster". Here now are a few facts taken from the life of Orthodox believers today in Western Ukraine, which confirm our grim prognosis.

In the village of Perevoloka in the Buchachsky Rayon, Ternopil [Oblast], as a result of a religious argument, Greek Catholics killed an Orthodox Christian, Vasyly Mokrytsky, a father of five children. Not long afterwards, his oldest son died from nervous shock. A widow and four children were left without any means to support themselves.

In the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, the priest Mykola Novosad died, one of the editors of the journal PRAVO-SLAVNYI VISNYK. His body, just as the Italian violinist Paganini's body in its time, could not be buried for a while, because Greek Catholics were picketing the cemetery. Only the local authority's interference gave the widow of the deceased an opportunity to have a funeral conducted at one of the village parish cemeteries.

In the same city of Ivano-Frankivsk, Greek Catholic extremists threatened to commit physical harm to a Baptist society pastor, if he did not agree to convert to the Greek Catholic faith. In this manner, the Catholics of the Eastern rite are carrying out religious aggression not only against the Orthodox believers, but also against Protestants, who are regarded as representatives of an "alien American or German faith".

We are far from the position of thinking that all the Greek Catholics are guilty of these violent acts. They have honest people among them, who love God and their

church. However, those who are acting in a lawless manner towards the Orthodox believers in Galicia, are hiding themselves behind the Greek Catholic believers' good name. And even worse than that—they are justifying their acts in the name of Your Holiness, because they state that by such methods they are "defending" the Ukrainian Catholic Church; that not only the Greek Catholic bishops approve of their methods, but so does the Apostolic See.

The practice of proselytizing and the aggressive means of establishing the Ukrainian Catholic Church by its members in Galicia provokes not only the Orthodox believers to protest, but also believers of other religious persuasions in the Soviet Union. It is well known, the monks in the Danilov Monastery in Moscow and the Monastery of the Caves in Kiev began accepting the Roman Catholic Church's visiting delegates in their cloisters with disapproval. This mood found an echo in the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Demands are resounding to stop any sort of dialogue from occurring between the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. In this manner, it appears that the painstaking work of many years by bishops of both churches towards developing closer ecumenical and inter-ecclesiastical ties is being threatened.

Taking into consideration the dangerous development of the inter-ecclesiastical conflict in Western Ukraine, yet also confident of the fact that only good can overcome evil, the Republic Committee in defense of the believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church proposes the following points to the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches' leadership, the archbishops and the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church:

(1) To conduct a large scale mission of Christian compassion for donating spiritual and material help to Orthodox believers, who suffered as a result of the violence caused by religious extremists in Western Ukraine; that is, to widows and orphan children; to priests, who lost their place of services as a result of violent actions, as well as to members of their family; to those who are fugitives on account of religious reasons, irrespective of their faith and nationality.

The representatives from the associations of the Red Cross and the Half Month Society [Pivmisyatsya] can be included in this beneficent mission of compassion. We propose to make the motto of this mission—"Christian compassion is opposed to violence."

(2) Besides this, the Committee in defense of the believers' rights of Ukrainian Orthodox Church proposes to conduct a "Divine Service for peace" and to call for the believers of all confessions in Western Ukraine to sign a "Declaration against violence"—a document which would include a repudiation of all forms of violence and discrimination with which one side could engage in against the other. This document could be used to put an end to the [current] situation, to begin a

constructive dialogue and cooperation on a communal basis, as various forces not involved with the church are using the inter-ecclesiastical conflict, which has arisen in Western Ukraine, for their own purposes.

(3) The Committee in defense of the believers' rights of the Orthodox Ukrainian Church asks You, Your Holiness, and also the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, to take part in the creation of a permanent Ukrainian ecumenical "Fund of Christian Compassion and Enlightenment". This fund could occupy itself with beneficent activities and strengthening the sense of Christian moral values in Ukraine. "We believe that the Ukrainian brothers and sisters of the same blood, as well

as their religious leaders, and pastors can reach agreements, which would return them to the conditions they need to live a peaceful and calm life"—it was noted in a statement of the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate in regards to the occasion of the Catholics of the Eastern rite's departure from a four-party commission.

The Committee in defense of believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church shares this faith and hopes to gain the support of your Person, Your Holiness for its initiatives, which, in our view, will also find a positive response in the hearts of people of good will. With this said, allow us, Your Holiness, to express our profoundest respect.